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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
The core of this thesis is a study of the parliamentary electoral behaviour of a mid 
nineteenth century East Midiands town, namely Leicester.
Its format is a quantitative anaiysis based upon a large programme of nominal record 
linkage between the contemporary polibooks and censuses, from which statistically 
reliable evidence was drawn and ultimately presented to argue the case of the 
existence and extent of social class and political generational influences upon electoral 
choice in Leicester during a specific period in time.
Naturally, such an analysis of voting behaviour would not have been feasible without a 
full knowledge of the contemporary local (and to some extent the national) political 
scene and of the socio-economic milieu in which it developed. The same Is true when 
offering an interpretation of the anaiysis to the reader. Therefore a detailed account of 
Leicester's socio-economic and poiitical life, both somewhat prior to and during the 
period focused upon, is presented in the two chapters which immediately precede the 
quantitative analysis.
As a piece of historical research it was also important to survey the field and present a 
review of those published works which have shed previous light regarding social class 
and political generational influences upon electoral behaviour. This has been covered 
in length following the introductory first chapter of the thesis. But there is an important 
point to be stressed regarding the content of this review. The social class dimension of 
voting behaviour has been especialiy associated with the mid twentieth century. 
Therefore it was considered appropriate to devote some attention both to this period 
and to the intervening decades which separate it from the period which my own 
research has focused upon: i.e., the main purpose for deiving into mid nineteenth 
century social class influences was a quest for a precursor to a statistically proven 
(rather than an assumed) mid twentieth century phenomenon. Much the same 
reasoning lies behind the accompanying study of poiitical generation which therefore 
follows a similar approach.
C O N T E N T S
PAGES
MAP
Leicester in 1857 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
CHAPTER ONE
introduction to the Research -  Thesis Content 1-7
CHAPTER TWO
Review of Pubiished Works on English Eiectorai Behaviour Since 1832:
Possible Influences of Social Class and Political Generation 8-36
CHAPTER THREE
Leicester 1832-67: Local Government -  Industry -  Working Class Politics 37-66
CHAPTER FOUR
Leicester 1832-67: Parliamentary Politics 67-106
CHAPTER FIVE
I. Scheme of Analysis used in the Research-Record Linkage 107-116
//. Anaiysis ofVoting Behaviour in Leicester (1847-61) 117-136
CHAPTER SIX
Findings in the Research -  The Religious Dimension 137-155
BIBLIOGRAPHY
LIST OF TABLES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
Appendix 1A
Parliamentary Election Results: Leicester 1847-61.
Appendix IB
Specimen Data Sheet.
Appendix 2
Pollbook -  Census Linkage Levels.
Appendix 3
The Correlation Coefficient (j>
Appendix 4
Composition of Occupational Groupings
I C K l t  O f YARDS
Daa«> KJi 
A  Km m
l^ciU oU s-V
A All S^'m/t 0^  
rA«(Vw<vw 
C U \ U ^ » W J ï  
I l»v«^<êxw C ^ f f i
3 U f t i a c ^ p ^
U AWiû ttW i(\u rxk  0 J* AVrAy«jTA«rrA 
M C y .tfy » rY J t(a itr*  
\ i  5* V«<y«N>^AM/rA 
^  y  C **r^ 't (Tt»rri
I « K t fc lm W f L  tkklU 
lwA4b*< Atjrlw«i
u  yJtfAtnt C^m/tà 
S fn iti^ if Ouffr^
I l4<« C#Wf $
3
6 AWi#A#*/.^AuV7
P CtJItyttttf S.A#V
10 Wérméritt
11 3’ V j/w rW * OwrrA
rO CmukljCiiJ
4<v~i Am */73 A ^
7? A/r«w/A Cm/
Leicester ill 1 8 5 7 . Based on Spencer’s M a p
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Ch Chapter
EHR English Historical Review
GP General Practitioner
HJ Historical Journal
low Isle of Wight
JBS Journal of British Studies
JSS Journal of the Statistical Society
LG Leicester Chronicle
U  Leicester Journal
LM Leicestershire Mercury
MP Member of Parliament
P Page
No Number
RC Roman Catholic
RC Royle's Ciass
RV Rateable Value
Vol Volume
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction to the Research -  Thesis Content
English electoral behaviour and especialiy the influence upon it of social class has 
been of increasing interest to me since early childhood. Even prior to my sixth 
birthday, when residing in a working-class district east of Leicester’s Belgrave Road,
I found myself amongst a group of older children under the tutelage of a local Labour 
party activist, Mrs Minnie Townsend, chanting a well-know ditty in support of 'Mr 
Donovan' and in derision of his opponent, 'Taylor*. The historical facts suggest that 
this event occurred during the general election campaign of February 1950 when the 
sitting local Labour M.P., T. N. Donovan, was seeking re-election and was being 
opposed by the Conservative, H. A. Tayior. It later became apparent to me that the 
Labour party consistently held sway in the poorer parts of the city whilst the 
Conservatives were supreme in the more prestigious districts, such as Stoneygate 
and Evington in the south-eastern part of the city, and into the county. Yet as my 
political awareness sharpened, I perceived the Labour partisanship of my home 
district to be seemingiy accompanied by ignorance regarding political issues. It 
appeared that the locals' preference for Labour thus hinged not upon any rational 
choice between the contemporary policies of the two major political parties, but on a 
vague, established assumption that the Labour party was somehow the true 
representative of their interests: they were 'Labour* and that was the. beginning and 
the end of it! However, as the local council election results demonstrated, a 
significant minority of the ward's electorate voted Conservative. But I did observe 
that within my immediate locality known Conservative supporters were usualiy 
owner-occupiers, not employed in unionised industries, and often retired small- 
business people. Arguably these comprised the socially superior minority of the local 
population.
Further observations were made after moving into a west Leicester area, in 1968, 
which comprised an inter-war housing estate, owned by a private trust, and a
2postwar council estate. This district was thus more modern than my former, 
Victorian, Beigrave Road locality, but was socio-economicaily simiiar. Over the 
years since 19681 have become aware of certain trends -  one being the very marked 
reduction in the number of Labour election posters being displayed in front windows. 
Though especially a common sight along the trust-owned Halifax Drive during the 
general election campaigns of the 1970s this feature has since almost entirely 
vanished. Those who persist in the practice tend to be elderly. Concomitant with this 
trend has been a highly significant increase in the incidence of owner occupation, 
made possible by a decision of the trust to sell their properties both with vacant 
possession and to those sitting tenants willing to purchase, and by government 
legislation enabling council tenants to buy their homes. Yet no other change in the 
district is apparent. There have been no noticeable ethnic incursions nor any other 
social transformations. A possible implication is a concurrent local decline in support 
for the Labour party, but it would be hazardous to attempt to offer statistical evidence 
because the local ward has been subject to considerable boundary changes and 
property developments within other parts of it. However, taking the parliamentary 
constituency of West Leicester in its entirety, despite the undeniable support for 
Labour among the large Asian section of the electorate (who dû, incidentaiiy, display 
election posters), it has steadily shifted from being a safe, five-figure majority Labour 
seat to a highly marginal one during the past fifteen years. Perhaps this could be 
interpreted as a manifestation of generational change. The earlier decades saw the 
indigenous, working-class Leicester folk living in relatively cheap rented 
accommodation, voting Labour and advertising the fact. These have progressively 
given way to succeeding generations who, though occupying a broadly simiiar 
position within the socio-economic spectrum, prefer owner occupation and are 
relatively less committed to any political party. Rather they may act as discerning 
individuals in their électoral preferences: i.e. they choose the party deemed best for 
them as individuals rather than as a close-knit community or ciass. But the change 
may not be purely to the disadvantage of Labour: the by-election at Mid- 
Staffordshire early in 1990, which witnessed an enormous defection of traditional
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Conservative support to Labour, may well be symptomatic of a loosening of party 
ties. Whilst it is true that by-election 'shocks' have characterised the political scene 
since Orpington in 1962, massive swings of opinion have, until more recently, tended 
to benefit the smaller parties of the centre.
The content of the two previous paragraphs is, admittedly, largely impressionistic and 
not based on the quantitative techniques that typify the analyses presented in this 
thesis, which focus upon a period of which I can have had no personal experience. 
The purpose of its inclusion is to serve as an introduction -  to indicate that my overall 
perception of social class and political generational influences on electoral behaviour 
has not entirely developed from the conclusions of modern historical writers, political 
scientists and 'experts' within the mass-media, but that personal observations over 
many years have made a contribution.
A strong argument justifying the study of history is that it helps to explain the more 
recent past, the present and, possibly, to predict the pathway of future developments. 
It thus seemed appropriate that while reading the Open University course, D301, 
'Historical Sources and the Social Scientist', as an undergraduate in 1983 that I 
should choose to focus the project component of the course on historical psephology.
I examined the influences of social class and political generation on the parliamentary 
election of 1852 using a statistical approach based on the Leicester borough 
electorate. The outcome of that analysis suggested that the Leicester electorate of 
the mid nineteenth century provided fertile ground for an in-depth study and the 
research presented in the following chapters illustrates my attempt to produce such 
an in-depth study. However, I must stress that despite this tenuous link with a 
previous study all data and conclusions presented in this thesis are entirely anew.
Chapter Two comprises a survey of those published works on English electoral 
behaviour which have produced revelations on social class and age factors in 
accounting for who voted for whom. The social class dimension occupies the major
part of the chapter and this reflects the fact that this aspect of eiectorai behaviour has 
been the focus of considerabie attention on the part of psephoiogists and social 
historians. One characteristic of this section of Chapter Two is that much of it dwells 
upon periods later in time to the period upon which my own analyses are speciflcaily 
based, but that was fully realised at the time of its compilation. As a whole social 
class influences are discussed in terms of research carried out on three broad 
periods of time: the mid twentieth century, the period of the later Victorian/early 
twentieth century, and the mid nineteenth century. The reason for their ordering in 
this way can be explained. The mid twentieth century period is well nigh universally 
recognized as being an era when social class was the dominant determinant in 
eiectorai choice. Therefore, it seemed apt to focus on this period first: i.e. it was 
thought wise to initially establish, rather than to assume, the social ciass factor of the 
mid twentieth century before attempting to claim antecedents a century earlier. But 
the phenomenon becomes controversial when attempting to discover when, how and 
why it came to be so dominant. Thus the appropriate next step was to survey the 
findings of researchers on the late nineteenth/early twentieth century period. Here 
the pattern is less clear-cut: some perceiving social ciass to be a significant factor, 
others seeing religious affiliation as the major determinant. Finally it was imperative 
to survey the field contemporaneous with my own research -  the mid nineteenth 
century, in which the consensus of opinion rejects the existence of a pattern of social 
class-based voting along the lines featuring a century later and, arguably, during 
much of the intervening period. But the concept of social class is in itself a thorny 
topic and therefore some space has been given in Chapter Two to the issues 
confronting its study. The survey on influences of political generation, which forms 
the later section of the chapter has been presented in a simiiar format to that on 
social ciass: i.e. beginning with the findings of the mid twentieth century.
Any valid interpretations of analyses of eiectorai behaviour must necessarily be 
rooted in the events and developments of the political scene during the period under 
study. Few would disagree too that a mid nineteenth century électoral analysis must
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be set in its local context, although contemporary developments at national level 
should by no means be overlooked. Therefore two chapters have been compiled 
with this end in view. Though not mutually exclusive the scrutiny of the political scene 
has been set in a two-chapter structure partly to avoid an undue, lengthy, single 
chapter, and partly to ease reading and comprehension of the wealth of information 
presented.
The second of these two chapters (Chapter Four) gives an account of the local 
political developments at parliamentary constituency level. I felt this necessarily 
entailed giving some attention to events during the decade and a half prior to the first 
(1847) of the five elections analysed in subsequent chapters chiefly because 1832 
was an important landmark in the historical development of parliamentary politics. 
But considerable attention has been given to the 1847-61 period, where I have 
sought to enable the reader to gain a powerful insight into what seems to have been 
an ebullient period in Leicester's parliamentary political history. To this end I have 
made much use of important primary sources -  the three contemporary local 
newspapers. These provided invaluable information to buttress the account of the 
local historical developments, much of which had been gleaned from the pages of 
'Victoria Histories'. References to published works are also made at appropriate 
points in the text.
Chapter Three concentrates on three aspects of the mid nineteenth century Leicester 
scene: local government, industry and working-class politics. The first focuses on 
the rise to ascendancy of the, largely nonconformist. Liberals in the key positions of 
local political power: the new town council provided under the terms of the Whig 
government Act of 1835, the Poor Law board of guardians, and the parish vestries. 
The second looks especially into the mixed fortunes of Leicester's contemporary 
staple industry -  the hosiery trade -  with its implications for the electoral process. 
The final section is given to an outline of specifically working-class developments 
within the borough: the early moves in the field of unionisation and the rise to
6prominence of Chartism during the later 1830s and 1840s. But though much of the 
content of Chapter Three concentrates on the period preceding the first of the series 
of analysed elections (1847) this was primarily an outcome of the developments 
within Leicester’s political scene at the time and owes little to the selection of source 
material. It is not simply an effect of the switch in source material from A. T. 
Patterson's 'Radical Leicester' (which terminates at 1850) to the local press (1847 -  
61). As indicated at the dose of Chapter Three there seems to have been a definite 
shift of the main theatre of poiitical activity, during the late 1840s, from the local 
authority level to the parliamentary sphere of Leicester's political life. During the 
1830s and 1840s the local Liberals were endeavouring to secure control of the key 
positions in the borough's authority structure. This having been largely achieved by 
the late 1840s the emphasis was from that time on centred more on the issues of 
franchise reform and disestablishment, which lay beyond the scope of local 
government. Thus the parliamentary representative sphere then became the major 
theatre for the conflicts which are detailed in Chapter Four.
Chapter Five comprises two main sections. The first focuses upon the scheme of 
analysis used in the research. A discussion is presented on the uses of polibooks in 
attempting to gain insight into the électoral patterns of the mid nineteenth century, 
indicating their advantages and shortcomings, both generally and within the specific 
confines of the facts I was attempting to elucidate. In turn attention is given to other 
numerical sources necessary for an analysis of the kind presented in this thesis; i.e. 
the électoral registers and the census enumerators' books. The second section of 
Chapter Five is a presentation of the analyses conducted on the above source 
material. It will be apparent to the reader that the whole system is based on the 
extensive use of quantitative techniques, and that considerable use has been made 
of the correlation coefficient. Thus the analytical approach is scientific and is 
intended to avoid the strong element of impressionism which, the historical social 
scientists claim, characterises so much social history. But in addition this section of 
Chapter Five does feature some discussion on the findings of the quantitative
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analyses as they emerge and prepares the ground for a further, thoroughgoing 
investigation into the outcome of the research in Chapter Six.
The concluding chapter of the thesis (Chapter Six) pulls together the threads of the 
research. But despite an appropriately strong emphasis on the influences of social 
class and political generation on the voting pattern of mid nineteenth century 
Leicester the chapter also includes an investigation into the contemporaneous 
influence of religion in order to achieve a measure of balance.
Overall the quantitative aspect of the research is not all-encompassing. Although a 
considerable wealth of data was gathered the information drawn from it and 
presented in Chapter Five is, and had to be, selective. No electronic aids beyond the 
pocket calculator were employed in the computations. The original data could thus 
be subject to considerable further investigation should the occasion arise.
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CHAPTERTWO
Review of Published Works on English Electoral Behaviour Since 1832: 
Possible Influences of Social Class and Political Generation
In their research on English électoral behaviour during 1963 D. Butler and D. Stokes 
found that about 68% of their questionnaire respondents gave evidence of seeing 
politics as the representation of ciass interests: and, in agreement with pioneering 
post-war studies by other political scientists, they drew the conclusion that party 
allegiance (Labour/Conservative) followed social class lines more strongly in Britain 
than elsewhere in the English-speaking world, where social data are avaiiabiel. 
However, the dictum of Peter Pulzer2; that 'class is the basis of British party politics; 
all else is embellishment and detail': may overstate the case, indeed, David Feldman 
has pointed out that describing British électoral sociology as formed by ciass 
alignments appears a very partial description and he stresses that the Labour 
successes of 1945 and 1966 necessitated the party making inroads among the 
middle classes. Thus the Labour successes depended on the disruption of ciass 
alignments, at least in part. Moreover working-class support for the Conservative 
party must be acknowledged: even as late as the 1930s about one third of the 
working-class electorate voted Conservative). Nevertheless this is not to deny the 
consensus of opinion which recognizes the salience of ciass in the mid twentieth 
century électoral scene. But the consensus exists alongside a widely held view that 
eiectorai cleavage along social ciass lines had not always delineated party support in 
British political life. However, the question as to when and how the transformation 
took place has, according to K. D. Waid, become the foremost issue in research on 
British political development4.
1. Butler and Stokes, pp67-94.2. Putzer.pIOZ 3 . .  Feldman, pp312-324.
4. WaW,p202.
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The 'traditional' school of thought, promoted by such as G. M Trevelyan, claimed the 
effects of the First World War engendered a sharp discontinuity between the pre-war 
and post-war bases of eiectorai cleavage, concomitant with the rise of the Labour 
patty to the fore of British politics in the 1922 general election. They believed that the 
decreasing salience of the religious controversy, which had structured the Victorian 
alignment, brought a loosening of traditional party links within the electorate, whilst 
extension of the franchise in 1918 produced a large number of voters, uninterested in 
sectarian politics and highly susceptible to a Labour party which emphasized 
working-class interests, in response the Conservative party became increasingly the 
agent of middle-ciass interests. This realignment synchronized the party system with 
the social structure and thereby heralded a new system which essentially 
represented social ciass conflicts.
This 'traditional' interpretation presupposed the salience of an électoral cleavage 
along religious lines before 1918 -  a feature that had long been widely recognized. 
In particular there was a considerabie affinity between the adherents of the 
Established Church and the Conservative party (as epitomized in Macaulay's famous 
gibe that the state Church was 'the Tory party at prayer'), just as there was a 
concomitant affinity between old dissent and the Liberal party. The role of religion in 
this case was, at least to some extent, that of the 'interest group' phenomenon: i.e. as 
a party becomes the traditional champion of a particular denomination the connection 
between the two tends to strengthen by the development of shared values. Indeed 
throughout the century preceding 1918 there was a constant theme of Conservative 
opposition to Whig/Liberal efforts to remove nonconformist disabilities: the Whig 
initiative to repeal the Test and Corporations Act in 1828, Lord Melbourne's 
legalisation of non-Anglican marriage rites in the 1830s, the constant Whig/Liberal 
opposition to Church rates, the Liberals' success in opening the universities to
5. m p p 2 0 2 -2 1 9 .
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dissenters, Liberal sympathy towards nonconformist attacks on the Established 
Church, education and entertainment. Liberal support for Welsh disestablishment in 
1895, Liberal opposition to the 1902 Education Act -  which seemingiy favoured 
Anglican influence in the schools. Liberal support for temperance and opposition to 
the pro-church House of Lords. On the Conservative's side there was the Anglican 
lobby in the style of the 'Primrose League', and support was given to the drink trade 
against Liberal temperance influences.
But the religious cleavage was not entirely a church/chapei conflict. Roman 
Catholics, though in terms of education, drink and Sabbatarian outlooks, were more 
akin to Conservatism, a strong and probably decisive countercurrent wrought by the 
Irish issue (especialiy after the first home rule controversy in 1886) cemented, albeit 
precariously, a R.C./Liberal alliance, in this case the phenomenon of religion as a 
'belief system', i.e. the Catholic emphasis on individual sin and personal salvation, 
which in consequence discouraged attempts to solve social problems through 
collective action, was overborne by the Irish ethnicity influence of the majority of 
Roman Catholics residing in England, Thus Irish Catholics voted as Irishmen first 
and as Catholics second. However, in terms of overall électoral behaviour, since 
R.C.S were not enfranchised in proportion to their numbers a not uncommon outcome 
was an increase in support for the Conservatives due to an anti Irish/Cathoiic 
backlash among protestant voters. P. F. Clarke observed this pattern in his research 
on Oldham and on Lancashire in general wherein the Irish resided in large numbers?.
In contrast to the 'traditionalists' the 'revisionists', like P. F. Clarke, Henry Peiiing, and 
N. Biewitt et ai, leaning towards a greater reliance on quantitative evidence and 
critical of the 'impressionistic' conclusions previously drawn, disagreed on the nature 
and timing of the realignment. Rather they perceived the transformation of the
6. Ibid, pp55-66. 7. Clarke, pp46-47.
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cleavage to have predated World War One-decisive even as early as 1885 when the 
bulk of enfranchised workers were grouped under the Liberal banner. They claimed 
the cleavage shift from religion to ciass was a separate process from the 
Labour/Liberal displacement, which occurred through a combination of mistakes and 
bad luck on the part of the Liberals).
'Revisionist views are thus more akin to the general ciass interpretation -  that the 
process of social differentiation by parties began after 1832. The Conservatives 
represented land, the traditional source of influence in British government, against the 
ambitions of the emerging industrial capitalists, whose claims were championed by 
the Whigs and their successors, the Liberals. (However, this is undoubtedly a much 
over-simplified generalisation, for it overlooks the fact that the Whigs too were major 
landowners whilst Peel had considerabie sympathy with the industrial interest). But 
this cleavage overlapped city/county and church/dissent divisions, therefore class 
was only one element in the formation of party alignments. Subsequent extensions 
to the franchise in 1867 and 1884 led to the consolidation of land and capital in the 
Conservative party, and the emergence of the Liberals as champions of the working- 
class. Although J. 8. Mill professed to see this happening in the 1830s, most 
accounts tie the clarification of class alignments to Gladstone's increasing radicalism 
over the Irish issue: i.e. the Irish Land Acts inspired fears concerning the will of the 
Liberals to resist further attacks on property. Consequently the Whiggish Liberals 
joined the Conservatives; the defection of Joseph Chamberlain being an exception to 
the rule. The remainder of the Liberal party, shorn of its middie-class base, became 
more identified with working-class interests from 1886 onwards: eg. the 'Newcastle 
Programme' of 1892 and the Liberal inheritance taxes of 1892-5. The defeats of 
1895 and 1900 were ascribed to working-class Imperialism and Liberal reluctance to 
go far enough to meet working-class grievances. Between 1906 and 1914 the
8. Wald,pp203-205.
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Liberals laid the groundwork for the modern welfare state, extended the recognition of 
trade-union rights, and promoted land taxes in their 1909 budget. These moves 
were accompanied by the inteiiectual approach of 'New Liberalism' by authors such 
as J. A. Hobson and disseminated through the 'Manchester Guardian', thereby 
indicating that the party was well equipped as a progressive force in British politics 
before 19149.
Actually, perceiving the political scene in terms of ciass during the period of the Third 
Reform Act (1884-1918) was not lost on its contemporaries. Sir William Harcourt 
claimed in 1894 that the innovation of household suffrage had brought about a rapidly 
expanding horizontal division of the parties, whilst Gladstone observed, during the 
1886 home rule crisis, that the masses had aligned with the Liberals against the 
'classes' and their Conservative spokesmen. Also Conservative opponents of 
Disraeli's 'Tory democrac/ perceived the development of universal manhood suffrage 
as a threat to their very survival as a major political force, in fact belief was 
widespread that a solid majority of the enfranchised working-class supported the 
Liberals or their Labour allies; an impression which was confirmed by the Liberal 
preponderance in industrial and urban parliamentary constituencies. Friedrich Engels 
agreed that the English working-class had, since its enfranchisement, become the 
'tail of the great Liberal party'. Even the 'traditionalisf Trevelyan gave further 
currency to the assumption that the pre-war working-class had been solidly attached 
to the Liberal party when he contended, in 1922, that the World War had brought 
about a wholesale transfer of the working-class vote from Liberal to Labour. In 1895 
the American scholar, E. Porrit, called attention to the increasing significance of 
social stratification in British politics, with the English middle-ciass rapidly becoming 
Conservative. Local observers drew simiiar conclusions: eg., the Wolverhampton 
Liberals saw the west constituency becoming an extension of 'viiiadom', whilst their
ft lbid,pp27-32.
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most reliable electoral support was located in the industrial districts of the southern 
and eastern parliamentary divisions. In Brighton the 'radical working-man' was the 
acknowledged backbone of 1894 Liberalism, who rejected even Conservative 
working-men candidates, thereby underscoring the association between the 
working-class voter and Liberal partisanship! 0. Peter Puizer claimed that the 
positive correlation between declining social status and increase in support for the 
party of the left had been particularly marked since the Second Reform Act of 
186711.
Regarding systematic analysis, Henry Peiiing presented data for constituencies in the 
London area using published census data on the number of female domestic 
servants per 100 households in three categories of constituencies: those 
predominantly middle-class, those mixed and those predominantly working-class. 
He found that the Conservative vote increased steadily with increase in servants in all 
eight general elections between 1885 and 1910. Peiiing concluded that class 
counted more than any other factor in London and thought that the class/party 
relationship probably held throughout the country.
Paul Thompson attempted to estimate the actual working-class and middle-class 
share of the London electorate, relying on a census of street blocks conducted by the 
school board visitors in 1889 and published in Charles Booth's survey, Apportioning 
each block to its appropriate parliamentary constituency, Thompson estimated the 
working-class and middle-class electorates by taking fractions of the respective 
class populations in the electoral districts. The constituencies were then collapsed 
into five groups ranging from 75% middle-class to 52.5% middle-class (1885 -  
1910). In all general elections the Liberal vote declined with the increased 
concentration of middle-class electors.
10. lb}d,pp20-24. 11. Puizer, p102.
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James Cornford hypothesized that the adoption of single-member constituencies in 
1885, which concentrated the voters into socially homogeneous electoral districts, 
facilitated the development of an electoral cleavage along class lines. He then 
studied the relationship between capita assessed valuation (a means of constituency 
wealth) and the Conservative share of the vote in 1885 London. Cornford found a 
strong positive correlation coefficient of +0.74, which suggested that class was 
becoming the most important single factor in deciding political allegiance. Like 
Peiiing, Cornford believed that London was the exemplar of a national trend which by 
comparison with the 1867-1884 period the class alignment had become the 
dominant factor, although he appears to have acknowledged its growing importance 
from 1868 onwards.
Using Polling's methods, Neal Blewett obtained similar results for all urban English 
constituencies but, according to Wald, his research involved impressionistic social 
descriptions from the local press and a certain degree of guesswork where borough 
boundaries did not correspond closely with constituencies!2.
P. F. Clarke dated the emergence of economic issues associated with ciass politics 
from the onset of the Second Reform Act period (1867+), and thereby saw the 1886 
home rule split as concealing electoral continuity. Though he was wary of 
interpreting the class-based London voting as indicative of a national trend, Clarke's 
own research in Lancashire demonstrated a decline in Conservative working-class 
support from the very end of the nineteenth century onwards in the cotton regions 
which, partly on account of a strong Anglican-protestant tradition, had previously 
gravitated towards Conservatism to a marked extent during the decades after the mid 
century. Clarke thus argued that Lancashire is the clearest area for such a transition
12. Wald,pp32-35.
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from religion to welfare as the core of eiectorai politics, rather than areas such as 
Yorkshire or Wales where Liberal support was already solid and ciass therefore did 
not show up directly as a party changel 3.
In a fairly recent publication (1983) Kenneth D. Waid offered a critique of analyses 
and theories of voter alignment, and discussed his own research on the period 1885- 
1910. Whilst acknowledging that 'revisionist" studies, by indicating continuity between 
pre and post 1918, had brought an influential corrective to the 'traditional' accounts 
that tended to portray the pre 1918 period as a matter of ancient religious conflicts 
and non-ciass influenced elections, Wald was somewhat sceptical of some of the 
methods used and the conclusions drawn from them. Like P. F. Clarke, Waid 
suggested that London may be atypical, partly because 'immigration' from without 
meant that London lacked the strong community life usually associated with religiosity 
(and particularly with nonconformity), and partly because London was unusually 
residentiaiiy segregated by social class. Both these features would have produced a 
fertile environment for the development of class-based politics. Employing a 
modification of the survey correspondents technique of Robert Alford, Waid indicated 
that the trend showed London class voting increased over the entire period, but the 
provinces bore the nature of a U-shaped curve, thereby demonstrating that London 
voting could not be generalised beyond the south-east. Furthermore Waid criticized 
the hasty conclusions concerning the primacy of ciass because the studies did not 
demonstrate that the class/party index was strong, nor did they consider the effect of 
other variables. Researching further on the London constituencies using a variety of 
social variables, such as Felling's servants index, Wald compared the 1885-1910 
figures with both his own and Miller's data for the 1955-70 period. Though he 
admitted to the crudity of the procedures, Wald stressed that the results confirmed 
that ciass alignment for the 1885 period did not approach the level evident in 1955-
13. Clarke, p51.
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70. By modern standards class had very little impact on the vote. Moreover, use of a 
wealth index in conjunction with local election results (1885-1910) in Bradford, 
Brighton, Norwich, Reading and Wolverhampton did not convince Waid of the 
existence of a class cleavage before World War One, although he conceded that 
more research was still needed#. This of course implies that no social class 
cleavage along electoral lines would have existed during the mid nineteenth century.
However, Wald did draw attention to a matter of greater importance in assessing 
électoral behaviour -  the definition of 'ciass'15. Considerable confusion regarding the 
identity of relevant class groupings has seemingiy been a perennial shortcoming 
among historical writers. The results of analyses on class voting depend 
considerably on where one draws the line between the middie-ciass and the 
working-class. It appears most studies have lent more or less towards the Weberian 
concept of ciass: i.e. class defined in economic terms (with or without 
'consciousness'): and thus the unwary are inclined to make an arbitrary dividing line 
from a continuous spectrum of social variation, which may well not relate to the reality 
of the social structure. As Norman McCord has stressed, there is a need for a clear 
demonstration of the existence of discontinuities in the social spectrum which indicate 
a significantly different middie-ciass and working-class immediately on either side of 
such a defined breaking point. Indeed McCord was highly critical of the vagueness 
concerning the concept of ciass employed recently in works by such notable 
historians as E. Hobsbawn, Gareth S. Jones, and Dorothy Thompson#. But it is not 
just a question of the line of demarcation. Even when the working-class is 
appropriately identified divisions within it, depending to a great extent on levels of 
organisation, could have affected their political proclivities. As Wald discovered the 
organised (trade-union) workers were the most pro-Uberai/Labour, followed by other 
manual and industrial workers, whilst the unskilled manual workers, and the general
14. Wald, pp37-52. 15. Ibid,p26. 16. McCord, (1935), pp410-419.
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and non-agricultural labourers were more disposed to support the 
Conservative/Liberal Unionist party! 7. The key to a vaiid interpretation of class 
voting therefore lies in establishing a clear understanding of the socio-economic 
framework of the locaiity under study. This is especially vital for the mid nineteenth 
century when socio-economic hierarchies, like their poiitics, were much more 
locaiised than they eventually became.
Despite Waid's doubts regarding the pre-1918 ciass alignment he was not convinced 
by the widely supposed impact of religion on mass eiectorai behaviour. Seemingly, 
systematic anaiysis of denominational influence has received iittle attention from 
scholars -  most having mereiy inferred its impact from iilustrative data. From their 
1963 sampie survey of an eideriy cohort Butier and Stokes found religious 
denomination more cohesive than class prior to 1918, thereby underscoring the 
claim, made in 1910, by Labour pioneer Keir Hardie that the mobilisation of the 
working-class on an economic basis was frustrated by church/chapel divisions. 
Thereafter the reiigious factor gave way progressively to the class factor. Butler and 
Stokes' findings thus confirmed the predictions based on the 'traditionai' interpretation 
of Engiish politics under the Third Reform Act, and pose a major challenge to the 
class interpretation. However Wald was convinced neither by the precise forms of 
analysis nor by the conciusions drawn. Butler and Stokes based their anaiysis on 
contemporary (1963) rather than pre 1918 party ailegiance, and erstwhiie- 
unenfranchised women were aiso inciuded in their survey, which Wald believed 
wouid have produced a bias aiong religious lines. Waid himseif presented data on 
the reiationship between ciass, reiigion and first party preference for maie 
respondents in the pre 1918 cohort, and his figures contradicted the reiigious 
interpretation of the pre 1918 party system. Though reiigious loyalties did exercise 
some infiuence, the paramount iine of political division clearly ran between the social
17. Wald,pp137-8.
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classes: i.e. the middle-ciass of whatever reiigion mainly identified with the 
Conservatives, and the working-class of whatever reiigion mainly identified with the 
anti-Conservative parties. Thus on this basis class alignment dates well before 
1918. But, as Wald stressed, the elderly 1963 respondents would have been 
relatively inexperienced voters before 1918 and therefore were an unreliable source 
from which to generalize to the larger population! 8.
Researching still further Wald embarked on a programme of ecological analysis: i.e. 
an attempt to relate eiectorai behaviour to the characteristics of the environment. He 
analysed the eight general elections between 1891 and 1911 in several 
constituencies, and in summary found a positive reiationship between the proportion 
of Anglican clergy and the Conservative/Liberal Unionist vote, and a more consistent 
and stronger negative correlation between that party and the nonconformist 
presence. He also found the Unionist vote declined with increase in proportion of 
industrial workers, while, like P. F. Clarke, he attributed the positive reiationship 
between the Roman Catholic presence and the Unionist vote to a low rate of R.C. 
enfranchisement coupled with local anti-R.C. sentiments on the part of working- 
class protestants! 9.
But though he believed his data established a more reliable picture of the electoral 
scene than did M. Kinnear in his The British Voter* (who nevertheless drew a similar 
conclusion of the importance of the religious variable in the 1910 election), Waid 
emphasized that the religion of an individual or group can act as a surrogate for some 
other form of social conflict. Thus though the poiitical struggle appears to involve 
religious issues, reiigion may be mereiy an idiom for expressing conflicts that have 
their bases in social, economic or ethnic differences. Hence the stratification of the 
secular order often largely mirrored that of the spiritual order. A case in point is the
18. . lbid,pp53-70. 19. Ibid,pp74-91.
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often-noted importance of working-ciass nonconformity and religiosity in the rise of 
popular socialism. This has been dismissed as mereiy a culturally conditional mode 
of expression. Chapels served as training corps for young socialists because they 
were the only organisational models available to the working-class. In this case to 
treat religion as the causal factor is to miss the class cleavage which really inspired 
the drive for social change. But this may be an example of twentieth century secular 
bias which refuses to take religion seriously. However, Wald's final conclusion on his 
ecological analysis is that during the 1885-1918 period reiigion had a much stronger 
impact than social class on electoral behaviour. The power of the religious variable 
to explain the division of the vote persisted even in the face of controls for social class 
and regionalism, and was robust enough to cast doubt on the notion that it was 
simply a surrogate for social disadvantage. His results contrast with data of the same 
kind gathered for the 1918-29 period by Miller, whose class measures exceeded the 
religious variable in its effect on the Conservative vote. Waid's conclusion is thus 
akin to the 'traditional' view of eiectorai cleavage. But he went further to suggest the 
decline of the religious dimension was a consequence of the 1870 Education Act, 
which, on the side of nonconformity, decreased the prominence of religious 
instruction in the state schools, and thereby in time weakened the appeal of a Liberal 
party which for decades had been the political wing of puritan nonconformity. The 
outcome being that ciass became increasingly the only divisive factor left, and the 
Labour party was perceived as the most suitable vehicle for the pursuance of class 
politics. This theory is in accordance with the conclusion drawn by Richard Rose: i.e. 
that ciass is the basis on which persons divide politicaiiy only when all other 
differences, such as national, reiigious and racial, are exhausted. But working-class 
Conservatism survived because the Anglican schools remained independent of the 
boards and were thus not freed from the non-puritan outlook associated with the 
Church and the Conservative party20. This phenomenon was also observed by P. F.
20. lb}d,pp207-254.
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Clarke, who produced statistical evidence to demonstrate a close association 
between the proportion of children in voluntary schools and the Conservative vote in 
1886 and 189521. Moreover the 1902 Education Act, although re-awakening the 
question of religion and education and thereby making it an important issue in the 
1906 générai election, did not alter the situation in the long term. The voluntary 
schools were still able to give denominational instruction.
So, if overall the influence of social class is deemed beyond dispute for the post 1918 
period, but debatable for the 1867-1918 period, what about the period of the First 
Reform Act (1832-67)? J. R. Vincent maintained that although there was a weak, 
but general and detectable, form of class between the higher and lower sections of 
the socio-economic stratum, he rejected the use of 'class' in the Weberian sense of 
the term, on the grounds that it did not correspond to any contemporary feeling 
(although Max Weber himself did not make consciousness a necessary condition for 
the existence of class in economic terms). He also rejected a Marxist explanation on 
the grounds that mid Victorian radicalism was not generated by the existence of a 
propertyless proletariat or capitalist modes of production. For Vincent political society 
was still essentially pre-industrial. In the main no group was linked to another by the 
cash nexus, or by relations arising from the means of production in any 
straightforward way. The characteristic relationship was that of vendor and customer 
rather than employer and employee. Thus economic conflicts over the material 
benefits of production, necessary for Marxian class conflict, were insignificant. He did 
concede that acute class differences between masters and men could arise, as at 
Oldham in 1852 and 1865, but these were short-lived and in general a strong unity 
existed between them -  as was demonstrated at Norwich (1830), where the textile 
employees voted Liberal in just about the same proportion as their employers. 
Moreover even when differences arose, the masters were still to the left of the other
21. Clarke, p46.
21
sections of the rich and influential. It was not until 1868, Vincent pointed out, that the 
voting patterns of some groups of railwaymen and labourers began to indicate a truly 
industrial pattern22.
However, as P. F. Clarke argued, the working-class were almost entirely outside the 
electoral system and therefore could have had no direct electoral effect (though this 
is not to deny that they could exert pressure on those who had the vote), even if class 
was particularly salient for the working-men before 186723. Certainly E. P. 
Thompson believed that working-ciass consciousness had featured since the 1780- 
1832 period24, and, although he has been criticised by such historians as Craig 
Calhoun, who considered his notions too simplistic by failing to distinguish the basis 
of the working-ciass consciousness of the factory system from that of the 
contemporary non-factory artisans25, the rise of Chartism in the 1840s was a sign 
that such a class consciousness could exist, even though it was not a classic form of 
Marxian ciass conflict. But P. F. Clarke suggested it is possible to argue that the 
1832 Reform Act defined a conscious working-ciass, so that the line was drawn in 
social consciousness by the franchise qualification. Therefore the middle-class was 
defined as those who gained the franchise in 1832. This supposition seemed to have 
been acknowledged during the debates on the Second Reform bill (1867). A. V. 
Dicey thought that the class consciousness of the working-men was due to them 
being treated as a separate class (i.e. by exclusion from the franchise), and the 
remedy lay in redressing the franchise. But as Clarke indicated, it was one thing to 
suggest that working-class consciousness fed upon political exclusion and another to 
infer that reform was a safe remedy. Indeed the belief that the politics of working­
men must take a socialistic form and lead to the rule of the uneducated, seizure of 
the property of the rich, and ruinous class legislation, lay behind the opposition of 
Robert Lowe and Lord Cranborne to the 1867 Reform bill. However, Gallagher has
22. Vincent (1967), pZ8. 23. Clarke, pp42-43. 24. Thompson, ppl 2-25.
25. Calhoun, p20.
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claimed that Lowe's opposition was based on utilitarian principles: i.e. that no radical 
change should even be contemplated unless it could be shown to be necessary in 
order to produce social peace, or a more stable regime, or a better House of 
Commons, and Lowe thought no such changes were necessary26. Nevertheless 
most other Liberals believed that the growth in education and increasing 
respectability of the skilled working-class made it safe and sensible to extend the 
franchise to them27. As Harold Perkin put it, the reformers believed the working- 
class to have accepted so much of the entrepreneurial ideal of a class society based 
on capital and competition as to be trusted not to use their voting power to undermine 
it28. Furthermore, Disraeli detected a Conservative working class further down the 
social side.
However, Vincent did accept that voting had a distinct social base, which was 
explicable in terms of Half Dahrendorf's interpretation of class;29 i.e. a conflict 
between two groups ('operational collectivities' as Vincent termed them), not 
necessarily economic in basis, but always Imbued with consciousness. Although 
Vincent's theorizing was very intricate and sociological in form, perhaps at a risk of 
oversimplification it can be viewed at a more concrete level as a mid-nineteenth 
century conflict, operating a national level, between the rural/landowning/church class 
and the urban/bourgeois/nonconformist class. The former aiming to prevent changes 
in the structure of the political order, the latter determined to achieve changes, with 
both sides fully conscious of what they were trying to do. The urban/rurai cleavage 
was especially salient in the East Midlands, where the manufacturers were primarily 
conscious of being in conflict with the great landowners of the surrounding 
countryside, and a similar situation typified the politics of Banbury. The anti-Corn 
Law agitation can doubtless be cited as an example of such conflict. But, although 
that struggle seems ostensibly economic, McCord stressed that the men in control of
26. Gallagher, p148. 27. Clarke, pp34-35. 28. Perkin, p319.
29. Vincent (1967), PP2S-30.
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the League were not moved solely by selfish economic motives, but also from an 
idealistic view of society30. These two classes formed important sections (though 
not the whole) of the Conservative and Liberal-radical parties respectively, although 
Vincent indicated that the division of voting along these 'class lines' was considerably 
less rigid than in the class divisions of the mid twentieth century: i.e. Liberal 
landowners and Tory craftsmen were produced in numbers, even though a majority 
of neither was ever secured. The towns thus were essentially Liberal, with their 
businessmen, shopkeepers and craftsmen united by a common social ethic and 
culture. The Conservative minority within the towns were associated in matters of 
business with the mainly Tory landed ruling class and were therefore rural intrusions 
from the Tory countryside and voted accordingly. An example are the lawyers. Being 
dependent on rural raw material the lawyers in Wakefield and Norwich were poiiticaily 
much further to the right of the upper-ciass in general there. It was probably similar 
in the case of wine merchants, who had an important rural clientele, but impossible 
to determine the extent to which customer influence swayed the political preferences 
of such a group. Nevertheless, Vincent did believe that at parliamentary level there 
was little to distinguish (socially) between Liberal and Conservative MPs31.
Vincent did perceive an anomalous pattern of Conservative voting among the 
labourers in the towns, thereby giving some credence to Disraeli's idea of an 
untapped Tory stratum lying beneath middle-class radicalism. Vincent attributed this 
phenomenon partly to their lack of literacy and leisure, which were necessary to the 
development of a radical political consciousness, and partly to their occasional 
competition with the radical elite immediately above them: whence ultimately their 
Toryism hardened into a deep-rooted habit32. However, from his study of Bury, 
Patrick Joyce repudiated the suggestion that popular Toryism was the preserve of a 
'iumpenproietariat'33.
30. McCord (1968), p30. 31. Vincent (1967), p15. 32. Ibid,p17.
33. Joyce, p211.
24
As Heyck34 quite rightly observed, Vincent did tend to make assertions without any 
attempt to follow them up with statistical analysis. This was notably the case in his 
'Pollbooks: How Victorians Voted', in which he seems to have only made selective 
references to the pollbooks where convenient to back up his pre-established, albeit 
highly sophisticated, notions of electoral behaviour. For example he appears 
convinced that, with the possible exception of distinctly vertical hierarchical groups 
such as 'clergy' and 'officers', the occupational pattern of voting, over a wide range of 
crafts and manufacturers, was, due to their objective economic homogeneity, 
fundamentally homogeneous regardless of socio-economic status within the 
occupation. He focused on shoemakers, seeing the divergence between rich and 
poor shoemakers, in terms of both wealth and politics, as marginal compared to the 
difference between shoemakers in general and 'gentlemen' in general. Likewise he 
did not see the High Street grocers as having any overall effect on the voting 
behaviour of grocers in general. This point brings home the limitations in using 
pollbooks alone to determine the socio-economic status of individuals. As T. J. 
Nossiter35 commented it would clearly be beneficial to attempt a pollbook/census 
linkage to determine if significant variations occurred, which Vincent appears to admit 
and deny at one and the same time. Though Vincent generally doubted the value of 
the census in providing evidence, he admitted that Leicester numbered among the 
exceptions wherein confident distinctions, say between employer and employed, 
could be made. He was probably unwise to refer to 'gentlemen in general' for 
pollbook/census linkages do indicate that the pollbook occupation of 'gentleman' does 
not necessarily entail membership of the 'gentry' as it often does in the colloquial 
sense of the term. Also Vincent seemed to display a certain arbitrariness in 
identifying the bulk of the enfranchised working-class as hand workers, such as 
tailors and shoemakers, whom he agreed did not differ in terms of wealth from the
34. Heyck,p71. 35. Nossiter, p176.
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middle-class shopkeepers, but, more to the point, are not always readily 
distinguishable from those engaged in the retail trade36. Furthermore he asserted 
that few textile workers were enfranchised before 186837. He presumably had never 
heard of the framework-knitters, whom not only formed an important section of the 
mid nineteenth century Leicester electorate, but are readily distinguishable from the 
middle-class retailers.
T. J. Nossiter, in his study of the North-East (1832-74), made a distinction between 
the Whig and radical sections of the Liberal party, and concluded that the social basis 
of radicalism was the 'shopocracy': i.e. the retailers, especially those engaged in the 
food and clothing trades, who had the ability, motivation and opportunity to play an 
organisational role in radical politics, but whom have been dismissed by labour 
historians as petty bourgeois, and by 'aristocratic' historians as small fry. He 
suggested that these retailers, owning little more than the product of their own labour, 
were actually or potentially members of the proletariat, and that their marginality 
within the social-class structure heightened their political consciousness. Moreover 
the shopkeeper, unlike the craftsman, was primarily concerned with sale rather than 
making of goods. Therefore his job called for a range of skills rather than one 
specific one, and his orientation was to the customer, not the craft. Thus his special 
ability to handle customers and commercial travellers, often a middle-class and 
upper middle-class clientele, and his clerical and organisational ability gave him the 
necessary expertise to lead the radical movement. The shopocracy were 
nevertheless supported by the artisans38.
Election results in the North-East indicated a marked difference in social class 
between the ratepayer-radical vote and the Whig vote. In Tyneside (1860) and 
subsequently confirmed in the study of Gateshead (1852) the radicals received nearly
36. Vincent (1967), pp6-9. 37. Vincent (1976), p81. 38. Nossiter, ppl44-147.
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two-thirds of their votes from the retailers, whilst the Whigs were predominantly 
supported by the upper and professional classes. In contrast the Conservatives were 
more nearly representative of the electorate as a whole, despite a tendency to draw 
somewhat more support from the upper-classes, the older free trades, the Church 
and the shipping interest. Nossiter did add, however, that the better-off varied in 
their support between the Whigs and Conservatives from city to city. The 
enfranchised working-class, delineated by Nossiter as freemen voters as against the 
lower middle-class £10 householders, in the 1832 Newcastle election appeared to 
have given markedly less support to the ratepayer-radicals. This feature was 
coupled with the scant support given to the working-class Northern Reform Union 
candidate, P. A. Taylor (later M.P. for Leicester). Nossiter deemed this to have been 
the outcome of the little part played by the labour aristocracy in electoral radicalism, 
which was itself due to a lack of working-class facilities among what was anyway a 
largely unenfranchised class. But he also noted that there was much less basis for a 
class war between capital and labour at the polls than for a status struggle between 
the lower and upper middle-class, although he does not explain clearly why39.
But although occupation was the major determinant of voting behaviour in the 
reformed electorate, Nossiter highlighted another phenomenon which is widely 
believed to have affected electoral behaviour during the period of the First Reform 
Act -  'Influence'. He detected an increase in Conservative support among the major 
occupational groups as influence from the Conservative interest grew. Even so, with 
the exception of the shipping interest, influence never entirely destroyed the impact of 
occupation as a social determinant, but merely limited it. Nossiter did note, however, 
that the evidence suggests a marked sensitivity to the political complexion of the 
immediate neighbourhood, presumably due to the influence of the local magnates. 
But although the trend was that the lower down the scale a voter's occupation was,
39. Ibid,pp148-168.
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the more likely he was to incline to the district's politics, the professional classes were 
not immune from this local influence. However, exceptions to this were those sectors 
of the wider upper-class society which were influential in their own right: -  the gentry, 
clergy and manufacturers of county Durham. For example Conservative clergy were 
found in areas of Whig patronage: Liberal manufacturers in areas of Conservative 
patronage40.
The above brings attention to a model of electoral behaviour which has aroused 
schoiariy controversy, it was D. C. Moore, one of the very few researchers to place 
his findings into a theoretical structure, who advanced the 'Deference Community' as 
an electoral model: i.e. that groups of individuals linked through occupation, 
residency, or other interests acknowiedged a limited number of individuals as their 
social, economic and ideoiogical leaders, who effectively represented electoral 
opinion which was then registered by the mass of the electorate. He used pollbook 
data which suggested that at least for rural constituencies before 1867 group 
networks were stronger than the ties of social status, and more apparent than 
evidence that electors voted only for their particuiar interests (as the Benthamites 
believed)41. In fact, Moore believed that the 1832 Reform Act was deliberately 
framed in a manner to restore local hierarchical community influence and thus the 
cohesion of society: eg. the 'Chandos' clause and the adjustments made to town 
boundaries. However, without fundamentally disagreeing with Moore, J. R. Fisher 
used pollbooks to demonstrate the limitations of hierarchical influence, when there 
was disagreement in the rural community on what was felt to be an issue vital to its 
prosperity. Despite being one of the most aristocratic of the English counties. South 
Nottinghamshire witnessed the defeat of the Earl of Lincoln during the Corn Law 
crisis of 1846. Lincoln had by that time virtually abandoned protectionism, and owed 
his defeat to the virulent protectionism of the farmer voters. And, in 1851, Lord
40. Ibid, ppl68-172. 41. Reproduced by Baer, p227.
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Newark was defeated due to residual protectionism among the rural tradesmen and 
craftsmen42. Further evidence indicating the limits of rural deference was apparent 
in Dr. Olne/s research on 1852 Lincolnshire: there, of the forty-five major 
landowners in the division, oniy twenty-seven secured absoiute support in one or 
more parishes on their estates. Richard Davis's research on Buckinghamshire 
showed landed deference considerably weaker than did Dr 0Iney43.
Moore attributed the decay of the deference community to industrialisation, 
urbanisation and migration which weakened the traditional social nexus and 
hierarchical relationships -  voters thereafter being recruited by Victorian election 
managers directly, but as individuals rather than as members of a community44. But 
Moore has been challenged by Patrick Joyce, who argued that not only will the model 
fit urban settings (which Moore denied), but that political behaviour based upon 
communal ties is clearly discernible in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
Joyce's research on Lancashire indicated that the consolidation of mechanised 
factory industry after 1850 was the occasion of class harmony rather than conflict. 
The family firm, territorial solidarity and trade-union activity coalesced to mediate the 
class system of factory society and secured the consolidation of the factory's 
domination over people's lives. This phenomenon was reflected in voting patterns 
and was seemingly not enforced by coercion. The 1868 pollbooks for Blackburn and 
Bury indicated that political allegiance to the factory employer was not significantly 
weakened when the operative was not one of his tenants. Joyce maintained that 
employer paternalism oniy decayed around the turn of the century due to a 
combination of urban growth, transportation developments, surburbinisation (which 
distanced 'masters' from 'men') and the decay of private factory ownership -  changes 
which were chronologically close to the onset of class voting in parliamentary 
elections (1900-1910). Joyce did concede, however, that paternalism channelled
42. Fisher, PP155-165. 43. Davis, p151. 44. Moore (1976), p324.
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rather than eclipsed class conflict, and that a very different outlook prevailed in the 
West Riding where, due to continuation of the handworking tradition and 
consequential absence of a cultural sphere of community politics, the politics of the 
Chartist inheritance continued powerfully into the 1850s and '60s45.
Examining voting behaviour in Victorian London, Marc B. Baer considered the 
London patterns quite similar to those discovered in Lancashire by Joyce. A case in 
point was the 1860 by-election in Southwark when G. Scovell, a wealthy employer of 
undisputed influence, was defeated by fellow Liberal, A. H. Layard. Though Scovell 
easily won the district where his workforce was located he was well beaten in two 
populous districts. Layard was recruited by many local employers to run against 
Scovell, and these allowed their workmen time off to listen to Layard: company bands 
being used to whip up enthusiasm -  parades -  torchlight processions, but with no 
evidence of coercion. Baer indicated that the pattern was mirrored elsewhere in 
London, but he stressed that the communal groups were not activated solely as a 
result of their internal dynamics. Equally important was the level of political 
organisation46.
Baer's comment concerning political organisation points to a grey area of the political 
scene lying between 'respectable' deference and influence, and 'less respectable' 
bribery. Much political activity centred around registration procedures. As D. C. 
Moore noted, it was each manager's job when a contest occurred to try to strengthen 
the favourably orientated nexus and to destroy the unfavourable47. And there was 
growing concern in the 1850s and '60s that electoral corruption, often centred around 
registration procedure, was growing. Gallagher claimed that the level of corruption in 
the 1852 general election led not only to the 1854 Corrupt Practices Act but even 
partly accounted for the decision to extend the franchise in 186748. Acceptance of
45. Joyce, pp320-321 (Moore accepted Joyce's criticism: see Moore (1976), p15). 46. Baer, pp232-234. 
47. Moore (1974), pi 18. 48. Gallagher, ppl54-163.
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bribes seems to have been particuiariy the preserve of the lower sections of the 
social stratum, as in the case of the Leicester stockinger outvoters who were well 
plied with liquor before being brought by carriage to the poil49. Indeed the 
nineteenth century statistician, Newmarch, drew attention in 1857 to the problem, and 
pointed out that the 1832 Reform bill originally intended to disqualify all the freemen 
voters on the grounds of their proneness to briberySO. In the twenty years after 1832 
there were 185 official inquiries into alleged bribery. There was evidence too of the 
even less respectable phenomenon of coercion. Gash recorded that the Leicester 
textile manufacturers, during periods of slack trade, threatened to remove their 
employees' framesSI. Nossiter indicated that Lord Londonderry coerced his tenants, 
and the 1874 South Durham and Durham city elections were declared void due to 
widespread violence and intimidation of Conservative voters, thereby demonstrating 
that corruption was not entirely an outcome of open voting52. However, Vincent did 
not think that corruption made much impact on election results overall; rather it may 
on balance have coincided with a general preference by voters and simply have 
intensified or revealed what was always latentSS. in fact most modern historians do 
not see the practice of 'treating' as anything other than a more innocent form of 
hospitality and thus represent a shift since the time of Charles Seymour's (1915) 
study of the nineteenth century electoral system, which leaned on the effects of 
various forms of corruption up till 188354.
The growth of a temperance lobby, principally nonconformist, brought the Liberal 
party into conflict with the drink trade during the late 1850s and early '60s when the 
trade consequently became increasingly identified with the Conservative party. But 
Vincent's research on Rochdale (1841) and Stockport (1847) suggests that, prior to 
this development, the 'beersellers' were proportionately more Liberal than their 
'publican' counterparts: the Liberalism of the beersellers ceasing in 1857 when the 
leading Congregationalist Liberal M.P., E. Miall, failed to support a bill deemed to be 
in their interests, promoted by Henry BerkeleySS. The Hammond's observed that the
49. Gash, p i39. 50. Newmarch, pi 75.
51. Gash,p137. 52. Noss'iter,pp101-102. 53. Vincent (1967), p i 1.
54. Clarke, p36. 55. Vincent (1976), p97.
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beershops, which proliferated with the passing of the Beer Act of 1830, seem to have 
been a preserve of the working-class and tended to provide a convenient focus for 
attack by the Church during the 1830s and '40s56. But whether or not this accounts 
for their relative radicalism, it seems clear that to some extent electoral division along 
social class lines was a feature of the drink trade until 1857. Thereafter the trade 
became what Vincent described as the perfect example of a 'pressure group': i.e. a 
sharply defined group of people organised to defend their economic interest by 
rational electoral pressure, uninvolved in general political issues and without 
ideoiogical overtones. Apart from the B.C. Church, the drink trade was unique in 
operating this way -  intelligently manipulating the traditional party system57.
Virtually all historical writers have pointed to the importance of religion in party 
political life during the period of the First Reform Act. As Walter Arnstein reflected, it 
was the religious issue in its various manifestations that was fundamental in defining 
party difference and provided the element of continuity from the 1680s to the 
1910s58. And, as K. Theodore Hoppen exclaimed: 'Religious issues played a large 
part in many English elections: until well after 1885 to know an Englishman's 
denomination was to know perhaps his most important electoral characteristic'59. 
Further, J. P. Parry has argued that religious issues were the paramount concern of 
politics after 1832 because they provided the ideological basis on which politicians 
could appeal to the electorate. Thus religious issues were far more important than 
secular issues both in dividing Liberal from Conservative and Liberal from LiberalGO. 
But the problem lies in proving it. As Nossiter pointed out the church/chapel 
membership records are an unreliable source, either in an analysis of individuals (i.e. 
linking individuals to pollbook information) or in an aggregate statistical analysis. This 
is due not only to the erratic survival of such records but also on account of what they 
do not reveal, such as the personal evaluation of the individual's religious allegiance
56. Hammond, ppl44-167 and p219.
57. Vincent (1967), PP17-18, 58. Arnstein. p i43. 59. Hoppen, p213.
60. Bernstein, p86.
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vis-a-vis his other social reference points for voting. The 1851 religious census is 
also problematical since it refers to registration districts rather than parliamentary 
constituencies, and relates to the whole population rather than just enfranchised adult 
males. Perhaps the best source, at least for the later part of the period, is the schooi 
board eiections of 1871. Some of these resuits survive broken down by wards and 
could thus be linked on an aggregate basis to the 1868 pariiamentary elections, 
which iikewise were broken down by wards.
Using the iatter source Nossiter investigated Leeds, Newcastie and Sunderiand. In 
the case of Leeds, despite the addition of working-class voters, he found a significant 
reiationship between the rank orders in twenty districts. The five most Anglican 
districts in 1871 were also the five most Conservative in 1868, aibeit in a slightiy 
different order. At the bottom of the rank order three of the five ieast Angiican 
districts were among the five most hostiie to the Conservatives. Likewise in 
Newcastle politicai rankings were essentiaily similar to religious ones, both before the 
1867 Reform Act and after. However, the 1868 Sunderiand election, which 
comprised a straight fight between a nonconformist radical and a Whig Anglican, did 
not produce a statistically significant result. Generally Nossiter found that in districts 
where dissent was strong the radicals gained more support in 1868. But the 
converse was not confirmed, and he attributed this to factors operating in the 
industrial districts, such as membership of work, occupation and trade union 
grouping, which effectively diluted the influence of religious affiliation. On balance he 
considered that whilst the three examples supported the conventional view that 
religion was contemporarily an important factor in voting behaviour, they also 
indicated that religion could, as Wald believed61, interact with other social 
determinants in a complex way to produce the final election result. Nossiteris overall 
conclusion was that although several factors undoubtedly interacted to determine
61. Wald,pp108-120.
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electoral behaviour, further extensive research was still needed to evaluate their 
relative importance, although he predicted that the occupational factor was likely to 
prove particularly significant62.
Maybe Nossiter's comment, that in the longer term the indifference of the working- 
class towards institutional religion was to render religion of decreasing political 
importance, highlights the lynch-pin of the development of class voting in Britain. 
The 1851 religious census showed that a majority of the working-class were 
undoubtedly indifferent towards religion by the mid nineteenth century, and the broad 
consensus among historians and political scientists appears to be that a social class 
cleavage along electoral lines became increasingly significant as the franchise was 
progressiveiy extended to the working-class. If, all other things being equal, the 
1918 franchise provisions had been put into effect in say 1850, would that alone have 
generated a rapid development of class-based politics regardless of all other 
changes which occurred between the mid nineteenth and mid twentieth centuries? 
There seems to be a need therefore for further research on those mid nineteenth 
century urban constituencies which contained reiatively high proportions of working- 
class voters. Leicester is such a place.
In their research on mid twentieth century electoral behaviour, Butier and Stokes 
discovered that those casting their first vote at a time when one party is especially 
dominant tend to support that party to a greater extent than older voters. Thus 61% 
of new electors voted Labour in 1945, the year of that party's zenith, whilst only 48% 
did so in the 1955 election when the Conservatives were dominant. Moreover these 
voters tended to stay with their original dominant choice throughout their voting lives 
-  as was apparent in the 1964 general election. Among those who first voted in the 
Labour years of 1945 and 1950 the proportion voting Labour in 1964 totalled 60%:
62. Nossiter, pp174-176.
Note : From a Leicester Newspaper source in 1834, Halevy found very marked positive correiatbns between the
Church and the Tory vote, and between Dissent and the Liberal vote in the 1833 Election.
(See Halevy, p63).
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among those who first voted in the Conservative years of 1951,1955 and 1959 only 
53% voted Labour in 1964. Although the results did not produce the ciose correlation 
observed between party choice of individuals and their parents, Butler and Stokes 
nevertheless concluded that their findings demonstrated the political generation 
phenomenonBS.
Actually, compared to investigations into social class, possible influences of political 
generation on eiectoral behaviour have received but littie attention from scholars. But 
P. F. Clarke, commenting upon studies of Banbury and Glossop, claimed the results 
suggested that the party loyalties of the older voters were conditioned by the past 
rather than the present, with the major implication that the Conservatism of a strong 
section of the working-class represented the allegiance of a generation brought up 
before the modern Labour party emerged. As successive age-cohorts became 
voters Labour had in this way come to occupy more and more of its natural ground64.
Likewise, in his hypothesis to explain the rise of a class-based Labour party, Wald 
pointed to generational influences coupled with parental influences to account for the 
pace of the decreasing salience of puritan nonconformity, and thereby the change in 
party fortunes65. But he did appear to err in suggesting that a young person from a 
working-class home, where the father was probably unenfranchised, would in 
consequence not receive partisan cues. Wald clearly assumed that anyone 
unqualified to vote would have entertained no party political preferences, which 
seems highly unlikely. In his analysis of Oldham politics during the post-reform 
period, J. Foster has shown quite ciearly how the non-voters could exert influence 
through mass organisationBS. if Wald's supposition was true it would seriously inhibit 
any research on electoral generations during the 1832-1918 period, since not all 
electors became eligible to vote at twenty-one years of age. When Butler and
63. Butler and Stokes, pp48-66. 64. Clarke, p54. 65. Wald, pp223-254.
66. Foster, ppl49-160.
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Stokes spoke of those entering the electorate at a specific point in time, they were 
referring to specific age groups who had all shared common experiences. It would be 
unreasonable to suppose that a mid nineteenth century elector, casting his first vote 
-  say at the age of sixty-one -  would have been politically conditioned in the same 
way as a twenty-one year old voting for the first time in the same election. Rather it 
seems more likely that the elderly new voter would, all other things being equal, have 
been at one with those in his own age-group who had become enfranchised at 
various earlier stages in life.
Even so, this is not to deny that new voters, drawn from across the age spectrum, 
produced important patterns of eiectoral support. In their study of iocal elections in 
Cambridge (1832-68) Mitchell and Cornford observed a strikingly high level of 
partisan stability over time: eg. only 8.8% of those entering the electorate in 1832 
ever gave a vote of any kind, single or split, for the party other than the one for which 
they voted initialiy in the period up to 1852. The Cambridge parliamentary electoral 
sphere witnessed a similar overall pattern, although temporary changes of party 
allegiance did occur, as in the 1847 general election when many Conservative voters 
either abstained or voted Liberal in the aftermath of the Corn Law crisis. By 1852 
83% of the 1845 election Conservative voters had returned to their old partisanship, 
and even more followed in subsequent elections. The possible implications of this 
phenomenon were, however, modified by a rapid turnover in the electorate: eg. of the 
290 new voters in 1837, only 36 remained in 186867.
Nossiter did not appear perturbed by the varying age of new voters in his study of 
certain towns and cities of northern England. He examined the common supposition 
that the oider a voter is, the more he had to lose by change (at least among the 
middle-classes) and the less likely he was, therefore, to support radicalism. (This
67. Mitchell and Cornford, pp266-271.
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so-called 'senescence hypothesis' is sometimes hinged on the notion of a natural 
propensity on the part of the young to favour change, which diminishes with age, 
regardiess of economic considerations). Linking pollbook data for the 1852 general 
election with the 1851 census, he found little in it; the average age of electors of each 
party in Bradford, Gateshead, Hull and Leeds varied little around forty-four. Butler 
and Stokes too rejected the senescence hypothesis as statistically unsoundBB. But 
Nossiter stressed that the similarity in average age masked a far more interesting 
difference in the age structure of party support. Different age groups tended to vote 
disproportionately for one party rather than another -  which paraliels modern findings 
of generational patterns of voting rooted in electors' early political experiences. In 
two cases, Gateshead and Leeds, the differences were statistically significant, but 
even the others showed marked variations in voting behaviour. Nossiter predicted 
that those who became politically conscious (and for Nossiter that occurred at the 
age of seventeen) during the reform period of 1828-32 might prefer the Liberals for 
the rest of their lives: those starting during the Conservative revival of the 1830s 
might incline towards the Conservative party. Both predictions were notably 
confirmed in his analysis69.
It appears that the phenomenon of political generation offers considerable scope for 
further analysis, given the availability of pollbook data and appropriate census 
schedules. But, as Mitchell and Cornford pointed out, electoral data by itself can 
suggest interesting questions and can isolate interesting groups of voters, but one 
has to look to social data and the contemporary record of political activity, debate and 
controversy to suggest why individuals or groups behaved as they did70.
68, Butler and Stokes, pp62-64. 69. Nossiter, ppl73-4. 70. Mitchell and Cornford, p263.
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CHAPTER THREE
Leicester 1832-67 
Local Government -  Industry -  Working Class Politics
a. LocaLGovernment
For many decades prior to the Municipal and Corporations Act (1835) the 
Borough of Leicester corporation was becoming increasingly the focus of 
political contention. This development was largely due to the prevalence of 
nonconformity among the local leading manufacturers and shopkeepersl. 
Around 1832 the most influential group of nonconformists were the liberal 
Presbyterians (Unitarians) whose 'Great Meeting' Chapel in East Bond Street 
had been established in the eariy eighteenth century. This Chapel was 
attended by the most intelligent, active and liberal citizens of the town, such as 
the important local textile industrialists the Brewins and the Coltmans2. 
Leicester's 'Great Meeting' was typical of Unitarian academies elsewhere as a 
centre of social and religious enlightenment, spreading knowledge of political 
theory and popular science. Theoiogicaily, Unitarianism represented the 
extreme left and contemporarily had no more in common with other 
nonconformist sects than with the Church of England. Of the remainder of 
Leicester's nonconformity the Baptists were the most numerous, whilst there 
was a new Independent (Congregationalist) Chapel which eventualiy settled at 
premises in Bond Street. However, in 1832 these two sects were not as 
notable for political leadership as they later became.
But the political discord between corporation and nonconformity was perhaps 
not just a straightforward resuit of the widespread age-old Anglican hatred of
1. Patterson, p27. 2. Ellis, p99.
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dissent. For many years the Tory corporation had resisted attempts by the 
county Whig nobles, the Duke of Rutland and the Earl of Stamford, to secure 
control of the borough. Consequently there arose an expression of municipal 
independence which in turn fortified a sentiment of devotion to the Angiican 
Church. Inevitably the corporation encountered opposition from the 
nonconformist hosiers and some Church Whigs. Thus overall the corporation 
was faced with an alliance of industrial, nonconformist and aristocratic 
influence -  essentially a local phenomenon not mirrored in national politics. 
However, the nonconformist/Whig alliance broke up after 1790 when 
developments in France, and their implications for England, caused the Whigs 
to join the Tories. But a legacy remained, for, whereas in some towns 
experiencing sectarian feeling the Test and Corporations Acts were not 
enforced against dissenters, the extreme Angiican nature of the Leicester 
magistracy and municipal authority was uncompromising. Thus until 1828 the 
local hosiers and worsted spinners were denied civic office, with consequential 
bitter resentment. Moreover the old corporation was by the early nineteenth 
century beginning to show sympathy with the industrial working-classes 
during employers' disputes -  a phenomenon which formed an element of 
nineteenth century Tory policy in general (evident in the work of Richard 
Oastier and Lord Ashley, and in the novels of Disraeli), resulting in the gradual 
development of an explosive situations.
Leicesters' reform party had emerged from the war-period with growing 
strength and solidarity, possessing an effective organ in the weekly 
publication, 'Leicester Chronicle', which made municipal reform probabie4. 
Competent leadership was provided by groups of frequently related families, 
wealthy merchants and manufacturers -  considerable employers of labour,
3. Pa«erson,p28. 4. moria, p147.
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almost all dissenters and mostly Unitarians. Some, like the Pareses and 
Thomas Paget, were in the process of passing into the ranks of the lesser 
gentry. Others, like Coltman, Robert Brewin and the Whetstones, were 
manufacturers of the second and third generation -  men of established 
standing in the town's large nonconformist community. In addition, there were 
those of a more self-made type and frequently of more advanced views, like 
John and Wiiliam Biggs. But around 1832 shades and differences of opinion 
among them were concealed by the common struggle against the corporation. 
In the field of national politics all agreed on parliamentary reform, religious 
equality, a free press, extension of popular education. Corn Law repeal or 
modification, and slavery abolition.
Aithough the 1832 Reform bill fell short of their aspirations, the Leicester 
Liberals welcomed it, caliing upon reformers of ail shades and classes to unite 
in its support. But, in contrast with the leading Whigs, like Lord John Russeil 
who even as iate as 1838 publicly regarded the 1832 measurers as final, the 
local Liberals saw the 1832 reforms as a means to an end for further reforms 
including municipal reform, further measurers of parliamentary reform, the 
extinction of tithes and Church rates, and a general removal of remaining 
dissenters' disabilities. Patterson notes that these activities form an example 
of that 'constant and active pressure from withouf, exercised upon the 
legislature and the two ancient and traditional parties by middle-class opinion 
in the larger industrial towns, which did so much to bring about the reforms of 
the first half of the nineteenth century. However, there were already hints of 
the local cleavage between right and left wings that was to come in later 
years.
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After the 1832 Reform Act the Leicester radicais petitioned Parliament against 
borough rate increases imposed by the corporation (1833). The row 
continued to be kept predominantly before the notice of Parliament, thereby 
forming an important advance towards the modernisation of municipal 
governments. In return, the pro-corporation Leicester Conservative 
newspaper, 'Leicester Journal', accused the reformers of trying to separate 
Church and state and make their own 'low-bred, illeducated, soi-disant' clergy 
equal in point of rank and consequence to those of the Church of EnglandS. 
However, the 'Journal' took care to exonerate the Wesleyan Methodists who 
carefuily maintained a policy of political quietism, or, in effect, conservatism, 
which was laid down by the governing body of the sect.
The commission set up by the Whig government to inquire into the municipal 
corporations reported in 1835. The report appeared to err on the side of 
severity, especialiy in its over-ready acceptance of compiaints against the 
magistrates' administration of justice. Almost everything which had gone 
amiss in Leicester was blamed upon the corporation. It was, in short, a party 
document, but nevertheless many of its charges were substantiaiiy justifiedT: 
indeed Sidney and Beatrice Webb later described pre-1835 Leicester as the 
'worst governed town in the country'8. Lord John Russeil's bill made a specific 
reference to Leicester as an example of corporate extravagance, corruption 
(of which there was much evidence) and misuse of charitable endowments. 
As Norman Gash points out the Leicester corporation was especialiy notorious 
for the political use it made of its public funds. It controlled various charitable 
and trust monies: eg. the Sir Thomas White fund of £18,000 was lent out in 
sums of £100 for nine years without interest to 'deserving tradesmen', together 
with similar patronage to the Green Coat School (where free places with
5. Patterson, p200. 6. Victor}a,p149. 7. Patterson, pp206-209.
8. Hammond, p44.
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clothing were gifts of the corporation), and the nominations to the Trinity 
Hospital. All these were used as political instruments to secure votes and it 
was reckoned that in Leicester, where one-fifth of the electorate was in any 
case regarded as venal, the corporation controlled another 6-700 votes 
besides. The same misuse of charitable endowments went on at Ipswich, 
Coventry and HerefordG. The 1835 Municipal Corporations Act swept away 
the old order and facilitated the immediate transfer of power to the new 
classes, by providing for new councils elected by all rate-paying householders 
of at least three years residence.
The new Leicester councii which took office in January 1836 had a large 
Liberal/nonconformist majority: i.e. -  two thirds were dissenters and thirty- 
eight Libérais were returned as against four Tories. This resuit established the 
pattern of Liberal domination of the local council which was to last for the rest 
of the nineteenth century. Although there was in fact littie change in terms of 
social status the new council was recruited from a much wider circle, including 
especially the large class of dissenting hosiers. Also for several years there 
was a tendency towards a Unitarian oligarchy indicated by the Unitarian 
membership of the first seven mayors of the new council 0.
Patterson points out that the nineteenth century ascendancy of nonconformity 
in Leicester was comparable on a rather smaller scale to the Birmingham of 
Joseph Chamberlain. Whereas the counties and market towns were stili ruled 
and judged by the country gentlemen, to whom all gave deference, the cities 
were governed by a totaily different type of person in accordance with a very 
different scaie of social values which, whether middle or working-class, were
Gash,p173. 10. Victoria, p251.
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essentially democratic. These contrasting features were epitomised in 
Conservative Leicestershire and Liberal Leicester.
The question soon arose for the new Leicester council as to whether it should 
become involved in contemporary political agitation or be neutral. The old 
corporation was notoriously Tory-inclined: a late example being its petition to 
Pariiament opposing the Reform bill during 1831-32. The radical wing of the 
new council led by Winks and supported by the marginaliy more moderate 
John and Wiiliam Biggs thought it should be party-political, especialiy in the 
field of supporting dissenters' grievances. The moderate Liberal faction led by 
Paget, Stokes and Whetstone took the opposite view, and the aiignment of 
leaders foreshadowed exactly the schism of the late 1840s and 1850s11.
The Leicester Liberal 'revolution' of 1835-6 was still incomplete so long as the 
new board of guardians, set up in accordance with the Poor Law Amendment 
Act of 1834, remained a Conservative stronghold12. This phenomenon was 
the outcome of the system of voting (invariably conducted along party lines) 
for candidates to the board -  a system which actually lasted until 189413. All 
owners and occupiers of rateable property could vote, but additional votes 
were granted in proportion to rateable value up to a maximum of six as owner 
and six as occupier: i.e. tweive in all. Thus in St. Margaret's parish the 
cumuiative votes established a Conservative majority on the board of 
guardians in what was otherwise a strongiy radical parish. But there is 
evidence of co-operation between Liberals and Conservatives on the board in 
attempts to cope with the acute poverty of the 1840s. However, change came 
about a decade later, partly due to the Liberals' successful revision of the 
voters lists, but also due to revelations of mismanagement and corruption.
11. Patterson, pp213-222. 12. Ibkl,p225. 13. Hammond, p70.
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The outcome was a Liberal landslide victory, except in the parish of St. Martin, 
in the 1845 board of guardians election, and henceforth the Liberals 
maintained a solid grip on the board as on the town council. Even so it should 
be pointed out that in practice the board under Liberal control was rather less 
'liberal' than it was earlier, for in 1849 it decided for the first time to implement 
the 'workhouse tesf for ail applicants for relief. The decision was put into 
effect, aibeit gradually, when a new purpose-built workhouse was opened in 
1851 aithough, despite a depression during 1857-8, it was never put to so 
severe a test as would have been the case had it been implemented during 
the rather more serious depressions in the 1840s14. But even so it offers 
evidence at a iocal level of the ascendancy of Benthamite ideals on Liberal 
thought whereby the theory of dependence and protection of the patriarchal or 
paternal system (and with it the old Tory notions of charity) had given way to 
manly self-respect, responsibility and ambition to rise in social status, which 
were believed to be the chief sources of energy and drive behind the progress 
of society. This appealed most powerfully to both the moral self- 
righteousness and the material self-interest of the middle-classi 5. 1
’ ■ I
During the late 1830s and 1840s the reform party in Leicester was becoming 
more radical. According to Patterson this was due to the influx of younger 
men of more advanced outlook who had a better grasp of the techniques of 
organisation required than the older leaders, although a Conservative society, 
supported by the 'Leicester Journal', was also operational. The men whose 
radicalism stemmed from the French Revolution and the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man were slowly giving ground to those who derived theirs from 
Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill (although in some ways the former had been 
more extreme than the latter). However, the moment of cleavage between
14. Victoria, p259. 15. Perkin, p224.
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right and left wings of the middle class reformers was still some distance 
away. The whole Leicester Liberal party stood to the left of Whiggism: I.e.: 
they wanted further parliamentary reform and the removal of remaining 
nonconformist disabilities.
A particular nonconformist grievance was the compulsory payment of Church 
rates, and this issue was to dominate municipal politics in Leicester until 1849. 
In 1834 the Whig ministry proposed, and swiftly abandoned, a scheme to 
substitute an annual treasury grant of £%m. In any case, the plan would still 
have entailed compulsory support for the Established Church via taxation. 
Similarly in 1837 a government scheme for abolishing Church rates was 
dropped. The question for Leicester's large dissenting community was the line 
of action to overcome the status quo. But aithough a number of individuals? 
were prosecuted for outright refusal to pay the levy, notably the draper William! 
BainesIB who was eventualiy imprisoned for non-payment in 1841, the 
general consensus of opinion during the eariy stages was that over-reaction 
might bring about the return of a Conservative government. It soon became 
clear to ail, as in other towns like Leicester, that the abolition of Church rates 
could oniy be achieved by securing dissenter majorities in the vestries of the 
individual parishes. Actually by 1836 only two out of the five parish vestries, 
St. Margaret's and St. Martin's, were Conservative controlled, but these, 
anxious to avenge local government defeat, were determined to enforce 
payment. Nevertheless, despite stress laid by important factions of the local 
reform party -  the moderates under Paget and Whetstone, and the somewhat 
more radical J. and W. Biggs -  that the law must be upheld until it could be 
changed, the ultra-radical faction demanded stronger action17. This latter 
section of the party was led significantly by the Baptists who from the later
16. Fraser, p49. 17. Victoria, p207.
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1830s, together with the Independents, were supplanting the Unitarians in 
Leicester's local government reformist politics and becoming what Patterson 
calls the 'shock troops' of local radicalism. One important inspiring leader was 
the Rev. J. P. Mursell of Harvey Lane Baptist Chapel, who considered the 
Church of England to be the representation of privilege and thus its 
disestablishment was necessary for the very salvation of its own soul. He was 
seemingly not alone in his views, for Patterson suggests that Leicester was 
the cradle of the disestablishment movement which, though ultimately 
unsuccessful, was for thirty years a factor to be reckoned with in the religious 
and political life of the country. Equally vehement was E. T. Miall, minister of 
Bond Street Independent Chapel. The faction was supported by the 
'Leicestershire Mercury', a newspaper founded in 1836 (aided by the reduction 
of stamp duty), which scorned the moderate men although it chose to deny 
the ultra-radical label, rather claiming its politics akin to those of the 
parliamentary Liberals -  Durham, Brougham, Hume, C'Connell and 
Molesworth. But opposition to Church rates was widespread nationwide, and 
in Leicester even the Wesleyan Methodist laity openly revolted against their 
ministers' sympathies with the Anglican Church. A Church Rate Abolition 
Society of 1836 was soon deemed too timid and inactive, especially In 
Leicester. This local stance was praised by the London newspapers, the 'Sun' 
and the 'Morning Advertiser' -  the latter paper expressing a wish that the 
Leicester leaders could be transferred to London to spur on the lukewarm 
heads of nonconformity there. The contest ended locally In 1849 when the St. 
Martin's vestry fell under dissenting control, four years after St. Margaret's. 
Thenceforth all the town's parishes substituted voluntary for compulsory 
payment, although It was not until 1868 that Church rates were abolished by 
lawlS.
18. Patterson, p259.
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It seems that the rise of ultra-radicalism was not purely a sectarian 
phenomenon, for the Rev. Miall in 1841, having by then left Leicester, 
established and edited The Nonconformist in which he attacked aristocratic 
government and class legislation: i.e. Miall was also an advanced radical in 
political 9.
All shades of local radical opinion united in protest at Graham's Factory bill 
{1843), which sought a reduction in hours worked by children in factories 
coupled with a scheme for compulsory, part-time education of factory children 
under the direction of the Established Church. Though many radicals 
supported the principle of education, the Rev. Mursell and his supporters 
objected to any compulsion or interference by the state in matters of 
education. Within Parliament John Bright, concerned at the loss of dissenting 
support, opposed this proposed new scheme of 'parson education'. But 
Richard Cobden refused to be cajoled or threatened by his dissenting 
supporters into opposing the proposal. He had first entered public life as an 
advocate of education and now refused to be false to his principles20. The 
education provisions were removed from Graham's bill in 1844. There was 
similar antipathy on the part of militant dissent towards the 1870 Education bill. 
They were not inclined to support Liberals in 1874 who had countenanced 
such a seemingly pro-Anglican measure21.
General radical antipathy towards progressive liberalising proposals when 
they appeared to conflict with the interests and ideals of nonconformity was 
not confined to Graham's bill. A marked example of the adoption of a non­
liberal stance occurred in 1845 when Peel's government announced its
19. Ibid,p255. 20. McCord (1968), p190. 21. Southgate, p350.
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intention to increase the grant to the leading Roman Catholic seminary at 
Maynooth. The plan provoked a widespread outburst of wrath and anti-papal 
sentiment, mirroring the late 1820s when the prospect of R.C. emancipation 
became more important locally than the repeal of the Test and Corporations 
Acts. However, in Leicester Mursell and the leading radicals tried to 
dissociate their opposition to the Maynooth grant from the taint of 'no popery* 
fanaticism, whilst Cobden again went against the tide by supporting the
grant22.
The 1850s and 1860s appear to have been a relatively unimportant period in 
the sphere of Leicester's municipal politics. There are several possible 
explanations for this. The major causes of sectarian discontent had largely 
disappeared, the Liberal reformists were then in control of the local institutions 
of authority, and the radicals by this time (possibly influenced by the European 
liberal revolutions of 1848) were again thinking in terms of extensions to the 
suffrage. For its part Lord Russell's aristocratic Whig ministry sought to stave 
off radical political reform for as long as possible by declaring that 'social 
questions' must have priority: i.e. Russell tried to focus attention on education 
and sanitary conditions, which would not involve too much transformation of 
the established order. In fact the relatively uncontentious task of improving 
the town's amenities was precisely what the municipal authority embarked 
upon, although even this demonstrated the widening division in the local 
Liberal party -  the 'economists' under Whetstone, and the 'improvers' under 
the Biggses. Russell's policy suited Leicester's more moderate radicals who, 
supported by the 'Leicester Chronicle', began to call themselves the Whig- 
radical party in the town. Opposing these the left and centre radicals, united 
under the Biggses, and supported by the 'Leicestershire Mercury*, regarded
22. See also Ch.4, pp 74-75 and 82-85: it was a novel departure when many Congregationalist and Baptist 
leaders opposed this concession to Roman Catholicism (Machin, 1967).
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local improvements as secondary matters and took a vigorous part in the 
developing campaign for manhood suffrage23. Thus, it appears inevitable 
that the parliamentary sphere of Leicester's politics should then have become 
the principal theatre of contest in the ensuing years, and it seems highly 
significant that John Biggs, undoubtedly the most influential local politician of 
the period24, decided after years of hesitation to embark on a parliamentary 
career in the town. Needless to say the developments in Leicester politics at 
parliamentary level were of paramount influence on the way the electors voted 
in the five parliamentary elections between 1847 and 1861. For this reason, 
considerable attention is given to those developments in the next chapter.
b. Industry.
During this period the hosiery trade, based on the stocking frame, was 
unquestionably Leicester's staple industry. Patterson indicates that the 
concentration of the trade within the counties of the East Midlands stemmed 
from a charter of King Charles II which had effectively made the London 
framework knitting industry a 'closed corporation', wherein the officers of the 
company exercised strict control, levying heavy fees and fines. The outcome 
was to drive the bulk of the London industry into the Midlands. Broadly, 
Nottinghamshire specialised in cotton, Derbyshire in silk, and Leicestershire in 
worsted. But this specialisation was not absolute for much cotton hosiery was 
made in Leicester25.
Until the later part of the nineteenth century the hosiery trade was essentially 
based on the 'domestic' or 'putting out' system, in contrast to the system 
operating in other contemporary sections of the textile industry where a 
genuine factory system was the norm: i.e. the cotton mills of Lancashire and.
23. Patterson, p342. 24. Victoria, p218. 25. Weils, p65.
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in Leicester itself, where by 1829 worsted spinning was carried out by steam- 
driven machinery, as in Brewin and Whetstone's factory in Frog Island, 
although there were still numerous small local factories or 'shops' where hand 
spinning with jennies was carried out26.
Several factors coalesced to severely inhibit the development of a true factory 
mode of production in the hosiery trade until the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. There was the technical difficulty of applying steam power to the 
frames, coupled with the superabundant supply of cheap labour which gave 
the employers no incentive to devise or promote labour-saving inventions. 
Also the framework knitters (stockingers) were fearful that such technological 
development would reduce the need for their labour: being accustomed to 
generations of grinding poverty they showed no spirit of enterprise, preferring 
their relative independence and liberty to the alternative of the 'factory beir27.
But, despite the pre-industrial nature of the hosiery trade, during the early and 
mid nineteenth century capitalist techniques were in being28. Although minor 
small-scale improvements had taken place, such as the introduction of a 
broad frame which could knit several stockings simultaneously, and William 
Dawson's 'wheels' which were applied to existing warp machines to improve 
the manufacture of fancy hosiery, the actual frames were essentially 
unchanged in construction for a century. These frames were increasingly 
rarely owned by the individual framework knitters. Sometimes they were 
owned by the master 'hosiers' (a term used since the late eighteenth century 
to describe merchant employers, as distinct from the operatives) and 
warehousmen, or by their makers (framesmiths). But the system was more 
complex than that, for the hiring of frames became a profitable business
26. Patterson, p i66. 27. Wells, p146. 28. Ellis, p92.
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during the early nineteenth century and especially after 1820. Speculators in 
frames included the 'shopocrats': eg. butchers, bakers and publicans; who 
hired the frames either to the hosiers or to the 'undertakers' (middlemen) who 
played an increasing roie in the system. The gap between masters and men 
widened from the early nineteenth century onwards and, as the domestic spirit 
left the domestic system, a new competitive get-rich-quick spirit took its 
place: thus it became apparent just how oppressive the system could be29.
By 1845 although some frames were still to be found In the workers' cottages 
they were Increasingly located in 'frame-shops' of varying size, which were 
often (incorrectly) referred to as 'factories'. These frame-shops, notorious for 
crowding and iil-ventilation, were actually organised on the same principle as 
the cottage. One of the largest in Leicester was that of J. and W. Biggs, with 
about nine hundred and fifty frames divided among about ninety-five 
middlemen30.
The system of renting the frames to operatives, whether at home or in a 
frame-shop, was throughout the period a constant source of friction between 
the framework knitters and their employers. The system provided a further 
positive motive, peculiar to the hosiery trade, for clinging to the old putting-out 
system and resisting change. A notable part of the manufacturers' profits 
came from the rent charged for the hired frames, especially if they resorted to 
the abuse of 'spreading' work over as many frames as possible and 
demanding full frame-rent in each case, even though something less than a 
full week's work had been given out. Small masters and middlemen were 
thereby enabled to undersell the larger and more reputable firms. And, in 
turn, the readiness of small employers and frame-hirers to let women,
29. Patterson, p62. 30. Victoria, p30S.
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children and newcomers from other trades to rent frames, for the sake of the 
rent, helped to perpetuate the over-crowding of the labour market. The 
hosiery industry in this respect seemed to have been caught in a vicious circle. 
The one-time hosier apprentice and, later, writer on his trade, Felkin, was well 
acquainted both with the wretched state of the Leicester stockingers in 1844 
and with the high profits made from frame-renting. Whilst a new frame cost at 
least £20, during periods of slack trade a second-hand machine could be 
bought for a few shillings and then rented for two shillings per week when 
trade revived. A Leicester framesmith admitted making 9-10% annual profit 
after paying for repairs (the average being about 7%), and the amount fell 
heavily on the workpeople. But the frame-rent position overall was 
complicated. To charge frame-rent was an insurance (or a recompense) 
against an undertaker, or even an individual workman, using the frame in part 
to do work for another employer. John and William Biggs (1842) deducted 
1/6d in the £ from wages for wear and tear of frames making hose: this being 
a lighter burden than the current rate, but was not over-popular as it had to be 
paid by many men whose frames were not hired from the Biggses but from 
independent frame-speculators -  in which case they had to go on paying 
frame-rent as well. Even so the Biggses were regarded as about the best 
hosier masters in town as they always paid the best wages the trade would 
allow and never resorted to the practice of charging full frame rent for less 
than a full week's work, nor knowingly allowed any middlemen who took out 
work from them to do so. They were even praised by a local hosier-hating 
Chartist leader named Thomas Cooper31.
In addition to frame-rent, the stockingers had other grievances such as low 
wages, frequent unemployment and truck-payment. The latter, a practice of
31. Patterson, pp380-384.
52
payment by goods rather than cash, was regulated by law in 1831 but this 
proved increasingly ineffectual until 1844 when a local anti-truck society was 
formed to enforce the law and oppose trucking, especially among small 
hosiers and middlemen. Between 1844 and 1846 nineteen out of twenty 
prosecutions were successful32.
In 1843 twenty five thousand stockingers in Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and 
Leicestershire signed a petition to the House of Commons concerning their 
grievances, and requested the appointment of a commission to regulate their 
increasingly inadequate wages and to arbitrate in disputes between masters 
and men. But the prevailing laissez-faire mood of Pariiament was 
unfavourable and the petition was rejected, thereby demonstrating that the 
stockingers could expect no help from Parliament. However, an investigatory 
commission was established under R. M. Muggeridge and his report was 
published in 1845. Muggeridge essentially took up the laissez-faire position 
that improvement was rather to be looked for from increased demands for 
hosiery than from any parliamentary legislation, and the report made gloomy 
reading. It presented a picture of an industry stuck in a rut -  left in the 
backwash of industrial progress33 -  whose leading figures, however 
enterprising they might be in other respects, had no beiief in the possibility of 
any radical change in its organisation. Muggeridge acknowledged the 
shortcomings of the 1831 Truck Act and concluded that the hosiery industry 
was depressed because of low earnings. Indeed all witnesses to the 
commission agreed that real wages had declined since 1815, although this 
was partly due to the ending of the French wars when military demand 
declined and English soldiers returned home to their frames. Stockingers' 
families were generally shabby in appearance, ill fed and ill housed. The
32. Victoria, p303. 33. Wells, p128.
53
report explicitly demonstrated many examples of poverty among the Leicester 
stockingers and irregularity of employment, especially in the glove trade. The 
supply of stockingers invariably exceeded demand thereby diminishing the 
value of their labour, exacerbated by the extension of employment of women 
and children in the unskilled jobs of winding, seaming and stitching. 
Muggeridge also acknowledged the question of frame-renting, which was 
always high when the stockinger worked in a frame-shop due to extra 
charges for the machine standing in the shop, for winding, taking in, putting 
out, seaming, needles, lighting and heating. The report showed the 
middlemen in a bad light over frame-rent abuses, although middlemen and 
hosiers were inclined to defend the system on the grounds that frame-renting 
was a means of securing constant employment, as the employer, needing the 
frame-rent, would have to give the work out. On the whole the manufacturers 
were apparently self-satisfied with existing arrangements.
But the frame-rent issue continued to burn throughout the middle years of the 
nineteenth century. An abortive bill to abolish frame-rent in 1853 was 
attacked in the House of Commons by William Biggs (then M.P. for Newport,
- I.O.W.), although his brother John had by that time abolished the system in all 
branches of his firm's business. Not until 1874, when the growth of the 
hosiery factory system was already making it an anachronism, was frame-rent 
finally abolished by law. However a steady improvement in the fortunes of the 
hosiery industry brought a new prosperity from 1860 onwards, and by 1868 
Leicester's 'lean stockinger' had disappeared34.
There were of course other industries in mid nineteenth century Leicester, 
some of which, like needlemaking and sinkermaking, produced equipment for
34. Victoria, pp308-310. See also Ch. 4, p85 andp87.
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the hosiery trade. Others formed part of the general textile industry, such as 
woolcombing, worsted spinning and dyeing. There was also some 
manufacture of lace, cotton thread, rope and twine, as weil as several iron 
foundries and manufacture of agricultural and other machines.
One important spin-off from hosiery making was the manufacture of elastic 
web, which began in 1839 when Caleb Bedells opened his Southgate Street 
factory -  to be followed soon after by a rival, J. Briggs. By 1861 twenty local 
firms were in production in what was apparentiy a true factory system from the 
start. Wages were high and profits easily made -  aided by the popularity of 
the elastic-sided boot, which in turn stimulated the local boot and shoe 
industry. Patterson notes that wages in fact dropped after the initial boom, but 
nevertheless remained significantly higher than any other part of the hosiery 
industry35.
The aforementioned boot and shoe industry in Leicester was considerable by 
mid century and expanded thereafter; the total local workforce grew from 
1,393 in 1851 to 11,000 by 1871. Although three wholesale shoemakers were 
in production by 1843, the footwear was often made individually to order, and 
there were no factories in the modern sense. Rather these were central 
shops which cut leather by hand and gave it out to domestic bootmakers, 
working at home, to make up by hand. In most cases the unit of production 
was the family plus apprentice(s). Even so in 1853 a strong step towards 
factory production was taken by T. and T. Crick who devised a system of 
riveting sole to upper by machine, and in 1858 Blake introduced a sole- 
sewing machine which sewed the insole (already attached to the upper) to the 
outer sole36.
35. Patterson, pp380-1. 36. Ellis, plOI.
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Perhaps the significant thing about Leicester's industrial scene is that apart 
from some notable strikes by worsted spinners and woolcombers during the 
early 1830s, discontent appears to have been confined to the hosiery trade -  
a point worth remembering in analyses of electoral behaviour.
c. Working Class Politics
Professor Asa Briggs regards the first half of the nineteenth century as an 
important formative period for both middle-class and working-class 
consciousness. He cites as an example the contemporary use of the terms 
'middle-classes' and 'working-classes', and occasionally 'middle-class' and 
'working-class', as indicative of this development. Before this period 
language suggested a more varied graduation: i.e. 'ranks, orders and degrees' 
(for social groups) and 'interests' (for economic groups). The new mode of 
thinking, he claims, led to a tendency to stress the divergent interests of the 
middle and working classes encouraged by both industrialisation and the 
1830s reforms.
Indeed the assessment seized upon at the time by many working-men was 
that, the 1832 Reform Act represented a betrayal by the middle-class 
'shopocracy' of its working-class allies, the 1834 Poor Law was the 
consequence of the assumption of power by the middle-classes in 1832, and 
the Anti-Corn Law League was an attempt to procure cheaper food so that 
the working-classes could then live on lower wages. However, F. 0. Mather 
indicates that these interpretations were based on much misconception -  that 
the 1832 Reform Act was a Whig aristocrat attempt to balance the old and 
new forces. The 1834 Poor Law was the outcome of the wishes of the landed
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interest to shed its old burden (which it had already been doing piecemeal well 
before 1834), rather than a manifestation of the aspirations of the middle- 
classes. In the case of the Anti-Corn Law League some of its leaders hoped 
to produce a raising of wages by a general extension of trade which was 
hoped would accompany repeal of the Corn Laws. Nevertheless, Mather 
admits that there is enough truth in the cruder interpretation of events to have 
made that version plausible and thus strengthen materially the antagonism of 
the workers towards the class immediately above them, although there was 
also a concomitant current of opinion which regarded the old aristocratic 
privileged class as the principal enemy, and the interests of the producers, 
employers and workman, as being in some sense united against them. This 
view was popularised by the Anti-Corn Law League itself and the middle- 
class reformers, including the socialist Robert Owen37.
However, in Leicester the early 1830s witnessed discord between 
manufacturers and employees. Though the evidence is fragmentary it is 
sufficient to show that local trade union activity was both larger than its share 
in the agitation for factory reforms, and attended by much more bitterness and 
unrest. Doherty's 'National Association for the Protection of Labour' (1830) 
absorbed the stockingers and other smail local trade societies. Widespread 
revival of trade union activity occurred throughout the Midlands in 1833 in 
consequence to the disappointment felt by the Whig reforms. Workers were 
now flocking into the surviving or newiy created regional and 'general' trade 
unions that were based on the separated societies which had previously 
existed. Cole and Postgate in their publication, 'The Common People', claim 
(probably with some exaggeration) that 'The theory of the class struggle now 
for the first time appeared overtly in British history as a dominant belief38
37. Mather, ppl7-18. 38. Cole and Postgate, p261.
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Among masters and men a bitter, aggressive mood developed; strikes were 
met by prosecution under the master and servant laws 'for leaving work 
unfinished'; masters were determined to destroy the local trades union whilst 
the working men were spoiling for a fight. In Leicester (1833) Baby's worsted 
spinning factory struck in support of dismissed women workers. A 'trades 
union secret committee' sent Baby a threatening letter demanding that the 
women be reinstated. The strike then spread to the woolcombers and severe 
sentences were passed on several strikers. By December 1833 the local 
stockingers became involved in the struggle when the hosiers appeared to be 
following the example of the master spinners in attempting to reduce wages. 
In 1834 the Leicester union became affiliated to the 'Grand National 
Consolidated Trade Union', whilst turning to co-operative production to 
augment their slender funds. However, all hope of building the 'Grand 
National' into a really comprehensive organisation of the working-classes was 
over by 1834, and where trades-unionism survived it kept quiet and set to work 
to rebuild its organisation on less ambitious lines, reverting to its earlier shape 
of small local societies in particular trades. Again it seems clear that the swift 
demise of the 'Grand National' was due to strong opposition from the 
employers. Different sets of employers (eg. the builders of Derby, the 
clothiers of Leeds, the hosiers of Leicester) offered workers the choice 
between leaving their employment or signing a document renouncing the 
union. In Leicester even the operative cordwainers (boot and shoemakers) 
vehementiy repudiated the charge of belonging to a trade union, claiming 
rather that their society had no connexion with any other.
Meanwhile the movement for factory reform had some bearing on Leicester. 
Actually there were few local factories at this time, and most of the agitation
58
centred in Lancashire and Yorkshire where power-driven machinery in cotton 
and woollen manufacture was predominant. Nevertheless the commissioners 
sent to investigate conditions of child labour in factories, when the Whig 
government established a royal commission instead of Lord Ashley's Ten 
Hours bill (1833), did visit Leicester and, in contrast with Yorkshire, were 
generally welcomed by the local working-classes. This seems to suggest that 
the Leicester workers were not entirely hostile towards the Whig reformers. In 
fact the Commissioners perceived that the worst local abuses were in the 
domestic system sector rather than in the factories39. The resulting 
government Act did effect some valuable improvements by limiting the hours 
of work for the young, but it did not go beyond what manufacturers, like the 
cotton spinner Whetstone, could regard with equanimity.
The period 1836-48 witnessed the phenomenon of Chartism as the principal 
activity in working-class politics. According to F. C. Mather support for 
Chartism was generally strong among two distinct categories. One category 
particularly active during the early Chartist period was the traditional skills 
sector: eg. printers, cordwainers, cabinetmakers, tailors and joiners: despite its 
relative affluence and improved living standards of the period. This traditional 
craft support thus owed less to transient economic pressure than to steady 
poiitical conviction -  an intellectual tradition stretching back at least to the 
London Corresponding Society of 1792. With time to read and study they 
were essentially labour aristocrats, with a mature political awareness well in 
advance of the mass of the working force. In fact radicalism among skilled 
artisans can be traced back to the fifteenth century Lollards who recruited a 
following from weavers, wheelwrights, smiths, carpenters, cordwainers and 
tailors. Mather's other category comprised stockingers, handloom weavers
39. Patterson, pp276-288.
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and woolcombers -  all unrevolutionised handicrafts, relics of an older order 
which were in a state of decay, with wages sinking to starvation level. Support 
for Chartism was remarkably slight in the smaller towns where the community 
remained closely-knit, thereby preventing the emergence of serious fissures 
of class. For example, in Glossop employers achieved remarkable success in 
maintaining contact with their workpeople through the churches and chapels, 
reading rooms, literary institutes and sporting clubs, which they and the local 
landowner helped to found. Likewise the new towns displayed relatively little 
support for Chartism where steam-powered factories were the norm. The 
evidence is not wholly consistent with the view that Chartism was a direct 
reaction against the industrial revolution. Rather it drew its main support from 
the outworkers -  surplus labour casualties induced by the expanding 
population and changing markets40. Craig Calhoun is broadly in agreement 
with this, although he clearly associates the rise of a class ideology with the 
new industrial workers: i.e. Calhoun identifies Chartism with the older, 
'populisf form of worker protest and criticises E. P. Thompson for not 
perceiving the subtle distinction. Whereas Thompson saw a 'working-class' 
emerging between 1790 and 1830 Calhoun stresses that this obscures the 
distinction between those for whom a conservative, traditionalist ideology 
could be the source of radicalism, and those for whom a forward-looking, 
even anti-capitalist, ideology was more often than not the source of 
reformism41.
Leicester thus, with its large pre-industrial labour force, provided fertile ground 
for Chartism, and the remnants of the early 1830s trade unionism and ten 
hours movement combined in the late 1830s to make Chartism a movement 
powerful enough to threaten revolution and to command the backing of the
40. Mather, plO. 41. Calhoun, p104.
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main body of the working-classes. Undoubtedly periodic depressions within 
the hosiery trade and consequential threat of workhouse incarceration was an 
influential factor. Patterson notes that there was an inherent weakness in the 
principle of the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act when applied to industrial 
areas because during depressions the inevitable outcome was destitution 
among groups such as the stockingers, where severe unemployment 
precluded the likelihood of (unsupplemented) wages rising in compensation, if 
indeed they were fortunate enough to have any work at all. This situation 
contrasted with the position of the agricultural labourers, especially in 
Southern England, whose wages had been kept deliberately low under the old 
Speenhamland system, and generally did rise after the 1834 provisions had 
been put into effect. It seems significant that Chartism blossomed in Leicester 
during 1838 when working-men were particularly hard-pressed by poverty 
and bitterly resentful of what they considered to be their employers' refusal to 
co-operate or help them. During the winter of 1838 a local petition bearing six 
thousand signatures was presented to Parliament, claiming that the abolition 
of outdoor relief would reduce wages still further, and this move led to the 
abandonment of the local workhouse policy despite the contemporary opening 
of a new and larger workhouse. However local opposition to the Poor Law 
was not as serious as in the north of England. This may have been partly 
due to the Conservative domination of the local board of guardians, who, 
partly through an intrinsic conservative distrust of radical measures of 
centralisation, uniformity and rigidity, and partly through a genuine sympathy 
for the poor, were inclined to resist enforcing the provisions of the 1834 Act42.
Actually 'Chartism' was a collective term. The movement came into existence 
in 1836 when Place and Lovett formed the 'London Working Men's
42. Patterson, pp275-295.
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Association' and drew up five points of what subsequently became the famous 
six-point charter. But by 1839, the year of its first high-water mark, it was 
apparent that much division existed among its leadership concerning tactics. 
Although various tactics were mooted43, for simplicity these can be reduced 
to the two approaches of 'moral force' and 'physical force'. Until 1842 the 
advocates of moral force prevailed strongly in Leicester, and this mirrored the 
Luddism of eariier years: i.e. violent approaches were in both cases confined 
to the northern part of the county. As in Wales Leicester's moral force 
approach may well have been partly influenced by an exceptional link between 
local Chartism and religious nonconformity, which heiped to mitigate the 
antagonism between the classes. The formidable Baptist minister. Rev. 
Mursell, certainly expressed his sympathies although he gave no active 
support for Chartism44. However, perhaps care should be taken before 
assuming from this that nonconformity held much sway among the lower 
classes during the mid-nineteenth century. The 1851 religious census 
indicated that the labouring classes were in general neither church nor chapel 
attenders. M. Halevy deemed puritan nonconformity a transitional creed for a 
man climbing from the irreligious lower end of the socio-economic ladder (i.e. 
unskilied labour/skilled workman), through the nonconformist small or modest 
businessman sector, to the Anglican higher reaches of society. The very 
institutions of nonconformity seemed to be designed for the man moving up 
the ladder, and success or failure in the worldly sphere looked very much the 
same inside chapel as outside it45.
Chartism itself was divided in the assessment of the contemporary power 
structure: i.e. who its principal opponents were: and this question of authority 
has been a source of controversy among twentieth century historians. For
43. Hammond, pp26S-270. 44. Victoria, p210. 45. Hammond, pp217-249.
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example, during the First World War decade Mark Novell assumed the 
middle-classes won power in 1832. More recently Dr. Kitson Clark believed 
the nobility and gentry still exerted ultimate control In the decades after 1832. 
Thus the middle-class reformers, not so sure of themselves as was believed 
earlier, courted support from the working-classes -  some by advocating 
further pariiamentary reforms along Chartist iines46. Often the Chartists 
themseives saw the importance of ailying with the manufacturing middle- 
classes. For example their prominent leader Feargus O'Connor declared In 
1841:
... 'it was in the working man's interest to uphold capital' for they could not 
all be capitalists ...'47;
while William Lovett saw the pragmatic necessity of working with the middle- 
class reformers, since aliies in Pariiament were needed to present Chartist 
bills. By the time of the final high-water mark of the movement's fortunes 
(1848) O'Connor was appearing on platforms with middle-class radicals, 
emphasising (like John Bright) the unity of middle and working classes against 
the aristocracy -  a union O'Connor himself called:
... 'mental labour on the one hand and manual labour on the other"... .48
One notable middle-class radical who shared a platform with O'Connor in 
1848 was Sir Joshua Waimesley, who became a Leicester M-P- in 1852.
Other Chartists rejected co-operation with the middle-classes, seeing them 
as the principal enemy. Certainly the eventual Chartist leader, Ernest Jones, 
pleaded for workers to purge the movement of middle-class leaders, whom,
46. Kitson Clark, p7. 47. Mather, p5. 48. Ibid,p20
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he claimed, were trying to play into the hands of class-selfishness. The 
middle class called meetings and misused the people's name, and therefore 
the first thing was to prevent the old dodge from being played once more49. 
And, as McCord points out, some Chartists lost no time in expressing their 
hostility to the anti-Corn Law agitation, which they condemned as a middle- 
class trick designed to drag a red herring before the workers to distract them 
from their real grievances and the fight for the political rights embodied in the 
People's CharterSO. ln Britain as a whole this seems to have particularly been 
the case between 1840 and 1842 when a severe trade depression, coinciding 
with very high food prices, raised social tensions of all kinds, according to F. 
C. Mather, to a pitch not perhaps to be reached again until after 1880. 
Middle-class magistrates and special constables frequently suppressed 
Chartist demonstrations during this period. In Leicester the rise to prominence 
of Thomas Cooper in the movement in 1842 brought local Chartism into 
conflict with the manufacturing classesSI. Two years earlier Cooper had 
made his first close contact with the abysmal poverty of the Leicester 
stockingers and was, apparently, shocked by it into becoming a Chartist. He 
denounced the hosiers and other employers as responsible, through their 
greed and selfishness, for the distress of the working-classes. In turn he was 
as stoutly resisted by the Liberal manufacturers as by anyone else in the 
propertied classes. Cooper also deemed Corn Law repeal and laissez-faire 
doctrines as beneficial only to the Liberal manufacturers, and the Anti-Corn 
Law League itself (locally founded under the influence of the radical hosier, 
John Biggs, in 1838) as a deliberate manoeuvre to divert attention from the 
Charter. On August 19th 1842 there was a local abortive skirmish between 
fifteen hundred Chartist demonstrators and the yeomanry, known as the 'battle 
of Mowmacre Hill'. However, the emergence of this 'physical-force' mood
49. Calhoun, p6. 50. McCord (1968), p45. 51. Victoria, p212.
64
perhaps owed more to the personality of Cooper than to local conditions of 
distress, for, though in January 1842 five thousand were receiving outdoor 
relief, similar distress occurred in the 1839-40 winter without disturbances or 
increase in Chartist activity, then at low ebb. Cooper himself was imprisoned 
for sedition in the Potteries soon after52.
Although more serious riots occurred in 1848, progressively through the 1840s 
a reconciliation between the middle and working classes began to emerge 
both in Leicester and elsewhere. This was undoubtedly assisted by the 
improvement in the economic situation after 1842, while the repeal of the Corn 
Laws in 1846 removed an important bone of contention, enabling the relations 
between classes to become smoother. The more moderate Chartists 
succeeded in spurring a portion of the middle-classes into taking up franchise 
reform as a means of winning working-class support in their battle against 
Toryism and aristocratic privilege.
From 1846 onwards the Leicester Chartist leadership was recruited 
predominantly from among the working men, and the movement began to 
nourish the idea of labour as a separate entity. However, Mather claims that 
although this trend suggests at least a limited existence of working-class 
consciousness, in Chartist times a single working-class, clearly differentiated 
from the middle-class, did not fully exist. Rather it was under a substantially 
different set of conditioning circumstances, economic and political, that a 
working-force sufficiently united to launch its own political party came into 
being between the 1880s and 191953.
52. Patterson, pp304-315: Ellis pp99-101. 53. Mather, pp25-30.
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The last Chartist revival during 1848 was concurrent with Poor Law riots in 
Leicester, which arose when the unemployed were being put to work in the 
stone-yards. But although there was no evidence to indicate explicit Chartist 
involvement in the disturbances Chartism seemed to some blameworthy, 
particularly among the propertied classes where a renewed fear of insurrection 
was spreading. The riots even shook the precarious rapprochement between 
the local Chartists and the Liberal reformers, although differences of opinion 
were already apparent: i.e. on the issue of the franchise the moderate 
Whetstone advocated household suffrage, the Biggses manhood suffrage, 
while local Chartist leader, John Markham, wanted the whole six-point 
charter.
Chartism declined rapidly everywhere towards the end of 1848. Patterson 
indicates that the key to its decline was that it had been essentially a hunger 
movement, born of hard times. When, after the 1840s, times began to be a 
little less hard it came to an end. As a Chartist leader George Wray 
exclaimed:
... There are hundreds of young men in Leicester who pretend to be 
Chartists and have been good members of the Association -  when they 
were haif-starved -  but as soon as they got employment they forgot their 
political duties'... .54
It was certainly true that by 1850 England, and especially Leicester, having 
passed from the 'hungry forties' was beginning to enjoy progressively better 
times on the whole, and by the turn of the twentieth century the town was 
numbered among the richest in Europe.
54. Patterson, p363.
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After 1848 the former Chartist activists moved in three different directions. A 
few locals, like Green, joined the avowediy socialist remnant of the movement 
led by Ernest Jones, but never achieved popular support. Others moved into 
the revitalised trade unions and co-operative movement. But especially 
significant in its implication for electoral behaviour of the 1850s and early 
1860s was the absorption of the more moderate wing of the movement into 
the radical wing of the local Liberal party. John Markham, a cordwainer and 
erstwhile Primitive Methodist preacher, was a notable example, becoming a 
Liberal town councillorSS. The Liberal left, under John Biggs's leadership, was 
to fight a succession of parliamentary elections advocating a programme 
which fell only just short of the six-point charter itself -  a point their less- 
radical opponents within the local parties, anxious to appeal to anti-Chartist 
sentiment, were often quick to draw attention to in their respective 
newspapers.
55. Ibid, p363.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Leicester 1832-67: -  Pariiamentary Politics
The nationwide excitement which accompanied the debate over the parliamentary 
Reform bill (1831-2) was mirrored in Leicester, although there were no incidences of 
riot such as occurred in Derby, Nottingham and Bristol when the House of Lords 
rejected the bill in 1831. Rather Leicester took the lead of Birmingham, which had 
formed a 'Political Union' of middle-class and working-class radicals (1830) and was 
urging other towns to form similar associations in order to make the wishes of the 
country overwhelmingly evident. The Leicester 'Political Union' was formed in 1832.
Under the provisions of the 1832 Reform Act a considerable number of working-men 
retained the vote through their 'ancient righf freemen status, even though the new 
franchise only included freemen entitled by birth and servitude and residing within 
seven miles of the borough. The outcome being that the 2,500 non-resident freemen 
listed in 1826 were reduced to 500 after 1832. Thenceforth the local electorate grew
slowly, but by 1852 it was still well below the pre-reform figure. Many of the freemen
and 'scot & lot' voters retaining the franchise were below the social and economic 
level of the £10 householders, and were accustomed to regard electoral bribes as 
their inalienable privilege!.
The new franchise favoured the cause of the opposition Liberal group. Despite the 
formation of a Conservative society supported by the 'Leicester Journal', the Liberals 
were better equipped, having their rallying points in the chapels, better techniques in 
registration and their own 'Liberal Reform Society'. Thus, the general election of 
December 1832 produced a victory for the reformers, Wynn Ellis and William Evans 
becoming the town's M.P.s2.
1. Patterson, pp187-193. 2. Victoria, p i 47.
68
As in the sphere of municipal politics after the Municipal and Corporations Act (1835), 
so in the local parliamentary sphere after 1832 the reformers were predominant for 
thirty-five years, although their predominance was briefly broken twice before the 
second Reform Act of 1867. But the general pattern among the local Liberals 
showed a theme of conflict beneath the surface of an apparently smooth and cosy 
triumph: i.e. conflicts between the reformers themselves. These conflicts were 
subdued in the face of a common enemy, but sharpened in response to social 
distress and religious discontent. In fact the period between the first and second 
Reform Acts (1832-67) witnessed a complete cycle of revolution in Leicester's 
Liberal parliamentary politics. It began in unity, dissoived into discord and then 
outright war, but ultimately recoiled into a lasting concord. The elections between 
1847 and 1861 were fought during the middle stage of the cycle.
The first break in the Liberals' parliamentary hold on the town occurred in the general 
election of January 1835, following the dismissal of Lord Melbourne's Whig ministry 
by King William IV. Although the Whigs triumphed nationally against the new-look, 
moderate Conservatism promulgated in Peel's 'Tamworth Manifesto', two 
Conservatives, Goulburn and Thomas Gladstone (brother to W. E. Gladstone), were 
returned for Leicester. It seems that the result was a manifestation of a loss of 
radical impetus, due to their disillusionment with the Whigs over the 1834 Poor Law 
and anger over the Tolpuddle martyrs, whilst a concomitant Conservative revival 
occurred, doubtlessly helped by Peel's moderation, and roused by the call to defend 
the Church against the local Church-rates campaign and the ecclesiastical policy of 
the Whig governments.
3. lbid,pp202-3.
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But an important effect of the 1835 Municipal and Corporations Act was to deprive 
the local Conservatives of their most effective political organization (i.e. the old 
corporation), whiist the Liberals benefited in prestige by their control of the new 
council, and the annual council elections kept their electoral machinery in constant 
motion. The ascendancy of the Liberal reformers was founded upon the control they 
succeeded in establishing over the wards and parishes, and they were inspired by 
the crusading vigour of dissent. For the general election of 1837, fully recovered from 
the 1835 setback, they selected Samual Duckworth and John Easthope to contest 
the two parliamentary seats, having dropped the moderate Evans, and successfully 
campaigned with a vigorous, radical programme comprising a national educational 
system, household suffrage, the ballot, triennial parliaments, abolition of compulsory 
Church-rates, 'Justice for Ireland', reform of the new Poor Law and repeal of the 
Corn Laws4.
The defeated Conservatives, though levelling accusations of bribery and corruption 
against the Liberals, had several disadvantages. The record of the old corporation 
still clung to them, while their connection with the Established Church put them on the 
defensive in a town where nonconformity was gaining strength. After the 1837 
election they were in a dispirited, hopeless position. Their membership, comprising 
gentry, professional men and some shopkeepers, could not compete financially with 
the moneyed power of the Liberals. In contrast the latter were well organised. The 
'Liberal Reform Society' controlled the funds, selected candidates and maintained a 
paid agent who kept in touch with the electors. A committee of eighteen was elected 
annually by a general meeting of subscribers, and similar organisations were 
established in the wards, controlled by secretaries and elected committees of their 
own. The candidates were not imposed on the party by central committee but 
submitted to the approval of delegates elected by the wards and to a general meeting
4. Patterson, pp232-3.
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of the Liberal electors, in 1856 the local Liberals boasted that their machinery for 
working the wards in connexion with the Liberal interest was complete and efficient to 
the extent that they were, in the 1852 general election campaign, able in one day to 
compute the force they should have. The 'Caucus' principle was thus developed in 
Leicester long before it was perfected in BirminghamS.
Even so a lapse in their efforts in ward control in 1838 brought alarm when 
Duckworth resigned of necessity on his appointment to a Mastership of the Rolls, and 
the possibility of a Conservative-Chartist alliance arose based on a mutual 
condemnation of the 1834 Poor Law. However, the Chartist hopefuls, John Markham 
and Colonel P. Thompson, both eventually declined to stand, and the Liberals 
decided to bring back Wynn Ellis who succeeded in attracting the Chartist vote and 
totalled 1,666 votes against the inexperienced Conservative landowner, Frewin, who 
obtained 1,371. Thus for a time the Liberals felt secure from the Chartist threatB.
But in the 1841 general election the Chartists, now under Thomas Cooper, who was 
more hostile towards employers and thus less willing to compromise with the middle- 
class Liberals, supported the Conservatives. They were however defeated by the 
Liberals without recourse to a poll; Wynn Ellis and John Easthope being elected 
unopposed on a policy of Corn Law repeal. Church rates abolition and reform of the 
Whig Poor Law7.
Although throughout the 1840s the Leicester Liberals remained clearly more radical 
than the Whig leadership strains developed, especially around the issues of religious 
equality, suffrage extension and Chartism. All these markedly exposed the different 
degrees of radicalism and strained the unity of the party. In the case of the Church 
rates issue some advocated openly defying the law, others advocated obeying the
5. Victoria, pp204-6. 6. Patterson, pp297-308. 7. Victoria, p206
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law until the Whigs changed it. This difference of opinion coincided with differences 
of religious denomination: i.e. the Unitarians stood for moderation, but the 
Congregationalists and Baptists stood for direct action and helped to found the 
'British anti-state Church Association (Liberation Society)' in 1844. As in the 
seventeenth century, religious radicalism led readily to political radicalism. Clerical 
privilege was seen as hand in hand with aristocratic privilege. The growing bitterness 
between the radical 'Leicestershire Mercury* and the more moderate 'Leicester 
Chronicle' reflected the strain within the local Liberal party. But it must be stressed 
that local radical pressure originated not only in dissent but also in response to 
ChartismS (originating from among the more intelligent artisans), as indicated by the 
founding, in 1842, of a local branch of the 'Complete Suffrage Association' to revive 
the union of middle-classes and working-classes that had been achieved during the 
earlier struggle for reform. Thus the radical wing began to demand 'universal 
suffrage' whilst the moderates wanted only 'household suffrage'. The rift within the 
Leicester Liberal party was contained so long as the two factions shared common 
ground in their opposition to the Corn Laws. When in 1846 the Corn Laws were 
repealed the split became consequently more obvious. The 'moderates' led by 
Joseph Whetstone, increasingly fearful of the direction and extent to which radicalism 
was moving, became closer to Lord John Russell's Whig ministry, which was 
attempting to divert attention away from parliamentary reform by turning to relatively 
uncontroversial, consensus politics such as sanitary reform, prison discipline and 
education. The 'extremists' or 'ultra-radicals', supported by the 'Mercury' newspaper, 
took a vigorous part in the developing campaign for universal (manhood) suffrage 
and concessions to nonconformity, including Church disestablishment, although the 
faction was not entirely composed of dissenters. They were reinforced by the 
personage of John Biggs, the local wealthy hosiery manufacturer, who had earlier 
been a balancing figure between the two wings, but had become increasingly
8. See Chapter 3, pp58-66.
72
associated with the left after the Corn Law repeal. Patterson notes that personal 
factors also contributed towards the growing schism and new political alignment 
which was taking place in Leicester. The older leaders, families prominent in the 
trade and politics (insofar as they were allowed, as dissenters) of the town since the 
late eighteenth century, resented the passing of their leadership to thrusting, self- 
made fellows such as the Biggs brothers.
Meanwhile the local Conservative opposition was developing a moderate or Peelite 
flank. The radicals, by winning back the working-men as they became disillusioned 
by the initial failure of Chartism, brought the possibility of a Whig-Peelite alliance. 
Thus the national political scene of the period, with its blurring of former party iines, 
was partly reflected in Leicester, but with one sharp and all-important difference -  
the numbers and predominance of the radicals.
The 1847 general election forced the issue between the local Whigs (or rather the 
'moderates') and radicals. The contemporary distress within the hosiery trade gave 
impetus to the radicals, who were not satisfied with the sitting members, Easthope 
and Wynn Ellis, whom had quarrelled with the Biggses and other radical chiefs over 
the extent of their 1841 election expenses. Also Ellis was considered too fully 
associated with Lord Russell's cautious Whig ministry, whilst Easthope had offended 
nonconformity by refusing to vote against Graham's Education bill (1843), which was 
thought to bestow dangerous privileges on the Established Church. However, the left 
was not yet quite united, because although the Biggses, Richard Harris and other 
erstwhile centrists had now adopted manhood suffrage and disestablishment, the 
extreme nonconformist left (eg. the Rev. Mursell) were suspicious of their pro­
education sympathies9.
9. Patterson, pp333-343.
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The Liberals eventually chose as one candidate Sir Joshua Walmesley, a prominent 
Liverpool corn merchant, whose local association dated back to 1831 by a 
partnership with John Ellis in the Leicestershire local mines at Snibston and Whitwick. 
He was part-proprietor of the 'Daily News' (founded in 1846 as organ of the 'New 
Reform Movemenf) and an outspoken radical who favoured disestablishment even 
though he was an AnglicanlO. A few days prior to the 1847 election the 
'Leicestershire Mercury'quoted Walmesley:
'... From conviction a member of the Church of England I am satisfied that the best 
service which can be rendered to that Church, and to the cause of true religion, is 
the removal of every ground for just complaint on the part of the dissenter. ...'11
Walmesley's remark was of course tantamount to a direct call for disestablishment, 
since the leaders of the 'new dissent' (eg. Mursell and E. T. Miall) had long 
demanded it as a basis for removing dissenting grievances.
The 'Leicester Chronicle', as mouthpiece of the moderate Liberals, criticized the 
selection of Walmesley in a manner which, in a roundabout way, seems to 
demonstrate Patterson's claim of antipathy among the older Liberals towards the new 
'self-made fellows':
'... Why, we must go to Liverpool; bring thence a man of whom we know nothing, 
save but by report, and hug him to our hearts as a sworn brother. We do not want 
an aristocratic man, or a man who has made a public situation the means of 
obtaining honour. Therefore we are to choose ^Joshua  Walmesley, of Liverpool, 
who when mayor of that town a few years since, was dubbed a Knight by her 
majesty. We (say them by implication) do not want men who have been the 
'architects of their own fortunes': therefore a gentleman who has been a successful 
speculator in corn and raiiroad shares, and is now a man of wealth, M s u it us! -  
Out upon the emptiness and worthlessness of the pleas that disappointed ambition 
puts forth to do its mischievous work! ...'12 (original emphasis)
10. Victoria, PP214-215. 11. LM. 24-7-1847. 12. LC. 20-2-1847.
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Walmesley's partner in the 1847 contest for the two-seat borough was another 
radical, Manchester mill-owner Richard Gardner. He too opposed the continued 
establishment of the Church of England and the endowment of any religious body by 
the state13.
The Conservatives put up a reformist Peelite, J. W. Parker. He tried to win over the 
Whig/moderate support by denouncing Walmesley and Gardner as dangerous ultra­
radicals. He said that he would 'protect the Church', show sincere respect for 
nonconformity and uphold the cause of 'protestant truth' against Romanism14.
This clear anti-Romanist stance of Parker appears to mirror the prevailing religious 
outlook in late 1840s Leicester, assuming the local press was a reliable reflection of 
opinion. Although the radical 'Mercury' gave it little attention, the moderate-Liberal 
'Chronicle' seems to have directed its religious attack principaliy against the 
Romanists, and was at one with the local Conservative organ, the 'Leicester Journal'. 
The latter, though it condemned 'bigotry, persecution and intolerance' towards the 
Romanist population of Britain and Ireland, it vigorously denounced the RC 
priesthood as the 'wily and revered apostles of Satan'15. It is true that the 'Chronicle' 
had an occasional swipe at the Established Church, like in its criticism of Lord 
Russell's support for the Bishopric of Manchester bill:
'... The country requires no more Bishops: their absence from the House of Lords 
would scarcely cause a tear to be shed in the Nation... '16
Nevertheless the 'Chronicle' made no direct calls for disestablishment and praised 
Lord Russell's anti-religious-discrimination outlook. Thus whereas 'church versus 
dissent' had been the dominant theme in the municipal politics of Leicester during the 
1830s and early 1840s, on the whole it appears that, insofar as religion was under
13. LM. 4-7-1847. 14. Victoria, p216. 15. LJ. 25-6-1847.
16. LC. 24-7-1847.
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scrutiny in 1847, it was more a case of 'Protestantism versus Romanism'. The 1845 
government grant to the R.C. seminary at Maynooth seems chiefly responsible for 
this development, and it appears significant that in his election address Gardner 
deemed it expedient to make an explicit reference to Romanism within his overall 
disestablishment standpoint:
' I am of course opposed, on principle, to the endowment by the state of the 
Roman Catholics, or any other religious body... '17
These attitudes reflect the point made by G. I. T. Machin that the Maynooth Grant, an 
important part of Peel's Irish policy, caused nationwide opposition and a split in the 
Conservative party (eg. Parker was a Peelite but spoke against the grant) 18.
The fourth prospective candidate in the 1847 election was George Buckby, the 
Chartist, who plunged into a campaign in which frame-rent was a burning issue, and 
the stockingers were consequently alienated from the hosiers, including John Biggs 
himself19. So, as in 1841, there arose the possibility of a Conservative-Chartist 
alliance. The 'Journal' expressed regret at the termination of parliamentary 
discussion on Halford's bill (which proposed control and ultimate abolition of the 
system of frame-rent) and attacked the sitting M. P., Wynn Ellis, for seemingly 
blaming the stockingers' lack of education, rather than the system, for their piight: i.e. 
their habits and the practice of putting their offspring to the trade. The 'Journal' 
stressed:
'. . .  You must first put the people into a condition to receive education and to 
exercise seif-control; as otherwise ail the discussions in Parliament on the 
advantages of education wiii be as useiess as putting food before an Inanimate 
body, or applying medicine to a corpse. ... Towards this end, we believe, the 
abolition of the Frame-rent and middleman system will tend: hence we pray its 
abolition, that a better superstructure may be raised upon the present unstable
foundations. ...'20
17. U . 23-7-1847. 18. Mach'in (1967), pp61-67. 19. Patterson, p345.
20. LJ. 14-5-1847.
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The 'Journal' maintained its attack on Wynn Ellis as the election approached, 
accusing him again of favouring the middlemen and the archaic system which was 
particuiarly open to abuses, and made a repeat call for the abolition of the frame-rent 
and middleman system by Law21.
It was of course both easy and convenient for the Conservatives, neither dependent 
on nor representative of the manufacturing interest, to side with the working-men 
during industrial discord. Nevertheless this stance mirrored earlier nationwide 
developments since 1832, such as Conservative support for the 'ten hours 
movemenf and their sympathy towards the working-men in the face of the Whig 
Poor Law of 1834 (although the Leicester reformists too sought consistently to 
ameliorate effects of the Poor Law during the late 1830s and 1840s). But it was less 
easy for the Liberals, and the 'Mercury' demonstrated the limits of its radicalism when 
confronted with the frame-rent question. Sir Henry Halford M.P. wished to compel 
the hosier masters to issue tickets to the stockingers for work done and for frame- 
rent;22. The 'Mercury, however, was cool towards the proposal:
' But we feel that to restrict these charges to a pariiamentary standard -  to 
prevent them from being matters of bargain and contract -  to enact that they shall 
never exceed a given proportion of the gross earnings when the workman may 
have lost half his time in idleness or pleasure -  or to deprive the owner of a frame 
of the first week's rent -  is an arbitrary and despotic interference with the rights of
property and the freedom of trade ...'23
The attitude of the moderate 'Chronicle' was similar and played upon the stockingers' 
perennial fear at the prospect of being forced into a fully-fledged factory system:
'... We feel certain that the inevitable consequence of the abolition of frame-rent 
by law would be the almost immediate removal of the machines from the houses of ■ 
the workmen, and the partial placing of them in factories' ...24
21. Ibid21-5-1847. 22. Patterson, p386. 23. LM. 23-1-1847.
24. LC. 27-3-1847.
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As it turned out no Conservative-Chartist alliance emerged. Buckby withdrew from 
the contest and advised his supporters to vote for Walmesley and Gardner. It 
appears that Walmesley himself played the leading role in this development, for he 
promised to help the stockingers 'in any way he could' (This was a sincere 
undertaking; Walmesley subsequently supported the abortive 1853 pariiamentary 
attempt to abolish frame-rent, and thus became the stockingers' champion).
Walmesley and Gardner won the 1847 election (see Appendix 1A)t but the Liberal 
majority was down on the 'show of hands' victory of 1841. Patterson claims that this 
was the outcome of considerable abstentions among sympathisers of the spurned 
sitting members, whom he describes as 'Whigs'25. However, the 'Chronicle' did not 
view the moderate section of the local Liberal party in this light, although the 
newspaper itself did share the contemporary Whig stress on the priority of sanitary 
reform and education. Rather it saw the real 'Whigs' as epitomised in the personage 
of Lord Russell: i.e. liberally-inclined but more liberal out of office than when in, and 
possibly even retreating from earlier liberal ground. It deemed the bulk of the 
contemporary Liberal party to be comprised 'progressives' ('as ÿlE  belong to') and 
'ultras'26. The 'Chronicle's' political stance during the 1847 contest was perhaps 
appropriately summed up in its editorial of May 29th 1847:
'... Our only desire is ... to witness the election of two sound progressive reformers 
for Leicester -  two men who will represent the majority of the Liberal party ably and 
faithfully. But we feel certain the party will not generally support men who hold 
opinions of an extreme or ultra character'27
And, after the result was declared:
25. Patterson, pp345-7. 26. LC. 15-5-1847. 27. Ibid, 29-5-1847.
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representatives... Leicester has returned two complete suffragists and anti-state- 
Church men; while the bulk of the constituency are realiy neither the one nor the
other.'28
The 'Chronicle' suggested that though the friends of Wynn Ellis had remained neutral, 
the success of Walmesley and Gardner m s  primarily due to a prevailing anti-Tory 
disposition among the electorate.29
But on a more ominous note the Conservative 'Journal' remarked:
'... We have the names of parties who received money to vote green instead of 
blue, and we know personally others who were told that if they chose to vote for the 
green party they could be told where they might make sure of a sovereign. These 
are the acts which have carried the return, and these are the acts of the party who 
claim the extensions of the suffrage and the Ballot... '30
The 'Journal' was on the mark for, as elsewhere in the 1847 general election, bribery 
was rife in Leicester, and a petition led to the disqualification of Walmesley and 
Gardner. Two of their supporters, John Ellis and Richard Harris, decided to stand in 
their place to 'keep the seats warm for the dispossessed members', and no poll was 
found to be necessary. In November 1847 John Biggs received the consolation of 
being elected mayor of the borough for a second term, during which he led the 
'expenders' on a discordant stage against the 'economists', and adopted the cause of 
national secular education31.
Five years later, in 1852, when, during the brief minority government of Lord Derby, 
the nation prepared for another general election, the Leicester Liberals again invited 
Walmesley and Gardner to stand. This action provoked an even more serious 
response from the moderate section of the party than had been the case in 1847. It 
seems that during the intervening period the minority moderates became more
28. Ibid31-7-1847. 29. Ibid. 30. LJ. 30-7-1847.
31. Patterson, pp341-8.
Victoria, pp217-8.
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cautious towards reformist ideas, and two developments influenced their outiook. 
One was the local Poor Law riots of 1848 which, occurring at the time of the final 
Chartist crisis, were (probably wrongly) laid at the door of the Chartist campaigners. 
The other was Louis Napoleon's 1851 coup d'etat and plebiscite which sanctioned his 
dictatorship of France. These developments warned them afresh of the dangers in 
political experiment and universal suffrage32.
But the ultra-radicals were unabashed and campaigned on a programme possibly 
even more radical than in 1847. The election addresses of Walmesley and Gardner 
pledged a programme including the suffrage for all tax-payers, the ballot, triennial 
parliaments, and abolition of the property qualification for M.P.s. This clearly had 
much in common with the Chartists' 'six points' -  a feature which the moderates 
readily fastened upon. A veteran moderate, T. T. Paget, summed up his colleagues' 
attitude in a speech which was published in the 'Mercury* and entitled 'To the 
Chartists (sic)':
'... Universal suffrage has not prevented a neighbouring country from faliing under 
the most cruel and degrading tyranny the world has ever seen. The first object of 
the French Dictator has been to destroy that bulwark against oppression, which the 
Middle-classes in every country afforded Ijy their superior advantages of education 
and property, to their humbler brethren...'33
The 1852 opposition to the dominant radical section of the Leicester Liberal party 
indeed went a stage further than 1847. Several well-known and influential 
characters, including Paget himself and Robert Brewin (both acknowledged as 
numbering among the 'founding fathers' of the local Liberal party), J. Whetstone and 
James Thompson (editor of the 'Chronicle'), rallied and produced two rival 
candidates, James Wilde and Geoffrey Palmer. As the 'Chronicle' reported:
32. Patterson, pp359-361. 33. LM. 29-5-1852.
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' He (Mr. Whetstone) evidently felt it to be a painful but necessary duty to show 
tliat he objected on principle to support candidates whose views approached so 
closely to the Chartist doctrines as to be scarcely distinguishable from them...
And, as the 'Chronicle' itself commented:
'... We cannot disguise from ourselves the fact that the more active and organised
section of the hitherto Liberal party has gone over to Chartism ...'34
The newspaper also pointed out that one of the former local Chartist leaders, John 
Markham, now numbered among the ultra-radical Liberals35.
With the wholehearted support of the 'Chronicle' the moderates staunchly opposed 
the idea of universal suffrage. The radicals wanted to give the vote to both 
householders and lodgers, but the moderates saw the plan as a trick designed to 
disguise what was, in reality, almost tantamount to Chartism's 'universal suffrage', 
and to make it instead appear only as a slight modification of 'household suffrage'. 
The moderates were prepared to accept only 'household suffrage' because, as they 
saw it, only the householders had stood the test of character -  otherwise they would 
not have remained householders for iongSG. Candidate James Wilde himself said 
that he did not want to see the idle, worthless and dissolute put on a level with the 
honest and laborious, otherwise every institution held valuable and dear would be in 
jeopardy: it was therefore the electors' duty to discriminate between Liberalism and 
the Chartism of Walmesley and Gardner)?. Wilde's partner, Geoffrey Palmer, 
likewise opposed 'pernicious Chartist doctrines' and dubbed Walmesley and Gardner 
'the lions rampant of Chartism'38, whilst the 'Chronicle' seldom lost an opportunity to 
remind its readership of the leanings of the radical section of the party:
'... although the leader of the Chartist party, Mr. John Biggs, had lately ...'39
34 LC 20-3-1852. 35. Ibid, 5-6-1852. smaisoat3.pee 36. LC. 3-4-1852.
37. Ibid, 29-5-1852. 38. Ibid, 26-6-1852. 39. Ibid, 22-5-1852.
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An almost inevitable development in the conflict was for the moderates to seek a 
rapprochement with the iocai Conservatives. As T. T. Paget wrote in an open ietter 
to the Conservatives:
'... We differ from you in General Politics... but we believe that you will aid us in 
vindicating our local independence from the fetters of a Chartist clique ...'40
The 'Journal' expressed doubt concerning the wisdom of not fighting Walmesley and 
Gardner with a Tory candidate, but said that it would accept its party's decision. A 
meeting of Conservative electors, held in early June 1852, opted to throw their weight 
behind Wilde and Palmer, and in so doing consciously drew a parallel with 1800, 
when the Whigs and Tories united to beat the Jacobins41.
Naturally enough the 'Mercury' defended the ultra-radicals:
'. . .  The cause of the difference is no angry collision of sentiments, no widely- 
removed principles, no irreconcilable distinctions in social or political creed. The 
ambition of a selfish minority is the only origin of the dissention ... . It has 
summoned as allies the leading members of that party whose principles it once 
affected to hold in abhorrence ... . It has been assiduously asserted that Sir 
Joshua Walmesley and Mr. Richard Gardner are the express nominees of 
Chartists and Communists, although the assembly which determined on their 
nomination was composed of Liberals of all shades and descriptions, among whom 
there was probably not a single avowed Communist, and of whom the great 
m^ority have never advocated or given in their adhesion to the People's Charter
And, as the contest progressed:
'... Leicester is not the only place in which a querulous Whig Minority... has ended 
a systematic course of unworthy machinations by open alliance with reactionists 
and obstructives ...'43
40. LM. 29-5-1852. 41. LJ. 4-6-1852. 42. LM. 29-5-1852.
43. Ibid, 12-6-1852.
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The relatively improved conditions within the hosiery trade by 1852 led to the decline 
in impetus of the Poor Law relief question. The radicals seemed disinclined to be 
drawn on the matter, but the moderate 'Chronicle' advocated a firm line. It stressed 
that although it desired humane treatment for the young, old and incapable, the able- 
bodied paupers should be strictly dealt with: they should not be encouraged to be 
kept by the ratepayers, most of whom were only a few degrees higher in the social 
scale than the paupers themselves.44 As in 1847 the 'Chronicle' deemed education 
to be the appropriate vehicle for generating improved moral conduct and industrious 
habits: and, as a side-swipe to the radicals commented:
'... It is now the fashion to flatter only one class -  the working class ...'45
On the religion front, the issue of disestablishment was again raised. As before 
Walmesley and Gardner advocated disestablishment46, whilst their opponents, like 
Parker in 1847, were loyal Anglicans47 -  a fact which was probably crucial in their 
alliance with the Conservatives. But on the whole it appears that, compared to the 
burning issue of the suffrage, the disestablishment question was a relative side­
show. It was a different matter, however, with Romanism. As in 1847 the radicals 
tended to ignore this topic, but their opponents did their best to make an election 
issue of it, and the tone of their respective organs in 1852 was rather more frenzied 
than during the 1847 election campaign. The Conservative 'Journal' stressed that the 
forthcoming election was all about 'Queen versus Pope', and exclaimed:
' ... We complain that Popery is persecuting, domineering and aggressive, we 
therefore pay it £30,000 a year to strengthen it for more assaults on our liberty 
•48
44. LC. 27-3-1852. 45. Ibid, 13-3-1852. 46. Ibid, 5-6-1852.
47. Victoria, p219. 48. LJ. 28-5-1852.
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The 'Journal' was of course referring to the continuance of the 1845 Maynooth Grant. 
But it appears that the contemporary antipathy by the Conservatives hinged more 
upon the seeming pretentiousness of the Roman Church in establishing an English 
regular hierarchy in 1850. Wilde expressed his abhorrence of this move, but the 
'Mercuiy was quick to note the absence of 'Maynooth' from both his and Palmer's 
election addresses49. The 'Chronicle' was very hostile towards the continuance of 
the Maynooth Grant, declaring the Irish college to be a 'hotbed of treason, sedition 
and dissatisfaction' and that it 'ought to be suppressed', it accused Walmesley and 
Gardner of being soft on Romanism, and that fifty Roman Catholic voters in Leicester 
had pledged them their support. Yet the 'Chronicle' conceded that many staunchly 
protestant nonformists were also pledged to support them, and it stressed that the 
question was whether the nonconformists would be true to themselves or be merely 
pledged to political expediencySO.
In contrast with the 'Journal' the 'Chronicle' also made several sharp attacks on what 
it considered to be the growth of Romanism within the Established Church itself. The 
growth of 'tractarianism' since the advent of the 'Oxford Movement' in 1833 had, 
under the influence of learned men like Dr. Pusey, led certain individual Anglican 
parishes to re-introduce the ritualism of the pre-reformation period, and they 
consequently became labelled as sympathetic towards the teachings and practises of 
the Roman Church. This development had a local significance since a Vicar of St. 
Margaret's church. Rev. Anderdon, noted for his innovation of 'Popish ritual', had 
latterly, like John Henry Newman, defected to the Roman ChurchSI. The 'Chronicle' 
exclaimed:
49. LM. 26-6-1852. 50. LC. 19-6-1852. 51. Patterson, p371.
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' We do not know what our readers' opinions may be on this subject, but to us it 
appears evident the virus of Romanism is spreading in this community... our late 
observations and experience convinces us that a 'Puseyite' is either rapidly moving 
on the high road to Rome, where he must arrive at last, quite unconsciously to 
himself -  or he is a JESUIT IN DISGUISE ...'52 (original emphasis)
The newspaper made a similar fuss over the Anglican 'Sisters of Mercy* at 
Devonport, and claimed that the Church awaited a second Reformation. It suggested 
that the 'Romanist traits' of the upper-classes were to blame for these developments 
within the Established Church53. The 'Chronicle's' outbursts on this matter produced 
no apparent response, and were thus of no obvious consequence in the 1852 
election campaign. Nevertheless it does serve to demonstrate the intensity of feeling 
towards Romanism on the part of some influential persons in the borough. It also 
seems clear that no politician dared to openly express sympathy towards Romanism, 
and this suggests that anti-Romanism could well have been significant among the 
electorate.
In fact the growth of ritualistic practices within the Established Church were seen by 
many as offering encouragement to the Roman Pontiff in his decision to establish a 
regular hierarchy throughout Britain in 1850 without even prior notification. This 
move infuriated the Erastian Whigs, including Lord Russell, who perceived the state's 
authority as being ignored by a Church which owed toleration and concession to state 
magnanimity. As Machin points out British toleration had come to a crisis: it would 
either go forward in spite of the provocation of the hierarchy or it would recede on 
account of it. Nationwide the dissenters were as much divided over the crisis as over 
the Maynooth Grant: some were predominantly anti-papist and some were 
predominantly voluntary (i.e. they wanted no state interference in the sphere of 
religion). Certainly the Ecclesiastical Titles Act (1850) which, in response to the 
Pope's move, half-heartedly attempted to restrict Roman designs beyond the
52. LC. 27-3-1852. 53. Ibid, 24-4-1852.
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qualified measure of toleration enshrined in the 1829 Emancipation Act obstructed 
the process of growing toleration in Britain. Such obstruction was clearly in tune with 
great sections of public opinion, and anti-Catholic feeling was demonstrated long 
after the immediate crisis of 1850: eg. with riots at Greenock (1851) and Stockport 
(1852). But the agitation was the last nationwide exhibition of "no-popery" feeling and 
the Titles Act (repealed in 1871) was the last measure of discrimination between 
religious denominations passed by a British government54. Evidence in Leicester, 
based on newspaper contents, suggests that the town was typical in this respect. 
After 1852 the issues concerning Roman Catholicism became progressively less 
salient in election campaigns.
The 1852 election produced a sensational victory for Walmesley and Gardner, both 
with a majority around the five hundred mark. Allegations of bribery were this time 
unprovenSS. However the month before the election the "Mercury" claimed that 
radical canvassers had discovered that outvoters in the villages lying between 
Glenfield and Mountsorrel had been ordered by Someone (original emphasis) not to 
promise votes to Walmesley and Gardner. The "Mercury" failed to identify who but 
drew attention to the Earl of Stamford, and stressed a need for the ballotSS.
The 1852 result did not revive local agitation for reform, although the issues of 
frame-rent and trucking continued to excite the stockingers. Walmesley kept his 
1847 election promise to the stockingers and voted for Halford's 1853 Payment of 
Wages bill, whilst John Biggs announced a 'discontinuance of frame-rents' within his 
own firm. The outbreak of the Crimean War forced domestic issues into the 
background and created a temporary regrouping in local politics: i.e. the moderates 
readily accepted the war and were thus reconciled with the ultra-radicals, although a 
few of the latter supported John Bright's 'Peace party'.
54. Machin (1977), p227. 55. Victoria, p219. 56. LM. 26-6-1852.
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The onset of peace, however, revived the old rivalries. In 1856, following the death of 
Richard Gardner, John Biggs was elected in his place without recourse to a poll57.
But the 1857 general election saw the moderates determined to oust Walmesley, and 
religious feeling was certainly important in the campaign. During his parliamentary 
career Walmesley had, like John Biggs, advocated secular education. But more 
controversial was his leadership of what was known as the 'Sunday League'. This 
organisation essentially sought to liberalize the Sunday observance laws, but its only 
immediate objective was to open the British Museum and National Gallery to the 
public on Sunday afternoons. For this and other reasons John Dove Harris (son of 
Richard Harris, M. P. 1848-52) announced his candidature with the intention of 
defeating Walmesley58. Harris was a Churchman, but was promised support by 
almost all the dissenting leaders, many of whom, like the Independent Rev. Mursell 
and the Quakers John and Edward S. Ellis, had long been associated with the radical 
left. Their adhesion was no doubt made easier by Harris's opposition to Church 
rates, although this issue had become locally less important since 1849, when the 
Liberals finally gained control of all the parish vestries and compulsory payments of 
Church rates in Leicester were effectively scrapped59. in his election address Harris 
stated:
'. . .  My estimation of the Sabbath, not only as a Divine appointment, but as an 
institution of the highest importance in a social point of view, especially to the 
Industrial classes, would lead me strenuously to oppose any legislative interference 
which would have a tendency to assimilate it to Continental usages. I am opposed 
to the compulsory exaction of money for ecclesiastical purposes, because I believe 
it to be not less prejudicial to the interests of the Established Church than to the 
general progress of Christianity ...'60
57. Victoria, PP219-220. 58. LC. 21-3-1857. 59. Patterson, p259.
60. LJ. 20-3-1857.
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But opposition to Walmesley was not entirely on religious grounds, for several leading 
moderates who had backed Wilde and Palmer in 1852 objected to his general leftish 
politics. J. Whetstone was a notable example: he said that he objected to Walmesley 
more on account of his support for Halford's bill to abolish frame-rent than for his 
views on the Sunday questionBI. The moderates thus reinforced with dissent 
devoted their efforts towards contrasting the 'virtues' of Harris with the 'vices' of 
Walmesley, whilst John Biggs seems to have been left alone.
The 'Chronicle' drew attention to a series of handbills posted around the borough, 
which invariably raised the Sunday issue. One was entitled: 'To the Working-men of 
Leicester' and signed 'A Working Man': it exclaimed:
‘ ... Harris will keep Sunday as it is -  and should be so -  Walmesley will make It like 
France -  working seven days a week -  we work long enough as it Is ..."
Another was headed: 'Vote for Harris, like me -  by 'A Radical Elector'.62 It appears 
therefore that a significant feature of Harris's campaign was an endeavour to win the 
support of the working-class section of the electorate by exaggerating the effects of 
the 'Sunday League' proposals, in order to convince the working-men that a return of 
Walmesley would be against their own interests.
The handbills further sought to elicit the support of the stockingers over the issue of 
frame-rent, by pointing out that the Harris family had already abolished the system 
within its own business, whereas Walmesley was ignored and ineffective in his 
parliamentary attempts to support them: i.e. his support for Halford's abortive 1853 
bill and his defeated motion for the establishing of a select committee for examining 
the continual inequalities in the representational system -  especially for working- 
men63.
61. LM. 28-3-1857. 62. LC. 28-3-1857. 63. LM. 28-2-1857.
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Similarly they tried to encourage the hosiery trade as a whole to identify with its own 
leadership against outsiders: i.e. 'Harris is in our own trade -  Walmesley is a coal 
merchanf (original emphasis).
The handbill campaign also appealed to Sabbatarian supporters: one terminated:
' ... I need not say, Sir, that Mr. John Dove Harris has no sympathy with the 
Sabbath desecration. In fact I think the difference amounts to this, the former 
(Walmesley) is a foe to Christianity: the latter (Harris) is a friend..."
And Harris invoked parochial prejudice, as the 'Chronicle' had done in 1847:
'... Harris is Leicester born and bred -  Walmesley is n o t... Harris spends all his 
money among us -  Walmesley does not (except during elections)..."
Finally, in his handbill campaign, Harris courted moderate opinion by attacking the 
general leftish politics of Walmesley:
'. . .  Walmesley is a Chartist -  would create chaos and disorder is society ... a 
demagogue -  a boisterous medlar in politics: Harris Is -  a moderate, progressive, 
gradual reformer -  a true patriot -  has in him the elements of a real legislator'64
Naturally enough the 'Mercury' defended Walmesley, claiming that Harris was not 
really very different politically to him, so was not offering anything essentially different, 
it published a letter written (ostensibly) by a recently enfranchised Sunday school 
teacher, who had made a study of the three election candidates. The letter firstly 
defended John Biggs, pointing out that no party had said a word against him -  that 
he was declared by all as a faithful servant, a liberal benefactor to the town, and 
'entitled to the highest honour which the town can confer upon him'. Secondly the
64. LC. 28-3-1857.
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writer praised Walmesley, although he did hold reservations concerning the 
candidate's motion to open the British Museum and National Gallery on Sundays: 
nevertheless he stressed that Walmesley was only attempting to do for the poor what 
was already done for the rich with impunity: i.e. the Sunday opening of the local 
General News Room. Thirdly, if the writer had had anything to say about J. D. Harris 
it wasn't published!65 Actually the letter closely reflected the consensus of opinion 
among the local Liberal delegates, who, at a meeting held in March 1857, agreed to 
support Biggs and Walmesley despite some reservations concerning the letter's 
attitude towards the Sabbath question66.
On the Conservative side the whole attitude towards the 1857 election in Leicester 
seems to have been one of cynical aloofness67. This is apparent in a report in the 
'Journal' on the 13th March 1857:
'... His (Walmesley's) anti-Sabbath predilections have stirred up that portion of the 
Liberals, which prefers the Bible to the Charter, to resist him, and we understand 
that Mr. J. D. H. has consented to stand and that he will receive the support of the 
Evangelical dissenters and moderate Liberals ...'68
The following week the 'Journal' stated its own opinion:
'... For ourselves we regard the contest pretty much with indifference. Mr. Harris's 
political creed does not, as far as we are aware  ^ differ from Sir Joshua's by one 
iota, and with regard to the Sunday question Sir Joshua has given that up as a 
legislative question altogether. We know not therefore upon what principle his 
former supporters, who have seceded to the opposition, justify their defection. 
That, however, is their business ...'69
But for once the 'Journal' was not entirely in tune with the local Conservative party. 
During late March 1857 a meeting of Conservative electors passed two resolutions: 
not to forward a candidate and, despite opposition to his demand for the ballot, to
65. LM. 21-3-1857. 66. Ibid, 14-3-1857.
67. Note: or rather tfje 'Jotyma/' was cyniceJ. As illustrated the Conservatives opted to support Harris -  it was rare for the parSes to be at odds 
with (W r respective organs. The Morning Advertiser' later claimed this support was due to a Consenrative dislike of Walmeslev. But not 
so much on account of his extremism: ramerit was because, despite his extremism, he was a reliable, staunch support of the wNg 
Govmment in Parliament. (LM. 2-2-1861, p7).
68. LJ. 13-3-1857. 69. Ibid, 20-3-1857
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support Harris70. The 'Journal' did support the first resolution but opposed the 
pledge of support for Harris, on principle, stating that it did not believe the Sunday 
issue to be at the root of the opposition to Walmesley, and again stressing that Harris 
was but little different to Biggs and Walmesley. Harris had, after ail, voted for the 
ultra-radicals in 1852, whilst his 1857 election address could mean anything from 
diluted Conservatism to five points of the Charter;
'... We disagree with Sir Joshua's politics, and we disagree with those of Mr. Harris 
which we believe to be the same ...'71
The 'Journal's' view of Harris was thus curiously akin to that of the 'Mercury'. This 
was not lost on the 'Chronicle' which accused its two adversaries of deliberate 
concurrence over the affair72.
The by now more familiar religious question of Romanism was still simmering in 
1857, although the matter appears to have been given rather less attention by the 
iocai press than in 1847 and 1852, especially as regards the 'Chronicle'. 
Nevertheless the 'Journal' reported that a petition to Parliament signed by nearly four 
thousand Leicester inhabitants demanding repeal of the Maynooth Endowment Act 
was presented to John Biggs73. The 'Journal' did publish a couple of articles during 
the month leading up to the election. One was by the secretary of the 'National Club', 
George Rich, who stressed the need for an end to the Maynooth Endowment, and 
instead for the R. C. priesthood to be educated at various colleges in Ireland, already 
open to them, in which they could mix with protestants of their own age group and 
thereby become less 'imbued with that servile obedience, which destroys the love of 
Country, and the better feelings of the heart. But the other article, a ietter entitled 'A 
True Protestant, points out that since the Maynooth Grant had been operative before 
the 1801 Act of Union, Britain should rather have objected and acted more strongly
70. LM. 28-3-1857. 71. U . 27-3-1857. 72. LC. 28-3-1857.
73. U . 13-3-1857.
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on the assumption of ecclesiastical titles by the Roman Church (1850): i.e. to have 
resisted the 'arrogance of the Holy See'74 . Actually the matter seemed highly 
marginal in the election campaign itself, although Harris did try to make political 
capital out of it by indicating that in Parliament Walmesley had abstained on the 
Maynooth question, which was, according to Harris, unsatisfactory.
At the election hustings, according to the 'Mercury', a crowd of 10-12,000 voted for 
Walmesley and Biggs:
'... Indeed the number of hands held up for Mr. Harris presented by far the most 
miserable minority that has ever characterised a contested election in Leicester for 
many years ...'75
But the poll demanded on behalf of J. D. Harris produced a different outcome. Biggs 
and Harris were returned and Walmesley defeated. 'Victoria' claims that Walmesley's 
defeat (by 178 votes) might have been worse save for the support he received from 
the iocai drink trade, who were alarmed by Harris's association with the 'Temperance 
Movement'76, although the 'Chronicle' claimed licensed victualler support for Harris 
aiso77.
Judging by the immediate reaction to the election result: i.e. the apparent satisfaction 
of the 'Journal'78 and fury of the 'Mercury'79; it seems fair to assess Harris as a 
definite moderate, despite the pre-election talk of his political similarity with 
Walmesley.
By early 1859, during the run up to the general election of that year, the issues of 
Leicester's pariiamentary politics were more closely linked to those of the House of 
Commons than had previously been the case since 1832. The reason being that
74. Ibid, 27-3-1857. 75. LM. 28-3-1857. 76. Victoria, p220.
77. LC. 28-3-1857. 78. LJ. 3-4-1857. 79. LM. 4-4-1857.
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whereas the question of pariiamentary/franchise reform had always been a feature of 
Leicester's politics, it had not been in the forefront of politics at national level since 
1832. But by 1859 reform was again in the air and important sections of both major 
parties in Parliament were proposing, albeit along different iines, changes to the 
parliamentary suffrage. These developments marked the early stages of a process 
which, after the death of Lord Palmerston in 1865, was to gather an unstoppable 
momentum and culminate in the 1867 Reform Act.
On the Conservative side their minority government of 1858-9, led by Lord Derby 
and Disraeli, introduced a Reform bill which mainly sought to bring the electoral 
qualification for the counties into line with that of the boroughs. Thus the county £50 
franchise was to be reduced to £10. But the bill did include provision for a lodger 
franchise for those paying a minimum rent of 8/- per week. In addition there were 
other clauses, dubbed 'fancy franchises', which were an important factor in the bill's 
defeat, due in part to opposition from the right of the Conservative party in 
ParliamentSO.
The Leicester Conservatives felt the time was ripe to forward a candidate of their 
own, and selected a local barrister, William Unwin Heygate. He was widely regarded 
as a liberal-Conservative and he certainly defended much that was in the Derby- 
Disraeli Reform bill, including the measures outlined above and a savings bank 
qualification of either £60 or £50. At a local Conservative meeting, however, Heygate 
firmly rejected anything approaching universal suffrage on grounds that such a 
measure would result in the working-class swamping all the other classes. Rather 
he preferred there be a way found to admit the best of the working classes -  to make 
the franchise a privilege -  the reward of industry, intelligence and good conduct. 
Towards this end he advocated an extension of education and the scrapping of the
80. Victoria, p221.
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remaining paper duties (taxes on knowledge)81. Heygate's standpoint on reform is 
further evidented in his election address:
'... For my own part, whilst anxious to promote all measures tending to the removal 
of proved abuse, I am, nevertheless, opposed to any attempt to assimilate the 
Constitution of this Country to those of America and France, and although ready to 
vote for an extension of the Franchise both in counties and boroughs, I could not 
support those wild schemes of Reform which have lately been advocated by 
certain politicians ...'82
It seems probable from this that Heygate was slightly to the left of the Conservative 
government, for, as the 'Mercuiy readily fastened upon, Disraeli, then Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, was reputed to have:
' ... declared unreservedly that he must view 'with the greatest alarm' any 
proposals, however moderate, for the reduction of the parliamentary qualification in 
the Boroughs'83
Meanwhile parliamentary moves towards reform on the side of the Whig-Liberal 
party, then in opposition, were led by the radical John Bright, whose reforming 
movement in Birmingham was now more moderate in its aims and less Chartist in 
tone84. Early in the 1859 election campaign the moderate Leicester Liberals, 
supported by the 'Chronicle', believed that the local radicals, seemingly supporting 
Bright, would also tone down their politics and thereby pave the way for a 
reconciliation between the two estranged sections of the local Liberal party. The 
'Chronicle' made this clear in its edition of 9th April when it claimed that the old 
understanding among Liberals, that moderates and extremists should share the 
borough representation, was obtaining recognition for the first time since before 
184785. The 'Chronicle' gave a wholehearted welcome to this and suggested that 
Harris and Biggs should be the representatives, and at a subsequent meeting chaired
81. LM. 23-4-1859, p2. 82. LC. 30-4-1859. 83. LM. 9-4-1859, p4.
84. Victoria, p221. 85. LC. 9-4-1859.
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by the moderate William Baines to promote Liberal unity the following resolution was 
passed:
'. . .  That in order to secure the united action of the whole Liberal Party, some 
degree of mutual forbearance will always be necessary, and since it is evident that 
without that united action there is a great risk of a Tory candidate being returned, it 
is the earnest desire of this Meeting that such forbearance should be exercised 
among us in the present instance, and that all personal feelings being subjected to 
the general good of the Country, the Liberal Party should agree to return Messrs. 
Biggs and Harris as their representatives'86
But it was all an illusion! it soon became clear that the Leicester radicals were as 
leftish as ever, and out to avenge Walmesley's defeat. Indeed the 'Chronicle' should 
have known better because, in the very edition it claimed the left had moderated, it 
reported that another ultra-left candidate had been chosen to fight alongside John 
Biggs87. And a fortnight later there appeared a report of a meeting of Liberal 
electors, who had indicated that the new candidate, unanimously adopted along with 
Biggs, was the man selected to wreak Chartist revenge on Harris for getting rid of 
Walmesley. This new candidate was Joseph Noble, a local G. P. and former mayor, 
who was revered for his kindness in offering his professional services free of charge 
to the poor88.
The continued ultra-radical policy of the left was apparent in Biggs's and Noble's 
election addresses. Both called for the extension of the suffrage to the working-man 
(or 'taxation with representation' as Biggs chose to call it), the ballot and more equal 
electoral districts. Harris, who was to stand again, was denounced for his 
'unconstitutional' moves to get himself elected. But the radicals were particularly 
hostile towards the Derby-Disraeli Reform bill and expressed satisfaction at its 
rejection by Parliament89. As they were quick to note it proposed neither the ballot 
nor any reduction in the £10 borough qualification. They remarked:
86. LM. 23-4-1859, p4. 87. LC. 9-4-1859. 88. Ibid, 23-4-1859.
89. LM. 2-4-1859, p4.
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'... (l^e) Humbug of Disraeli -  a charlatan -  all for private reasons and personal 
ambition -  no vote for the Working-class... no equal distribution of seats -  a plan 
for exalting the political influence of the counties at the expense of the industrial 
interests ...*90
In turn the moderates attacked Biggs and Noble. The 'Chronicle' remarked that 
Noble's speech to the meeting of Liberal electors 'teemed with animosity towards 
Harris', and that: 'The animus oozes out of every sentence' (original emphasis). The 
'Chronicle' stressed that the universal suffrage policies of Biggs and Noble would 
destroy the influence of the middle-classes:
' ... prostrating at the feet of numbers the intelligence, the education, the 
respectability of other classes of inhabitants leading to a degeneracy in the 
personnel of the Commons House akin to that which has of late years been visible 
in the council chamber ...*91
In a calmer mood, earlier in the campaign, the 'Chronicle' stated the prevailing 
moderate view:
'... Without going so far, even, as Mr. Bright, the existing electors run the risk of 
neutralising their own present influences; for nearly all addition which may be made 
to the town constituencies will be from a class below themselves in the social 
system. Every movement in that direction is experimental, and more or less 
perilous to the position of the Middle Class voters .... Household suffrage would 
probably lead to ultra-left M. P.s. being elected .... Same would occur elsewhere 
... a complete and boisterous change in the representative system .... In asking 
the Moderate Liberals to help them, therefore, the ultras expect their proposed 
allies to commit political suicide, and to submit to political annihilation.... There is, 
however, a class of inhabitants to whom the vote might be entrusted -  what may 
be called the picked men of the Working class, whose general fitness for the 
suffrage would be nearly tested by the social position they have earned by their 
own sobriety, industry, and frugality. This body of men are identified with the best 
interests of the community, and would exercise their power in the long run for the 
obtainment of useful measures. They form also the representatives of their own 
less-fortunate neighbours, and, if enfranchised, all that is legitimate in working- 
class aspirations would find a voice through the order of men here described ...'92
90. Ibid, 12-3-1859, p8. 91. LC. 30-4-1859. 92. Ibid, 12-4-1859.
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Two important points can be drawn from the above. The first is that the 'Chronicle' 
and the moderates had definitely moved further to the right, for in 1852 their 
candidates Wilde and Palmer were prepared to countenance household s u ffra g e 9 3 .  
Indeed their 1859 position was to the right of Lord John Russell. Sandwiched 
between Disraeli's and Bright's proposals, Russell, although no longer leader of his 
party, suggested lowering the qualification from £10 to £8 householders. The 
'Chronicle', calculating that such a measure would more than double the Leicester 
electorate, rejected the idea on the grounds that the working-class would thereby 
swamp the other classes in the eIectorate94. Actually this assessment was not 
without foundation. The outcome of the show of hands at the Market Place hustings 
in 1857, when, in contrast to the actual poll, a large crowd of locals (the majority of 
whom can be assumed to have been unenfranchised) clearly preferred Walmesiey to 
Harris, seems a fairly reliable indication95. But then again, as all were well aware 
(and shortly to be reminded again), the ultra-radicals could win anyway under the 
existing franchise. The second point is that the moderates' 1859 outlook on urban 
class-politics was strikingly akin to that of the Conservative candidate, Heygate. As 
the 'Chronicle' pointed out:
' liberal Conservatives and conservative Liberals are virtually at one in this 
election ...'96
But there is no evidence that even a tacit alliance between the Conservatives and 
Liberal moderates existed in the 1859 election campaign in Leicester. It was 
coincidental that both parties had put up only one candidate apiece for the two-seat 
borough. This was the most the Conservatives had ever done since 1837, whilst the 
moderates were anxious to avoid all indication of trying to monopolize the borough: 
i.e. they wanted to share the representation with the ultra-radicals. On the 
Conservative side the 'Journal' made its own position clear:
93. Ibid, 3-4-1852. 94. Ibid, 9-4-1859. 95. LM. 28-3-1857, p4.
96. LC. 30-4-1859.
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'... All professed Conservatives wiil, of course, pledge themselves to Mr. Heygate, 
and in regard to their second votes they must strenuously refuse them to any other 
candidate, except upon the distinct understanding that they are to have a vote for 
their own man in return ...*97
Wedged between the two parliamentary sets of reform proposals and opposed to 
both (Harris voting against the second reading of the Conservative Reform bill), the 
moderates had little to offer but caution. However, they were still backed by the 
dissenting ministers and therefore tried to make Sabbatarianism again an election 
issue. To this end Harris's election address said little other than that his politics were 
'well known':98 i.e. he was clearly fighting the 1859 election on his 1857 platform in 
which the 'Sunday League' issue was to the forefront. But this proved more difficult 
than in 1857, for Noble and Biggs were not so vulnerable as Walmesiey on this 
question99. Dr. Noble himself did admit that he understood Walmesley's 'Sunday 
League' views, but that he would not have pursued them (as Walmesiey did) without 
the clear support of his local party. Noble supported Church-rate abolition, though 
an Anglican, like Walmesiey, but he opposed disestablishment. In the latter issue 
Noble was thus in disagreement with his partner John Biggs. However Biggs 
seemed to accept that the holding of different views did not necessarily entail 
hostility. Also the issue of Romanism no longer seemed capable of rousing strong 
feelings. The changed attitude is clearly evidented by the fact that for the first time, in 
the election campaigns here under scrutiny, candidates dared to publicly support 
continuance of the Maynooth Grant. Noble's election address clearly stated that he 
would not oppose the grantlOO, and Heygate said the same on the grounds that he 
considered repeal dangerous to R. C. loyalty, though he admitted the difficulty of 
accommodating R. C. rights as citizens with protestant scruplesi 01.
97. U . 22-4-1859, p5. 98. LM. 9-4-1859, p4. 99. Victoria, p221.
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The 1859 general election produced a national victory for Lord Palmerston, and local 
victories for Biggs and Noble. There was the usual post-election acrimony: the 
'Chronicle' accusing the victors of misrepresentation and intimidation, while Heygate 
attributed his narrow defeat to the 'conduct of those Conservatives who sacrificed 
their political principles to the claims of private friendship'. It is not clear to whom 
Heygate was referring, but a likely explanation points to the personage of John Biggs, 
and possibly to J. D. Harris also. Both were well-to-do and Biggs was noted for his 
lavish generosity, and thus his friendship was presumably not limited to his political 
sympathiserai02. it is quite noticeable too that the other ultra-radical candidates of 
the period: eg. Walmesiey, Gardner and Noble: invariably appeared to receive the 
brunt of the anti-radical hostility, whilst Biggs, significantly unopposed in 1856, 
seemed to some extent above criticism.
Though possibly worsened by his temperance views and his defects as a speaker, 
the poor showing of J. D. Harris in the 1859 election led to considerable heart- 
searching among the Liberal moderates. The consensus of opinion pointed towards 
a formal alliance with the Conservatives, at least at local level: i.e. for Harris and 
Heygate to lead a common front against the radicals. This was apparent in the 
speeches given at a meeting and dinner of Harris's supporters after his defeat. One 
speaker, John Ellis, said that he wished the two names of Whig and Tory were sunk: 
they were held out as bugbears to keep those apart who were really agreed, and that 
if the country was to be well-governed, it must be by those two sections of men 
acting together. Ellis stressed that he wanted to see a large extension of the 
suffrage, but did not want to establish 'class legislation' in Britain, and claimed that 
the Derby-Disraeli Reform bill was precisely intended to destroy 'class legislation'. 
He admitted that the working-classes had not yet obtained their fair share, but he 
was not prepared to give it all up to that class and swamp the middle-classes
102. Victoria, p223.
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altogether. Another speaker, Mr. Walker, pointed out that present day Toryism was 
not like in the old days of Mr. Paget, but rather it had been merged into 
Conservatism, and that there was now little difference between liberal Conservatives 
and moderate Liberals. He said that he had voted for Heygate, deeming him to be 
safer than Biggs or NoblelOS. |n contrast the prevailing gulf between moderate and 
ultra-radical views on the suffrage was highlighted by a third speaker, Mr. Kempson. 
The 'Journal' published a report on Kempson's speech two years after it was given:
'... They were opposed to extension of the suffrage without regard to fitness; the 
doctrine of the inalienable rights of man was only fit for a schoolboy. They must try 
to improve the constituencies so that they might send better members. The fact 
that they sent such as they now often did was the greatest proof they could have 
that the majority were not yet fit for the franchise, and he only wondered that the 
Country was so well-governed as it was ...'104
The Conservatives, however, were cool towards union with the moderates. Religious 
differences and political memories still fought against a thorough reconciliation. 
Neither group was essentially prepared to surrender its identity and each wanted 
union under its own aegis. Moreover Heygate had done well in the 1859 election, 
and maybe the gradual re-emergence of the party as a viable, national alternative to 
Whig-Liberalism encouraged the local party to preserve itself and exploit division 
within the Liberal party. The formation of a new local Conservative society in 
celebration of Heygate's achievement was undoubtedly an indication of their growing 
optimism105.
The situation became acute early in 1861 when the sudden death of Dr. Noble made 
a by-election necessary. The Conservatives were not prepared to make 
concessions, so both Heygate and Harris announced their decisions to stand again. 
The two groups were therefore in direct opposition with each other for the first time
103. LM. 21-5-1859, p7. 104. LJ. 1-2-1861, p5. 105. Victoria, p221.
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since before 1847. In January the 'Journal' stated its opinion on the current state of 
politics:
'... We believed, as we believe now, that there is a mass of public opinion, which 
rejecting the distinctive name of Conservative, is to ail intents and purposes 
conservative; we believed that a large portion of the best educated and most 
estimable of our townsmen were in favour of a liberal policy, which should at the 
same time not be a democratic one, and we urged upon them to give their votes to 
Mr. Heygate as the representative of their own opinions. We ask them to do so still 
.... If such people... go on supporting men of extreme political views... they must 
be prepared to take the consequences in the adoption eventually of some measure 
even more democratic than Lord J. Russell's bill ...'106
On the suffrage issue Heygate supported Lord Derby's proposal to reform the 
electoral districts, a lodger franchise, and a reduction in the rental franchise, although 
he declined to specify by how much. Rather he preferred to express vague notions of 
adding to the franchise a number of intelligent, industrious artisans -  just as the 
'Chronicle' had done in 1859. He was likewise inclined to fudge the issue of Church- 
rates, ciaiming that he held a liberal outlook on the matter and suggested that 
objectors should seek disqualification from the vestry roll for one year to avoid 
payment. This 'solution' had already been advocated by Cambridge M. P. James 
Stuart107.
Like the Conservatives, the ultra-radical Liberals saw no reason to seek alliances or 
tone down their politics, although from the onset of the 1861 campaign the 'Mercury' 
was decidedly jittery at the prospect of a three cornered contest, and suggested that 
it a more popular candidate emerged then Harris should stand down108. The 
coolness shown towards Harris at a meeting of the Liberal registration society and 
the subsequent enthusiasm towards a rival at the meeting of Liberal electors were 
stages in a process which ied to the adoption of Harris's rival as a Liberal candidate. 
This was Peter Alfred Taylor, a radical of the younger generation -  of the J. S. Miil
106. U . 18-1-1861, p5. 107. LM. 19-1-1861, p8. 108. Ibid,p4.
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type -  individualistic, humanitarian and internationalist. He was an admirer of the 
Italian revolutionary, Mazzini (for which he was castigated by the 'JournalT09), a 
champion of universal suffrage and direct taxation, and a partner in the firm of 
Courtauld. He had previously contested Newcastle borough. A meeting of non­
electors declared their overwhelming support for Taylor, who exclaimed to them:
'... Then there arose the Anti-Corn Law League, and in that struggle both I and my 
Father took our humble part -  We advocated political rights and commercial rights 
-  but we were denounced by the working-class as middle-class men -  till 
Chartism cut its own throat in 1848 ...'110
And, he told a meeting of Liberal electors:
'... I am sick of seeing the great Radical Party dragged at the heels of the two great 
parties in the state. For my part I shall think a great political gain has been 
achieved when reactionism, whether it calls itself Whig or Tory, recedes into a 
compact phalanx on the one side, and we have the other, a pure body of 
Reformers. I care not how small, for we shall be then in the right position for 
advocating the question of reform ...'111
Taylor's radicalism was thus self-evident, but on the question of the ballot he 
believed the necessary elimination of bribery and coercion could best be achieved by 
other means. Although, unlike many Whigs and Liberals, he did not regard the ballot 
as 'un-English', he disliked secrecy and viewed the ballot at best as a temporary cure 
for a temporary evil. However, he was not entirely out of tune with Victorian radical 
thought on the issue: J. S. Miil and Fergus O'Connor held similar opinions112. Taylor 
was also cool towards equal electoral districts, preferring a system whereby entrance 
to the House of Commons would require a minimum number of votes. Though 
denying being a socialist he supported income tax and, like his late twentieth century 
counterparts, opposed another form of taxation:
109. LJ. 25-1-1861, p5. 110. ibid, 1-2-1861, p6. 111. LM. 26-1-1861, p3.
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matter what his means ...'113
Taylor's professed argument for universal suffrage also seems a trifle individualistic, 
by bearing no hint of being based on class warfare. In his election address he 
stressed:
'. . .  I would show my allegiance to the principles of our constitution by making a 
man a voter because he was an Englishman, and not because he happened to pay 
a certain rental ...'114
On the religion side he opposed disestablishment, but denounced Church-rates and 
state endowments for ecciesiastical purposes. He was therefore against the
Maynooth Grant, although, perceiving Rome as a temporal rather than a spiritual
power, he did not wish to make Maynooth the object of sectarian attack. Indeed he 
was infinitely more against the protestant ascendancy in Ireland115.
Supported by the 'Chronicle' Harris and the moderates attacked the parliamentary 
record of the late Dr. Noble. Apparently he was seldom in Pariiament and his death 
occurred whilst on a prolonged visit to Spain. The 'Chronicle' dubbed him as 
'Walmesiey's locum tenens in Parliament'116, and considered Taylor's adoption a 
firm barrier to reconciliation between the two wings of the Liberal party, and would 
render a Conservative success probable. The 'Chronicle' commented:
'... Seeing how utterly without a chance Mr. Taylor is, it is the duty of all Liberals,
without exception, who desire to 'keep out' the Conservatives to poll as early as
they can, without waiting, for Mr. Harris ...'117 (original emphasis)
It seems that Harris and his supporters, in contrast with their 1859 shift towards the 
right on the suffrage question, had now adopted a more reformist stance. Harris now
113. LM. 26-1-1861, p3. 114. Ibid, 2-2-1861, p4. 115. Ibid,p2.
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wanted a £6 franchise (the 'Chronicle' in 1859 thought an £8 franchise was too 
radical) but said he would support the current Whig government's Reform bill, which 
provided for an £8 franchise, and the old Chartist demand for the abolition of the 
property qualification for M.P.s. His religious policy however mirrored Taylor's: i.e. he 
opposed disestablishment. Church-rates, and appropriation of the public money for 
ecclesiastical purposes. The 'Journal' readily perceived that Harris and his 
supporters were less moderate than was generally supposedi 18.
Right up till the poll the two wings attacked one another. Taylor accused Harris of 
being two-faced over the licensing legislation -  that he had told the brewers he 
opposed it, but told the temperance crowd that he supported it119. Moreover Taylor 
rebuffed a suggestion that he himself should stand down on the grounds that many 
radicals would vote for Heygate to keep Harris out120.
Even so both sides were anticipating possible defeat, and warnings to the effect 
came from the press outside Leicester. For example the Whig 'Leeds Mercury" 
expressed great regret to find that Leicester was in danger of being represented by a 
Conservative121. Like in recent elections the moderates expressed a forlorn hope of 
unity, as the chairman of a meeting of Harris's supporters exclaimed:
'... It is an acknowledged fact that there has been in Leicester, for the last ten or 
twelve years, two distinct sections of the Liberal Party, each having its different 
registration offices and also its various distinct organisations... each section should 
choose ONE member... Union of Party ...'122 (original emphasis)
The radical 'Mercury* claimed there was no material difference in the poiitical creeds 
of Harris and Taylor, and that many Whigs supported Taylor whilst many advanced 
Liberals supported Harris. Seemingly losing its confidence the 'Mercury' commented:
118. LJ. 8-2-1861, p5. 119. LM. 2-2-1861, p2. 120. Ibid, 9-2-1861, p2.
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104
'. . .  It is like a family difference, which, in being healed, appears to both parties 
singularly trifling ...'123
The apprehension on both sides of the Liberal divide proved to be well-founded. 
Although at the hustings Taylor won easily, the poll called for by Harris and Heygate 
produced a sensational outcome -  the first Conservative victory in Leicester since 
1835, and by a considerable margin at that! Taylor came third in the poll. In its 
February 8th 1861 edition the 'Journal' boasted:
' ... Mr. Heygate has polled ... the highest number of votes ever obtained by a 
candidate in Leicester, with one exception which was altogether of a peculiar 
character.... It is a fact worth noting that in a borough which is rapidly rising to the 
first rank of English commercial towns, and which moreover has been looked upon 
as the stronghold of even Chartist opinions, 1,600 men could be found to give their 
votes for a Conservative .... There are ... in both the House of Commons and 
emphatically in Leicester two Liberal Parties ... (which) cannot unite as
diametrically opposed ...'124
But on this last point the 'Journal' was ultimately proved wrong, for their defeat taught 
the Liberals that neither wing could stand on its own, and the radicals were therefore 
forced to abandon attempts to dominate the borough. Their swiftly changing attitude 
was clear in the 'Mercury's' post-mortem on the 1861 election. It stressed that the 
'townsmen' of Leicester: i.e. the Pagets, Harrises, Ellises and Biggses: were, through 
personal ambitions, the source of ail the trouble and division, and advocated their 
retirement from parliamentary politics, and that the borough henceforth be 
represented by two strangers, drawn from the Whig and radical sections of the 
Liberal party respectively125.
On their part the moderates rejected absorption into a Conservative party they could 
not hope to dominate, instead preferring toleration of the radicals within a reunited 
Liberal party. The Leicester moderates thus made the same sort of choice as
124. LJ. 8-2-1861, p5. 125. LM. 16-2-1861, p8.
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Gladstone in national politics: i.e. Gladstone finally rejected joining Lord Derby's party 
and went on to become Liberal prime minister in 1868.
Events moved rapidiy after the 1861 by-election. June of that year saw the formation 
of a united Liberal registration society, based on the old compromise by which the 
borough would be shared equally between moderates and radicals. But the radicals 
may have been moved to compromise for financial reasons when John Biggs, 
probably the chief source of their funds, suffered financial collapse. Biggs took no 
part in the reconciliation, resigned his seat in February 1862, and maintained an 
absolute political silence for the remaining ten years of his life. In accordance with 
the agreement his seat was taken, unopposed, by P. A. Taylor. In 1864 the 
'Chronicle' and the 'Mercury' became one newspaper126.
In the 1865 general election (the last on the old franchise) electoral reform was a 
dramatic issue. Harris and Taylor were duly adopted as Liberal candidates. But the 
alliance was not strained, partly because this time the radicals avoided being 
committed to a specific degree of reform, and partly because the moderates 
perceived that the present electorate was becoming increasingly Conservative. 
Therefore they deemed that the local Liberal party needed 'new blood' if it was to 
survive. (Bill Lancaster attributes this growing Conservatism and need for 'new 
Liberal blood' to the collapse of the apprenticeship system and its attendant 
freemen's rights. The proportion of mainly Liberal-supporting, freemen framework 
knitters in the Leicester electorate had steadily declined from 16% in 1837 to 9% by 
1861127). Heygate stood again for the Conservatives committed to a measure of 
parliamentary reform, but was hostile to the £6 householder franchise. He was 
defeated by a small margin, and the united Liberals went on to represent Leicester 
continuously until the Conservatives scored again in the 1900 'khaki' election128.
126. Victoria, pp222-3. 127. Lancaster, pp77-78. 128. Victoria, p242.
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Far-reaching changes then began to take place. The 1867 Reform Act increased the 
Leicester electorate from 5,736 to 15,161, and the 1870s' developments in party 
organisation tended to deprive politics of variety, since it diminished the importance of 
local issues and the influence of local individuals in parliamentary political Iife129.
129. lbid,pp223-4.
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CHAPTER FIVE
(i) Scheme of Analysis used In the Research -  Record Linkage 
(II) Analysis of Voting Behaviour In Leicester (1847-61)
(i) A systematic quantitative anaiysis of mid-nineteenth century, local 
parliamentary electoral behaviour is feasible only through reference to 
polibooks. These provide the individual-level data with which one can test 
modern theories of voting behaviour in an historical context. Polibooks 
enumerate individuals and their electoral behaviour and, frequently, they also 
list other individual social attributes such as occupation. This individual level 
information has something in common with that which is found in 
questionnaires for modern sample surveys upon which many contemporary 
analyses of British voting behaviour are based, such as that by Butler and 
Stokesf. Polibooks cannot match the range of enquiry attempted in modern 
sample surveys, but a simplified historical anaiysis of voting behaviour can be 
carried out using poiibook data which parallels survey analysis.
Polibooks are lists of voters at a given election, accompanied by indications of 
which candidate{s) they voted for. This is the only feature common to them 
ail. Most polibooks were printed, but a few stiii survive in manuscript, and 
usually indication is given regarding the address of the voter. Their internal 
arrangements varied considerably. Some grouped the voters by villages, 
wards or even by streets: other listed their names aiphabeticaily or according 
to the order of voting. Some distinguish between freemen electors and £10 
householders, and between resident voters and outvoters: others do not make 
such distinctions. It appears that the local printers who usually published
Butler and Stokes, pp13-15.
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polibooks acted under no responsibility to anyone, and the consequences of 
their having had a free hand are evident in the complete lack of standard 
presentation in the pubiications. In a few cases polibooks were published by 
political bodies, but in general everything depended on the free-will of some 
small printer looking around for a small profit. During times of political 
excitement the printer had most incentive to publish a poiibook, so the 
elections of the 1830s tend to be well represented. But 1868 polibooks are a 
rarity, presumably because the great increase in the electorate would have 
made them too expensive to sell easily. The same consideration doubtless 
lay behind the absence of polibooks for very large constituencies: i.e. no 
poiibook is known for Manchester after 1839, Birmingham after 1841, or for 
any London seat after 1841. Everything depended on the chances of the 
printer recovering his costs2.
Leicester borough polibooks were found to be extant3 for the parliamentary 
elections of 1847,1852,1857,1859 and 1861. These were published by J. 
Burton of Haymarket, Leicester. It was the accessibility of these five polibooks 
which both enabled research of the nature presented in this thesis to be 
conducted and actually determined the period which was to be analysed: i.e. it 
might have been more fitting in the historical sense to have included the 1865 
general election in the analysis (the last under the 1832-67 franchise), but no 
poiibook is extant. This series of polibooks follows a similar pattern. The 
resident (borough) voters are segregated on a ward by ward basis -  each 
ward comprising a list of voters arranged in alphabetical order of surnames, 
followed by forenames or initials. Each individual's street of residence is 
nearly always recorded, though rarely is the actual house number. Naturally 
all record the voting choice of each elector, including those who abstained
2. Vincent (1967), p i. 3. Reference Ubrary, Bishop Street, Leicester.
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from voting -  the latter being listed separately in 1859 and 1861. In the case 
of the 1852 and 1857 polibooks the individual's electoral qualification is 
indicated: i.e. 'householder", "freeman", 'scot & lot", or a combination of any two 
of these. All the series yield similar information regarding the non-resident 
freemen electors -  those who resided within a seven mile radius of the 
borough and who thus retained their borough franchise after 1832, although 
only the village of residence is normally recorded.
According to Vincent only a minority of polibooks give the occupation of each 
elector. He maintains that it is not clear why occupations featured in the 
polibooks at all: whether, for instance, some polling clerk wrote them down, 
and if so how far he did so on his own imputation, and how far he accepted 
the self-assessment of the voter: or whether the printer himseif added the 
occupation from common knowledge, or from street directories. From some 
surviving manuscript polibooks it would appear that information regarding 
occupation was expected, since a space under a printed heading was 
provided for it. But how far this was general is not known, because so few 
manuscript polibooks appear to have survived4.
The Leicester series of poilbooks generally record the individual's 
occupation(s). But doubts concerning reliability aside, there is a more 
fundamental problem in using simple occupational descriptions as an 
indication of the individual's socio-economic standing within the community. 
Such descriptions as 'hosier', "framework-knitter", 'warehousman', "spinner", 
"baker", "grocer", etc, say little. It cannot be supposed that enfranchisement 
under the terms of the 1832 Act meant that all electors were relatively affluent 
or comprised some kind of "middle-class" within the context of the locality of
4. Vincent (1967), p3.
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the period. Indeed a glance at the range of occupations given in Appendix 
Four reveals that some voters were engaged in occupations whose 
descriptions suggest a very low socio-economic status (thereby bearing out 
the point made by Robert Lowe during the 1866 reform debate, that more 
working-class men had the vote than was generally realized). Furthermore it 
cannot be ascertained from the poiibook alone whether an individual 'hosier" or 
'grocer* was an affluent person: eg. an employer: or just a poor individual, 
living a meagre existence in some back-street hovel!
But to a great extent the information yielded in the census enumerators' books 
of 1851 and 1861 would overcome this drawback. In these sources 
occupational records are more reliable on account of the official status of the 
census declarations, whiist valuable indicators of socio-economic standing, 
such as the numbers of household servants and other employees, are also 
recorded. So too is the age of each individual on census day -  evidence 
crucial to the second focus of this research: i.e. an analysis of political 
generation.
Therefore it was considered appropriate to carry out a systematic programme 
of linkage between the two sets of data -  poiibook and census. To 
accomplish this it proved necessary to rearrange the entire poiibook for each 
election to achieve the highest possible level of linkage. The census returns 
(available on microfilmS) are always arranged by enumeration district, but the 
key feature is the individual streets. Although some streets do not fit into a 
single enumeration district, when each street appears the pattern is for the 
schedules to be recorded house by house down one side, and sooner or later 
the schedules for the other side turn up. Therefore the poiibook data needed
5. Reference Ubrary, Bishop Street, Leicester.
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to be rewritten in an alphabetical street order for the entire borough, so that as 
each street appeared on the census film the corresponding street data 
extracted from the polibooks could be easily referred to and the census data 
tabulated alongside.
The recorded poiibook data was recorded on sheets marked out as in the 
specimen which forms Appendix One(B) to the thesis. The far left-hand 
column on page one for each election began with the ‘Abbey', followed by 
'Abbey Gate' and 'Abbey Street*, and, for the borough voters, ended with 'York 
Street*. Similar lists were drawn up for the outvoters, beginning with residents 
of 'Anstey* and ending with 'Woodhouse Eaves'. In the next column electors 
from each street (or village) were listed in alphabetical order of surnames, 
followed by given forenames or initials. The only deviation from this pattern 
occurred when one side of a street lay in a different ward to the other, in which 
case two consecutive, alphabetical series of surnames were listed: eg. in the 
lengthy 'Belgrave Gate' one side belonged to 'North St. Margarets" ward whilst 
the other formed part of 'Middle St. Margarets'. The pollbook-defined 
occupations were noted in the third column and voting preferences in the 
fourth. On the specimen sheet, 'Hr/Hg/T' refers to the three candidates in the 
Leicester parliamentary by-election of 1861, namely Harris, Heygate and 
Taylor respectively.
But a troublesome problem quickly became clear at this stage. Whereas the 
Leicester census always indicated the street number of each recorded 
borough household (although this was apparently not a universal feature of 
the 1851 and 1861 censusesG), the polibooks seldom did so. As the census 
evidented, two or more male householders living in the same street often bore
6. Census Guide, p9.
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the same names and sometimes held the same occupation (where 
occupations were different the poiibook occupation was an invaluable guide to 
matching), but only one was enfranchised. Question: who was the real 
elector? In addition there was the irksome task of linking voters in populous 
streets where many electors were living. This would have been particularly 
gruelling when scrutinizing those sections of the census films which were 
characterized by fading, scratches and poor script.
However the drawback was considerably assuaged by reference to the extant 
published electoral registers of the period, which usually recorded the house 
number of each enfranchised individua|7. Utilizing these sources fully often 
necessitated reference to more than one register (eg. the registers for 1860 
and 1861 were used for the 1861 voters) as a significant tendency for electors 
to move house appears to have characterised the period. Electoral registers 
are likely to be of a high internal accuracy since, unlike the poilbooks, they 
were official public documents and were subject to annual, contested revision. 
House numbers duly obtained from these registers were recorded on the 
sheets in the 'address' column using red ink. However electoral registers were 
of no help regarding the outvoters because, like the poilbooks, only the 
elector's village was usually recorded. An effect of this was that a number of 
outvoters had to be discounted from the analysis, and the tendency for many 
individuals within a single village to bear identical names exacerbated the level 
of uncertainty. For example in 1861 one 'Daniel Palmer*, a framework knitter, 
appeared in the poiibook as a non-resident freeman living in the village of 
Belgrave. But the 1861 census revealed two Daniel Palmers, living in 
separate Belgrave residences, both of whom were framework knitters. In this 
particular case, for an analysis of social class, based on the criteria set out in
7. Reference Ubrary, Bishop Street, Leicester.
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section (ii) of this chapter, it was of no matter because both were engaged in 
the same occupation and neither were employers of any kind. But one was 65 
years of age and the other 31, which therefore ruled out 'Daniel Palmer* in the 
political generational part of the analysis. A similar example occurred in 
Belgrave in 1852 with a single poiibook, 'John Bentley* -  a framework knitter. 
The 1851 census revealed three John Bentleys, all framework knitters, but 
with ages of 32,42 and 67 years respectively.
But with borough and outvoters alike there was the distinct possibility that 
occasionally the son may have been mistaken for the father, when the former 
resided with the latter. This should not have occurred in the case of the £10 
householder, but was a risk where freeman status combined with identical 
occupations and (as was so often the case) identical Christian names. There 
was also likelihood of error when the election was held after the census to 
which it was linked: eg. the father appears in the 1851 census but dies before 
the elections of 1852 and 1857, whilst his son becomes enfranchised during 
the intervening period. But conversely where the election precedes the 
census (eg. the 1847 election) the enfranchised father dies and thus only the 
son's name appears at the time of the decennial census of 1851. Therefore 
whilst it would appear that an element of error was inherent in the linkage, it 
would not produce bias because these inaccuracies would tend to balance out 
over the linkage programme as a whole.
The overall scheme, then, was to attempt to link the entire poiibook data for 
the five parliamentary elections between 1847 and 1861 to the census data. 
In the case of the 1847 and 1852 elections these were linked to the 1851 
census, whilst the 1861 census was used in conjunction with the 1859 and
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1861 elections. Regarding the 1857 election, it was decided to link the 
poiibook data separately to both the 1851 and 1861 censuses. This seemed 
appropriate because the possible differences in outcome from the dual 
analysis might serve to demonstrate the limitations of the whole procedure. 
The effects of this are discussed later in the chapter.
Information gleaned from the census returns was duly recorded alongside the 
pollbook/electoral register data on the sheets. It will be observed that a 
column is provided for 'household size': this was adjudged to comprise the 
householder and family, lodgers and resident apprentices, but excluding 
resident domestic servants. However, unlike the number of 'domestic 
servants' and 'other empioyees' (the latter of which included all apprentices), 
the household size factor was not utiiized in assessing the social class of the 
individual voter. During the data-gathering stage of the research I did 
entertain the idea of expressing social class along the lines of Royle who, 
following others such as Armstrong and Tillot, devised a five-fold social 
stratification scheme which hinged upon a subtie relationship between 
occupation, numbers of employees and numbers of domestic servants relative 
to household size. Hence the column headed 'R.C.' (Royle's class)8. 
However, such an analysis would have been prone to criticism on account of 
the scheme being devised for the socio-economic circumstances of the mid 
twentieth century and thus, arguably, may not have reflected the reality of mid 
nineteenth century Leicester. Even so I did personally feel that Royle's 
scheme could have been a useful, if not ideal, vehicle for analysing social 
class in the Weberian sense and the main reason for placing it in abeyance 
was due to the practical consideration that it would have involved too much 
sub-division of the electorate (particularly when conducted on an occupational
8. Census Guide, ppl9-26.
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basis) and would thereby render a statistical analysis unreliable. Certainly 
some of Royle's classes would have comprised very few voters once 
segregation by occupation had been carried out. In the end the social class 
analysis presented in this chapter was based only upon a simple division 
between employers (including employers of domestic servants) and non­
employers: i.e. upon the not unreasonable assumption that employers must, 
on balance, have ranked higher within the contemporary socio-economic 
spectrum than their non-employer counterparts, at least within the same 
occupational grouping. Nevertheless the 'household size' information was 
fully recorded and could be referred to in any future analysis of the data.
The far right-hand column of the sheets provided a space for rateable value 
('R.V.'). It would seemingly have been legitimate to use the rateable value of 
the voter's dwelling as an indication of his relative socio-economic standing, 
either by itself or in conjunction with census evidence. Certainly ratebooks 
have been used in determining aspects of electoral behaviour (eg. Davis, 
1972, p i73), and it is not unknown for the poilbooks themselves to record 
rateable values alongside their voting lists (eg. the Newry (County Down) 
poiibook of 18689). However a survey of the Leicester ratebooks did not 
suggest this pathway to be a viable one. In the less prestigious districts of the 
borough rateable values tended to be recorded on a block basis and might 
therefore have been misleading. Moreover information regarding many 
districts is not extant, so this approach was discounted.
Finally, data for the remaining column on the sheets, 'age', was obtained 
directly from the census and written down towards the left-hand side of the 
column, in order to leave room for the adjustment in age to coincide with the
9. See O.U. Course, D301, Unit 8, Appendix.
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data of the election. This adjustment was made on a year basis: i.e. an 
elector who was recorded as being 70 years of age in the 1851 census was 
taken to be 66 at the time of the 1847 election. The adjusted age was then 
recorded in red ink alongside the census age. A comment concerning the 
reliability of census ages appears later in the chapter.
For analytical purposes there is an assumption that the information yielded by 
the census returns is correct. But a distinctly possible source of error arises in 
presuming that occupation and employer/non-employer status of the 
individual elector at the time of the census was essentially the same at the 
time of the election. Although this may have often been the case, it is likely 
that a goodly number of electors' occupational statuses would have changed 
during the interim period. Certainly, changes can be observed among 
individuals from one census to the next -  some becoming employers, others 
relinquishing employer status, whilst definite changes of occupation also 
featured. Therefore although the intervals between election and census are 
always shorter than the ten-year span between the two censuses some 
changes must have occurred, and thus in cases where the poiibook 
occupational description differs from that of the census, the former may, after 
all, have been correct.
Considerable numbers of voters were linked by the method described in this 
chapter, but as expected there was a broad pattern of less success when the 
time-span between election and census was relatively large. The actual 
degree of success of the linkage programme is illustrated in Appendix Two.
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a. Town Residents
Throughout the period there is a clear tendency for the town residents 
to give disproportionately high levels of electoral support for the ultra­
radical candidates vis-a-vis those electors who resided beyond the 
town boundaries. This is ampiy illustrated in Table 110 which indicates 
the numbers of votes involved, the percentages of radical support, and 
the 0 values which express the correlation levels between the 
incidence of town residence and radical voting in statistical termsH. 
Illustration la  graphically demonstrates the phenomenon. As no 
census linkage was necessary to gather this particular set of data the 
entire electorate was used in the calculation.
There are two points to be made concerning the pattern illustrated in 
la. Firstiy it demonstrates the existence of a fairly high correlation 
between town dwelling and radical support throughout the period. 
Secondly it shows that the correiation is strongest in 1852, the year of 
the radicals' greatest triumph, and weakest in 1861 when they lost 
much ground. Therefore the outvoters must have been relatively more 
stable in their electoral choice throughout the five eiections.
b. Occupational Grouping
To produce a useful analysis regarding occupation, certain occupations 
were selected from the linked electorate and arranged into seven 
credible groupings, a full list of which is presented in Appendix Four. 
Admittedly these groupings may contain an element of arbitrariness in 
their make-up, but it was important to provide individual groupings of 
sufficient electoral size to enable reliable analyses to be carried out.
10. See ‘Lists of Tables and illustrations'.
11. See Appendix 3.
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Combined these seven groupings comprise at least 70% of the linked 
electorate in each election. The voting behaviour of the groupings is 
summarized in Table Two.
In Table Two, the 'N' values refer to the total number of votes cast by 
each group in each election. Under these are the percentages of those 
'N‘ values given to the ultra-radical candidates. Glancing across the 
rows it is apparent that considerable fluctuation in these percentiles 
occurs from election to election. But although to some extent this 
reflects the changing fortunes of the two contending political groups, it 
is also greatly influenced by the varying sets of candidates from one 
eiection to another. In 1847 all electors could vote for up to two of the 
three candidates -  two ultra-radical and one moderate. Inevitably 
many, although by no means all, of those who voted moderate chose 
not to use their other vote. Conversely there was a tendency for those 
voting radical to vote for both radical candidates. This expiains why 
(with the notable exceptions of the drink trade in 1857(a), 1857(b) and 
1859) the percentiles all give their highest values in that year. For the 
1861 election, being a by-election, voters each had a single vote to 
give to one of the three candidates, of whom only one represented the 
radical camp: hence the relatively low percentiles. In fact, of the five 
elections only the 1852 (when two radicals faced two moderates in a 
two votes per elector contest, wherein, unlike in 1859, cross-voting 
and plumper voting was minimal) and the 1861 come close to reflecting 
the proportions of radical versus moderate support in terms of actual 
electors rather than just in terms of votes cast.
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Much more important for the analysis are the variations down the 
columns, and beneath each percentile appears a 0  value expressing 
the relative radical support for each grouping compared to that given by 
all the remainder of the linked electorate (whether included in the other 
six groupings or not) for each election. For example in 1847 the 
hosiery trades gives a 0 value of +0.21: if one wished to know the 
correlation between M -hosiery and radical voting, one simply 
changes the sign: i.e. to -0.21. Likewise the correlation between 
Hosiery and moderate voting would be -0.21, and that between non-  
hosiery and moderate voting +0.21. The values of 0 for each 
occupational grouping over the five elections are graphically illustrated 
in 2a and 2b. In this case the 1857 (a) and 1857 (b) results are 
combined via a simple average of the two 0 values for each grouping.
The patterns illustrated in 2a and 2b are largely self-evident. There is 
wide disproportion in the relative support for ultra-radical candidates 
between the groupings. The hosiery trade is clearly the most radical, 
and the clerical/professional grouping the least. Vincent's observation, 
that the drink trade rebelled against the temperance-supporting, 
moderate Liberal candidate in 1857 and 1859, shows up well by the 
relative upsurge in radical voting by that grouping in those elections12.
But the question arises as to the extent to which these groupings are 
representative of the electorate as a whole. The dotted graph line in 
Illustration 2a connects a value of 0 for all votes cast by electors 
comprising the seven groups: i.e. by initially detaching the votes from 
the occupational groupings and thereby indicating their relative
12. Vincent (1976), p97.
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radicalism vis-a-vis the smaller portion of the electorate which was not 
incorporated into them. On the basis of the outcome the majority group 
were not representative of the linked electorate as a whole in terms of 
votes cast. For example in 1852 the remaining electorate would have 
yielded a (p value of -0.13, identical in fact to that yielded by the 
clerical and professional group. This was perhaps to be expected 
since the rural (and thus relatively anti-radical) farmers would have 
formed an important section of the remaining electorate. But the 
relatively high 0 values, even in relation to the seven groupings, are 
very much due to the influence of the hosiery trade electorate: as Table 
Two indicates the voting strength of that occupational grouping was by 
far the largest. This, coupled with the fact that the trade was (except 
for the drink trade anomaly in 1857-9) by far the most radical grouping, 
was bound to lead to elevated mean 0 values. To some extent the 
relative decline in the hosiery trade's radicalism by 1861 explains the 
mean 0's dip into the negative region, although from 1859 to 1861 the 
drink, food, building and other textiles also move in the same direction. 
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of electoral behaviour in 1861 
hinges on the fact that the excluded votes would yield a significantly 
high 0 value: i.e. +0.10. The reason for this at first seems hard to 
fathom, but as Table One indicated the outvoters tended to be more 
stable than their town counterparts. Thus the excluded votes, 
comprising a goodly number of rural farmers, would appear to be 
becoming relatively more radical in an election when the town vote 
swung against radicalism.
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However if, instead of aggregating the votes among the occupational 
groupings, a simple mean of the seven <p values in each election is 
calculated (as shown towards the foot of Table Two), and thereby each 
of the seven occupation groupings are accorded parity of weighting, 
the combination of the groupings is then considerably more 
representative of the linked electorate as a whole. This is graphically 
illustrated in 2b by the dotted line. The groups are then seen as only 
marginally more radical (0 = +0.01) until 1861 when their mean 0 value 
drops to -0.02.
But the overriding conclusion at this stage is that occupation was an 
important determinant of electoral behaviour in the locality during the 
period under study. Nevertheless, whilst the mean 0 values and the 
alternative ways of calculating them may be only of academic interest 
within the context of voting and occupation, they do become 
considerably more important when analysing the relationship between 
social class and electoral behaviour.
c. Social Class
After careful consideration, it seemed that a most convenient method of 
dividing the electorate along the lines of social stratification was simply 
to adjudge all voters whom the censuses recorded to be employers as 
'high' social class. No distinction was made here regarding the nature 
of their employees: i.e. work hands, apprentices, domestic servants or 
even a single errand boy. The only exception for an employer to be 
excluded from the 'high' group was where his employee was a close 
relative. Conversely all non-employers were deemed 'low* social
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class. At least during the early stages of this analysis no attempt was 
made to detach these two groups from the seven occupational 
groupings considered in the previous section. One advantage of this 
particular single line of demarcation is that it puts sufficient numbers of 
votes into each of the two categories, within each occupational 
grouping, to make a statistical analysis credible. Data assembled from 
this analysis is set out in Table Three.
In Table Three, for either class in all seven occupational groupings, for 
all five elections, ultra-radical support percentiles are indicated. The 
'N' values bracketed indicate the total number of votes (radical plus 
moderate) upon which each percentile was determined. But of greater 
statistical significance are the 0 values which appear immediately 
below each pair of percentiles. Each 0 value represents the relative 
ultra-radical support from the low class vis-a-vis that from the high 
class within that specific occupational grouping for each election. In 
this table therefore each 0 value is in no way influenced by any 
variable outside the box into which it is placed. For simplicity a mean 
value of 0 is indicated for the twin 1857 (a) and 1857 (b) sets of data. 
The 0 value analysis is graphically illustrated in 3a, 3b and 3c.
In these illustrations, despite a rather strong element of oscillation from 
one election to the next, a generalized trend towards a stronger 
positive correlation between the low social class sections of the 
occupational groupings and radical voting seems clearly apparent. In 
1847 four of the seven groupings yield a negative correlation: by 1861 
only the shoe trade remains negative, and even then considerably less
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SO. As in Illustrations 2a and 2b attempts have been made to clarify 
this trend and the outcome is graphically illustrated in 3d.
Similar to the dotted line in 2a, the dotted line in 3d connects the 
overall 0 value for each election: i.e. by detaching the two social 
classes and their respective electoral support from the occupational 
groupings and determining an overall 0 value. The points (a) and (b) 
are the actual overall 0 values for 1857 (a) and 1857 (b) respectively -  
the line was drawn to pass through the median value of the two. But 
although the dotted line indicates an overall upward trend, credibility is 
marred by the oscillating pattern. However, this serves to demonstrate 
just how sensitive 0 is! A scrutiny of Table Three indicates that, not 
only do the 'N' values vary markedly in size from one occupational 
grouping to another, their relative proportions vary from election to 
election. These variants, coupled with the evidence apparent in 
Illustrations 3a, 3b and 3c, that all occupational groupings were yielding 
variable rates of movement towards a higher positive correlation 
between low social class and radical voting, were bound to produce 
oscillations from election to election when 0 is calculated in this way. 
The overall trend of the dotted line in 3d might have been more 
convincing if elections between 1847 and 1861 had occurred more 
frequently, but even then oscillations would still be a likely feature.
However, as the dotted line in illustration 2b suggested, a simple mean 
of the occupational 0 values, on an election by election basis, indicated 
that the seven occupational groups combined on an equal weighting 
basis were closely representative, in terms of electoral support, of the
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electorate as a whole i.e. it ran close to the line of zero correlation. If 
all linked voters had been included in the mean 0 value (whichever of 
the two alternative ways the latter was measured) of the occupational 
sets of data the result was bound to be zero for each election, because 
it would, in essence, be a measure of the disproportionate level of 
radical support among the Leicester electorate vis-a-vis the same! 
Moreover this method tended to dampen the sensitivity of 0  by 
annulling the variable proportions of the 'N' values. This principle was 
applied to the social class data by calculating a simple average of the 
seven 0 values and the outcome is both tabulated at the foot of Table 
Three and graphically illustrated by the continuous line in 3d. This 
graph line indicates a remarkably consistent movement towards a 
class-based voting pattern from 1847 to 1861. In 1847 the low social 
class was marginally less radical than the high: by 1861 the correlation 
coefficient between low class and radical voting stood at +0.16. To 
express this in plain man's English, if an electorate comprised 100 
voters, each having one vote, of which 50 were high class and 50 low 
class, and if 25 of the high class voted radical and 25 moderate, the 
corresponding low class vote would need to be 33 radical/17 moderate 
to produce a 0 value of +0.16. In short if the high class voted 
radicakmoderate in the ratio 1:1 the low class radicakmoderate ratio 
would be almost 2:1.
Furthermore it does not necessarily follow that the demarcation line 
between the two classes has shown the disproportionate voting pattern 
to its fullest extent. It may be that too many individuals were awarded 
high class status. Employing an errand boy or the odd apprentice may
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well not have been a hallmark of relative socio-economic superiority. 
Thus a higher set of employment requirements to determine the 
demarcation line might have produced significantly higher 0 values. 
But without further scrutiny of the data this is only speculation.
However as the continuous graph line in Illustration 3d does involve 
amalgamation of the occupational groupings there is a possible 
objection that this involves the presumption that the lower classes of 
each grouping shared a common position in terms of social stratum: 
i.e. that they did form a class in the Weberian sense. Certainly, at least 
in the extreme cases, this is unlikely because many numbering among 
the low class clerical/professional grouping were the sons of 
professional men who had not left home and therefore had no servants 
of their own. In fact virtually that entire grouping would have been 
literate and numerate. The same could not be said for the hosiery 
trade with its ranks of poor framework knitters living on the poverty line 
and often owing their enfranchisement to their freemen status.
But on the other hand, if we assume that the occupational groupings 
themselves represented the real social divisions of mid-nineteenth 
century Leicester, it is not unreasonable to assume that each grouping, 
and indeed the specific occupations within them, comprised the 
relatively more affluent, who were thus largely satisfied with the socio- 
poiiticai status quo, and the 'have nets' who were consequently more 
inclined to support radicalism in the hope that it could somehow be to 
their advantage. This sub-division within all occupational groups might 
conceivably become more acute as the general economic climate
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improves, as it certainiy did, steadiiy, between 1847 and 1861. As 
relative affluence developed individuals became less disposed towards 
being subject to the confines of their occupational group with its 
traditional pattern of voting behaviour. Such a hypothesis does appear 
to be born out in the tables and illustrations.
I
There is another piece of the analysis of social class voting to consider. 
There is little doubt that there was a considerable socio-economic gap 
between low class hosiery voters and high class ciericai/professionai 
voters, if any section of the electorate justified the working-class label 
it was the iow-ciass hosiery workers. The high class 
ciericai/professionai group, on the other hand, would have been the 
upper middle class of their day. Therefore these two isolated groups 
have been compared regarding their voting preferences. The outcome 
is indicated in Table Four.
The upper rows in the table indicate the correlation between radical 
voting in the low class hosiery trade vis-a-vis the same in the high 
class ciericai/professionai group. Although here (p does not increase 
with time, its values for the five elections are impressively high. Indeed 
the peak value of +0.49 (1852) is akin to the correlation between the 
working class and support for the Labour party in the mid 1960sl13 
However, these values do disregard the 'occupational factor" which has 
already been demonstrated important: therefore it seemed appropriate 
to also determine the disproportion in radical support among the high 
class hosiery group vis-a-vis the high class ciericai/professionai group. 
The outcome is also illustrated in Table Four. Very high correlations
13. Butler anof Stokes, pp39-43.
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emerge in 1847 and 1852 but decline sharply after 1852. Although it 
might well not be sound statistical practise the two sets of values have 
been subtracted to give a set of values based entirely on social class 
difference. Now we see the disproportionation increasing from 1847 to 
1859 although it falls again in 1861.
Even so these 'differences in 0' may to some extent underestimate the 
real levels of disproportionation in radical support between electors 
markedly different regarding their socio-economic standing, because, 
even though the high class hosiery group would have contained a 
goodly number of well-to-do persons, there is no reason to suppose 
that that section of the electorate as a whole was on the same level, in 
socio-economic terms, with those comprising the high class 
clerical/professional group. Again there would be a need to consider 
elevating the set of criteria upon which the demarcation line between 
low and high class has been based in the analysis.
There remains one aspect of social class voting to consider. Although 
the analyses presented in this chapter are based essentially on the 
ultra-radical/moderate divide (which entailed amalgamating the 
moderate Liberal and Conservative votes -  a seemingly wise practice 
in view of the clarity of the divide) the research would be the poorer if 
no focus was given to the other political divisions upon which electoral 
choices could have been made. Radical/moderate divisions do not 
offer evidence of voting patterns along the traditional two-party lines, 
except perhaps in the case of the 1847 election. Therefore a further 
analysis of data has been conducted concentrating on the 1859 and
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1861 elections, both of which included radical, moderate Liberal and 
Conservative candidates. The outcome is set out in Table Five.
The mean 0 values at the foot of Table Five are quite interesting. A 
major finding is that in both 1859 and 1861 the biggest difference in 
class support is between the radical Liberal and moderate Liberal 
candidates. This is especially notable in 1861 where the correlation 
between low social class and radical voting (vis-a-vis moderate Liberal 
voting) yields an impressive <p value of +0.21 -  significantly higher than 
the 1861 peak value of +0.16 when moderate support was adjudged to 
include the Conservative vote (see illustration 3d).
This brings low class support for the Conservatives into the spotlight. 
Although as Table Five indicates the low class, on balance, preferred 
the radicals to the Conservatives by the significant 0 margins of +0.10 
and +0.13 in 1859 and 1861 respectively, this section of the electorate 
was evidently less antipathetic towards the Conservative candidate, 
Heygate, than towards his moderate Liberal counterpart, Harris. The 
mean 0 values for the correlation between low social class and 
moderate Liberal support (vis-a-vis Conservative support), when the 
ultra-radical vote is set aside, also highlights this point. Admittedly it is 
barely existent in 1859, but is somewhat significant in 1861 where a 0 
value of -0.06 emerges. Moreover there is, arguably, some 
justification for placing greater reliance on the 1861 data than for that of 
1859. 1861 was a by-eiection in which each elector had a single vote, 
therefore no opportunity for plumper-voting or cross-voting existed; 
the electors were faced with a simple choice between three candidates.
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The overall balance, as indicated by the mean 0  values at the foot of 
the left-hand columns of the 1859 and 1861 sets of data in Table Five, 
yields a disproportionately high level of Liberal voting from the low 
social class, although less markedly so in 1861. But this was entirely 
due to the presence of uitra-radicais candidates within the Liberal 
camp. Remove the ultra-radicals and the Liberals have a 
disproportionately low appeal to the low social class, especially in 
1861.
Ail these findings provoke considerable thought regarding the social 
class electoral patterns in Leicester and elsewhere in the period after 
1861, and the matter is returned to in Chapter Six.
d. Political Generation
Ail electors, where their individual age was discernible in the census 
schedules, were included in determining the average (mean) age of the 
voters supporting each of the candidates in ail five elections. Where an 
elector cast two votes his age became included in the calculation for 
two candidates. The results are illustrated in Table Six. The ultra- 
radical candidates are arranged in the upper section of the table and 
are underlined in red: the lower section comprises the moderate 
Conservatives (underlined in blue) and moderate Liberals (underlined 
in green).
Table Six indicates a clear pattern. The mean age of the individuals 
casting a vote for any of the candidates in the five elections is always 
lower in the case of the radicals. This age difference varies from 0.22
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years (in the 1847 case of Walmesley versus Parker) to 2.59 years (in 
the 1861 case of Harris versus Tayior).
But there are three additional points to consider concerning the 
evidence offered in Table Six. it is noticeable that in the two elections 
contested by John Biggs the mean age of his supporters was higher 
than that of the other radical candidates: i.e. Walmesley in 1857 and 
Noble in 1859. it may well have been that Biggs's standing and 
influence in the town led to his receipt of support from the relatively 
older voters, despite his radical politics -  support which they were not 
prepared to give to the less influential candidates of an identical 
political hue.
The second point to note is that the narrowest margin (0.22 years) 
across the radical/moderate divide -  that between Walmesley and 
Parker in 1847 -  is the narrowest by far. True the Biggs/Harris gap is 
only 0.35 years in 1857 (a), but even that becomes 1.02 years in the 
1857 (b) data, in fact the 1847 difference might be insignificant 
considering the analysis hinges upon census ages recorded in years 
only, although the large number of individuals involved greatly reduce, 
statistically, the individual precise-age error, and in any case a 
combination of the two radical candidates produces a median age of 
46.12 years which does increase the margin to 0.29 years -  about 3% 
months. But the narrow margin of the 1847 result may in itself be a 
pointer towards an explanation of the apparent generational 
phenomenon suggested in Table Six. Parker was a moderate 
Conservative. So too was Heygate, and it can be observed that the
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latter's support, in terms of average age, is noticeably younger than 
that of the moderate Liberal, Harris: i.e. 0.34 years in 1859 and 0.69 
years in 1861. If Biggs is discounted, for the reason given above, the 
biggest age differences always occur across the ultra-radical 
Liberal/moderate Liberal divide: eg. even the smallest margin (0.82 
years) between Walmesley and Harris in 1857 (a) becomes 2.24 years 
in 1857 (b), while the largest disparity (2.60 years) is that between 
Harris and Taylor in 1861. Thus one could conclude at this stage in the 
analysis that the on-going conflict between the two wings of the local 
Liberal party to some extent reflected a generational conflict: i.e. the 
younger Liberal voters were giving a disproportionately high level of 
support to radical candidates.
But there is a third point about the data in Table Six. Although there is 
no difference in rank order of ages supporting the three candidates 
between 1857 (a) and 1857 (b), there are marked differences in the 
mean ages between the two sets of data. This in itself does not 
suggest direct inaccuracy for two reasons. Firstly the two sets of mean 
ages by no means relate to all the same individuals. A goodly 
proportion of the 1857 electors linked to the 1851 census do not 
reappear in the 1861 census, and vice-versa. Secondly the certain 
element of crudity involved in adding six years to the 1851 set and 
subtracting four from the 1861 census ages should not have produced 
the disparity as two candidate's values fail from (a) to (b) whilst the 
third rises. But it is true to admit that among those 1857 electors who 
were linked to both censuses it is not uncommon to find individuals 
only eight or nine years older than they were a decade earlier.
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Likewise others appeared to be eleven or twelve years older by 1861. 
However, in the end the researcher must accept the overall 
truthfulness of census information and in this case the assumption is 
that errors in precise age (and this may well be due to many individuals 
being unsure themselves) tend to average out, and therefore data 
based upon large numbers of individuals can be deemed reliable. But 
since the 1861 census data (1857 (b)) linked 26.6% more votes than 
the 1851 census data (1857 (a)), the former data should be statistically 
more reliable: i.e. the inevitable error due to sampling decreases with 
the proportional size of the sample. Therefore as the initial results 
illustrated in Table Six clearly merited deeper analysis, and as this 
involved considerable further sifting of data, it was thought appropriate 
at this stage to exclude the 1857 (a) data from further analysis: i.e. all 
analyses presented from this point on for the 1857 election relate to 
that portion of the electorate which was successfully linked to the 1861 
census.
The next stage entailed determining the relative support given to each 
candidate in the five elections in terms of ten-year cohorts. 'Cohorf in 
this context refers to the age-group of individual votes cast at the time 
of the election, and does w t  refer to groups who entered the electorate 
at the same time. The results are set out in Table Seven and depicted 
graphically in illustrations Seven (a-e).
These results reinforce the evidence of an age factor in electoral 
choice. As indicated in the original mean age calculations, the younger 
voters did give a disproportionate high level of support to the ultra-
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radical candidates especially when Biggs and the moderate 
Conservatives are discounted. On balance the graphs suggest that the 
proportional change in allegiance hinges, roughly, around the age of 
fifty: i.e. there is no apparent proportional decline in radical support 
before mid-life. Therefore use has again been made of the correlation 
coefficient to obtain evidence of the relationship between the under 
fifty-ones and radical voting. The statistics appear in Table Eight. This 
table is derived from the 'N' values listed in Table Seven.
As expected a positive 0 value occurs in all elections. The elevated 
values bracketed in the row beneath are the values of 0 when Biggs 
and Heygate are eliminated from the calculation.
It would be tempting at this stage to offer an explanation for this 
undeniable age factor in electoral choice, either in terms of a general 
tendency for younger human beings to be more radical than their older 
contemporaries or in terms of the different outlook of the older electors 
born of their experiences of the preceding decades. But, as previous 
sections of this chapter have indicated, electoral choice was found to 
be considerably influenced by urban/rural residence, occupational 
grouping and social class -  all of which at times produced greater 
disproportionation of radical support than is indicated by age. 
Therefore if any of those three divisions in the electorate comprised 
electors substantially different from the general distribution of age- 
groups within the linked electorate as a whole, it might well account for 
the positive correlation between the younger voters and radical support 
in the five elections.
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In Table Nine it can be observed that in the 1852 election the outvoters 
formed a smaller (10.3%) proportion of younger voters within the 
electorate as a whoie than older (13.4%) voters within the electorate as 
a whole. But to some extent its effect is offset by a somewhat stronger 
radicalism among the outvoter young vis-a-vis the young electorate as 
a whole: i.e. the young outvoters give a <p value of +0.07 against +0.06 
for the young electorate as a whole. The key figure in Table Nine is the 
0 value of +0.05 when the Leicester borough votes are considered in 
isolation. The positive correlation between the younger voters and 
radical supported remains, albeit reduced. Even so, on the basis of the 
1852 analysis, this reduction would have been sufficient to eliminate 
the 1847 0 value o f+0.01.
Table 10 indicates that the younger section of the relatively radical 
hosiery trade, when matched with the same age range among the 
relatively non-radical clerical/professional grouping, is marginally larger 
in terms of votes cast than when a similar matching is made with the 
older voters: i.e. 70.0% against 68.6%.
The Table 11 data highlights the age disproportion of social class 
within the confines of occupational grouping. In the case of the hosiery 
trade the older age range contains a markedly greater proportion of low 
class voters than in the younger age range within the same trade. In 
the clerical/professional case the older group contains relatively fewer 
low class voters: i.e. 38.9% against 44.8% for their more youthful 
counterparts.
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These snippets of data presented in Tables 10 and 11 serve to 
emphasize that it could well be folly to draw any conclusions from the 
results appearing in Table Seven without further analysis in which rigid 
controls for occupational grouping and social class are applied. This 
policy was used in the assembling of the data set out in Table 12.
Because of the intrinsic unreliability of drawing statistical evidence from 
analyses based upon smallish numbers of votes, which this further 
sub-division of the electorate inevitably entailed, only the four largest 
of the original seven occupational groupings feature in Table 12. Even 
so care should be taken not to read too much into the individual 0 
values on account of the smallness of the vote involved in some of the 
calculations. Nevertheless certain patterns may be of significance. 
The younger members of the high class clerical/professional group, 
after demonstrating marked disproportionately high radical support vis- 
a-vis their elders in 1847 and 1852, swung sharply against it in 1857, 
1859 and 1861. The younger high class food trade voters behaved in 
exactly the opposite fashion. Young low class hosiers show a slight 
relative inclination towards radicalism after 1847, whereas their high 
class counterparts, having been relatively strongly radical compared to 
their elders in 1847, turned very sharply against radicalism in 1857.
Much more important and reliable are the overall mean 0 values 
appearing at the foot of Table 12. These values are all lower than 
those set out at the bottom of Table Eight, although a distinct similarity 
exists between the two sets of data. On the one hand this difference
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may well indicate heterogeneity across the age spectrum regarding 
occupation and/or social class, but on the other hand the four 
occupational groupings which comprise Table 12 together only account 
for about half the total linked electorate; I.e. there is an assumption that 
the overall generational pattern of the four groupings is representative 
of the electorate as a whole.
One important feature emerges in the results: the disproportionation 
tends to increase when the votes cast for Biggs and Heygate are 
discounted. This is especially so in 1861. The revised 0 value relates 
to the votes obtained by the radical Liberal, Taylor, and the moderate 
Liberal, Harris, in a one-vote per elector by-election contest in which a 
Conservative, Heygate, also participated. But this outcome begs the 
question: 'What happens when the vote distribution is analysed on a 
party basis?' The answer is provided in Table 13. In 1861 we are back 
to precisely the fractionally negative correlation evident in 1847 when 
the election was conducted on Liberal/Conservative party lines! The 
generational feature therefore, like the social class feature, appears to 
be closely linked to the on-going cleavage within the local Liberal 
party. These findings are discussed in greater depth in Chapter Six.
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CHAPTER SIX 
Findings In the Research -  The Religious Dimension
The outcome of the analyses presented in Chapter Five reveals that, to a greater or a 
lesser extent, residence, occupation, social class and age were all influential factors 
in electoral choice during the five Leicester parliamentary elections held between 
1847 and 1861.
Cf particular significance was the stronger radicalism of the borough dwellers 
compared with their outvoter counterparts residing within a seven mile radius of the 
town. Even a summary inspection of the pollbooks reveals that given a Conservative 
candidate the outvoters gave him considerable electoral support. When no 
Conservative stood (as in 1852 and 1857) they would turn to the Liberal moderates, 
although whether this was more from desire to keep the radicals out than a 
demonstration of affinity towards Wilde, Palmer and Harris is open to question. An 
important point is that the non-radical character of the rural areas is very much in 
evidence in modern times, throughout much of Britain. Leicestershire itself is a prime 
example. In the general election of 1987 the city returned all three Labour candidates 
whilst the surrounding constituencies produced very substantial Conservative 
majorities.
Cccupational preference was likewise of significance. The hosiery trade in particular 
tended towards radicalism: the clerical and professional voters were non-radically 
inclined. Again, there is the suggestion of a parallel with the mid twentieth century, 
although there may well be a crucial difference. Cccupation during recent decades 
has been categorized more in terms of occupational status than trade: i.e. occupation 
is classified as higher managerial, lower managerial, supervisory non-manual, lower
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non-manual, skilled manual or unskilled manual. These types of division are akin to 
social class strata and are frequently perceived as such both by modern researchers 
and by individual voters when giving a self-assessment of their own social standingl. 
But most of those mid nineteenth century occupational groupings which are analysed 
in Chapter Five would only represent vertical divisions with the socio-economic order 
of the period: i.e. there seems no justification in attempting to represent the drink, 
boot and shoe, building, food and textile trades as forming horizontal socio-economic 
divisions of Leicester, in this respect the findings simply reflect the conclusion that 
Nossiter drew from his poiibook analysis -  that the various occupational groups gave 
disproportionate electoral support for candidates.2 Nevertheless it is fair to assume 
that those electors numbered among the clerical and professional grouping were, on 
balance, of a higher social standing than the others, while the hosiery grouping was, 
on balance, lower than the rest and certainiy lower than the clerical and professional 
sector, in which case the results of the analysis point to a salient social class factor 
in electoral choice throughout the period under study.
But even when no social stratification based on specific occupational grouping is 
assumed -  when social class is determined by the criterion of employer status (high) 
and non-employer status (low), albeit in a scheme which gave parity of electoral 
weighting to the seven individual occupational groupings -  the analysis indicated a 
steady growth in the phenomenon of class-based voting to a highly significant 
dimension by the end of the fourteen year period, indeed this is probably the most 
important discovery in the research and indicates that the social class factor was 
more, or at least was becoming more, salient in electoral choice than Vincent was 
prepared to acknowledges.
Butler and Stokes, pp69-70. 2. Nossiter in 'Drake', p254. 3. See Ch. 2, pp20-25.
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However a drawback arises in attempting to equate the evidently marked level of 
class-based voting in Leicester during the 1850s and early 1860s with the general 
existence of the phenomenon by the third decade of the twentieth century, to which. 
several researchers: eg. P. F. Clarke, H. Felling, N. Blewett, P. Thompson and J. 
Cornford: have read back into the late nineteenth century -  some as far back as 
18674. As the analysis reveals the level of social-class voting was considerably 
enhanced by the fratricidal split within the local Liberal party. The low class gave 
disproportionately high support to the ultra-radical faction, the high class gave 
disproportionately high support to the moderates. And though the overall pattern 
indicated a low class preference for the Liberals in sum total, vis-a-vis the 
Conservatives, when the latter re-entered the local electoral stage in 1859 and 1861 
this disparity was due to the formidable presence of the radical candidates within the 
framework of the Liberal partyS.
It is therefore somewhat risky to predict what social class pattern the election results 
after 1861 would have produced, since it is well known that following the 1861 by- 
election debacle the Liberals felt obliged to heal their differences and agree to share 
the representation of the borough: i.e. one candidate to be ultra-radical, the other to 
be moderate. This policy proved successful both in terms of party unity and electoral 
rewards. The party continuously shared the representation at Westminster until 
election of 1900. Moreover the 1867 Reform Act would have shifted the class 
balance of the electorate in favour of the low social class, and therefore the politics of 
the borough would have henceforth operated under a different set of circumstances 
than those prevailing during the period under study. Even so it seems feasible to 
envisage the local Liberal party drawing disproportionately high support among the 
swelled echelons of low class voters. The unified Liberals continued to include a very 
influential left wing, as evident in the personage of P. A. Tayior, who replaced John
4. SeeCh.2,pp13-14. 5. See Ch.5. pp126-9,
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Biggs as M. P. in 1862 and continued to represent Leicester until towards the close of 
the century. There is no evidence to suggest that local Conservatism could offer 
anything approaching Taylor's brand of radicalism. It therefore seems unlikely that 
many low class radical voters would have rejected the re-unified Liberal party on the 
grounds that the radical politicians had now allied themselves to what their electoral 
supporters had long been accustomed to perceive as a Whiggish faction. Even the 
disgruntled would have shown their protest merely by plumping for the ultra-radical 
candidate. The newly enfranchised electors would surely have supported the vehicle 
which incorporated that group which had for nearly twenty years campaigned to give 
them what they had now attained, and that vehicle was the Liberal party. Rather it 
seems more likely that erstwhile moderate Liberal voters would have spurned the 
party in significant numbers. These, in contrast to the radical voters, did have an 
alternative party to turn to which was untainted by the extreme radicalism which 
characterized one half of the local Liberal party and which, as evident in Chapter 
Four, was barely distinguishable in its policies from the Harris-led moderate 
LiberalsG. Even if they remained loyal to Harris (who incidentally came to share the 
representation of the borough with Taylor from 1865) there is the likelihood of their 
second votes going to a Conservative candidate. If these predictions did in fact 
become reality they would strongly reinforce Pulzer's claim of a marked positive 
correlation between Liberalism and lower social status since 18677 -  well before the 
1886 split which many other revisionist historians believe to have been crucial.
But whilst such a hypothesis on the local voting pattern of a period later than that 
under study is inevitably conjectural the analyses of social class influences from 1847 
to 1861 do indicate certain important features. The on-going Liberal split after 1847 
was clearly linked with an electoral pattern characterized by a growing tendency for 
ultra-radical candidates to draw disproportionately high support from those voters
6. SeeCh.4,pp92-100. 7. SeeCh.2,p13.
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who were not employers of any kind. This may point to the phenomenon of rationality 
in electoral choice: i.e. the Utilitarian argument that the voter behaved as an 
individual, in an essentially rational manner -  that he understood the workings of the 
political system and had a complete grasp of the issues placed before him by the 
various candidates. Thus the more affluent voter would have had less inclination to 
vote for a radical reform of a system which had placed him in a relatively high socio­
economic position. However, political scientists have long since found that large 
proportions of electorates know precious little about the workings of the political 
systems and the issues put before them. Certainly Cox expressed such an opinion 
regarding British voters of the late nineteenth centuryS. Moreover Utilitarian 
arguments underplayed the social nature of man. It is now a commonplace that man 
is a social animal and that the social groups to which he belongs largely determine 
his attitudes. As three leading American political scientists put it nearly fifty years ago, 
'A person thinks politically as he is socially. Social characteristics determine political 
preference'9. in fact there are grounds for claiming that the majority of those who 
voted for either side formed distinct social entities, regardless of their employer/non­
employer status. An inspection of the pollbooks leaves little doubt that radical support 
tended to be considerably stronger in those wards which were undeniably the poor 
parts of town, whilst the least radical districts comprised the central shopping area, 
the prestigious London Road area and (though partly for reasons other than social 
class) the outlying villages. Although the extent of 'party' organisation in the different 
wards should not be overlooked, and in any case this would have tended to mirror the 
existing political hue of each ward, the voting pattern of mid nineteenth century 
Leicester regarding its wards closely resembles the pattern of a hundred years later. 
In the 1850s the poorer wards preferred the radicals (radical Liberal) and the 
wealthier wards the non-radical (moderate Liberal/Conservative): in the 1950s the 
poorer wards preferred the radicals (Labour) and the wealthier wards the non-
8. Cox,p8. 9. Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, p27.
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radical (Conservative). With the exception of the Conservatives the parties had 
changed, but the social class factor in electoral choice had apparently remained.
However, Leicester was undoubtedly exceptional in this respect; it harboured a more 
forceful radicalism than elsewhere. As A. T. Patterson notes, it was the numbers and 
predominance of the radicals which made the one ail important difference between 
Leicester and other parts of the countrylO. But, as discussed at length in Chapter 
Three, the forces which generated this local radicalism owed little to a class struggle 
in the Weberian sense of the term (i.e. the poor versus the rich). Rather it was 
largely the outcome of the struggle of nonconformity to overcome its disabilities in the 
face of the opposition of the Established Church'll. Nevertheless once the pressing 
needs of nonconformity had been attained, once they had succeeded in scrapping 
the local Church rates, the more advanced radicals, undoubtedly impressed by the 
apparent local sympathies for Chartism, proceeded to turn their attention to franchise 
reform, whilst the more moderate radicals began to think things were moving too far, 
too fast. The former quickly discovered they were on fertile ground. The large local 
hosiery trade had undergone a series of depressions, the threat of the workhouse 
loomed large, and the electorate incorporated large numbers from the low social 
class. Therefore by the early 1850s Leicester enjoyed the right set of circumstances 
for the development of class-based voting, it had what was in effect a two-party 
system offering decisively different policies towards the contemporary political issues, 
especially franchise reform. The options were clear and, for a time, completely 
devoid of traditional party alignments: i.e. during the split the ultra-radicals and the 
moderates were both claiming to represent the true Liberal party. Admittedly the 
relative numerical strength of the low social class vis-a-vis elsewhere is largely 
assumed and is not statistically confirmed. Suffice to say that the 1857 poiibook 
records that 24.75% of the borough electorate owned its electoral qualification solely
10. Patterson, p343. 11. See Ch.3, pp44-46.
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on the basis of resident freemen status. Furthermore these comprised only 11.20% 
of the St. Martin's ward electorate -  consistently the least radical ward of the town -  
but reached 37.11% in the predominantly radical West St. Mary's ward. Thus a fair 
portion of the local electorate was seemingly below the £10 borough franchise limit, 
and yields further evidence of a positive association between low social class and 
radical voting. Electoral qualifications were not taken into consideration when 
establishing a demarcation line between low and high social class in the analyses 
presented in Chapter Five, primarily because it would have placed great reliance 
upon poiibook information alone, and in any case for only two of the five elections 
was this information recorded. Even so an inspection of the West St. Mary's ward 
electorate for the 1857 poll revealed a correlation between the incidence of freeman 
status and radical voting of +0.14 -  higher in fact than the +0.10 low class/radical 
voting figure obtained for the same election using the entire census-linked electorate 
with an employer/non-employer line of demarcation12.
Yet Nossiter, in his study of the North-East, found the freeman voters non-radical 
and attributes this to the virtual non-participation of the labour aristocracy in electoral 
radicalism and the lack of working-class facilities. But there is little to suggest labour 
organisation played any role in Leicester's radicalism during the 1850s either. 
Moreover he reveals that the radicalism of the region was essentially a creation of the 
lower middle-class, the 'shopocracy', largely in response to the upper middle classes 
represented chiefly by the Whigs who (in the case of Newcastle) upon displacing the 
old Tory corporation in the 1830s, then became as self-satisfied and corrupt as their 
predecessors13. But whilst the research presented in this thesis has not delved into 
precisely who performed the party spadework, there appears to have been certain 
important differences between the two localities which may account for the 
contrasting voting patterns. As illustrated in Chapter Three there is no evidence that
12. See Illustration 3d. 13. Nossiter, pp144-176.
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the reformed Leicester corporation had fallen into the hands of a corrupt Whiggish 
clique. Indeed it became a springboard for radical reform14. The whole Leicester 
Liberal party, rooted as it was in nonconformity, stood to the left of WhiggismIS and 
the radical/moderate divide was not significantly related, as far as is known, to social 
strata in terms of its organization. Certainiy there was nothing petty bourgeois about 
the radical leadership of the 1850s and early 1860s: John Biggs was a very wealthy 
and influential hosier. Maybe this in itself goes a long way to explain it. During the 
two and a half decades after 1832 the Tyneside radicals were prone to the hostility of 
the governing Whigs and Tories, and certainly did not have access to the financial 
resources available to their opponents. In contemporary Leicester the Liberal- 
radicals were an integral part of the local authority and included such influential 
persons as the Congregationalist minister, E. T. Miall, and the Baptist, Rev. Murseli. 
The town Tories had virtually disappeared from the scene, while the disagreements 
regarding further radical proposals were a matter of degree, not kind. It was not a 
question of whether the Church rates should or should not be abolished, but rather a 
question of the pathway to achieve abolition. The only real opposition to Liberal- 
radicalism came, naturally enough, from the Established Church. And, as the two 
Liberal wings drew apart in the late 1840s, Biggs, having twice held office of mayor, 
shifted from his unaligned stance and embraced ultra-radicalism. Thus in Leicester 
during the period for which the voting analyses are presented in Chapter Five the 
radicals had acquired money, influence, power and respectability -  all invaluable 
resources which, coupled with a political programme barely distinguishable from 
Chartism, clearly won the support of the enfranchised working class. In contrast the 
Tyneside radicals were not able to make a serious breakthrough until the 1860s.
14. See Ch.3, pp41-43. 15. But of œurse 'Whiggism' is a debatable term: see Southgate, p76.
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Regarding Conservative voting the Chapter Five data does indicate that, like the 
North-East, it was more representative of the whole social strata, in that it was 
somewhat less disproportionately weighted towards the high social class than the 
non-radical Liberals. Even so there is little concrete evidence to suggest that the 
party was making serious inroads among the low social class. Whilst a scrutiny of the 
election returns does point to some support among the lowest class (eg. it is not 
uncommon to find a town resident, described as a 'labourer*, registering a 
Conservative vote) there seems no grounds for supposing the Conservatives could 
have benefited from a lowering of the franchise qualification. However, this 
conclusion, which runs contrary to what Disraeli was thinking at the time, is based 
purely on the pattern of voting on the part of the enfranchised. It merely assumes 
that the unqualified would have followed suit.
Of those electors who voted Conservative in 1859 about a third did not use their 
second vote in support of any of the other three Liberal candidates. Most of those 
who did voted, not surprisingly, for Harris. This feature was largely predictable and 
reflected the growing confidence of a local Conservative party which felt no need for 
an alliance with the Liberal moderates against the radicals16.
The influence of religious sectarianism on the shape of Leicester's politics is beyond 
question, and as Chapter Four illustrates religious issues appear to have been salient 
during the election campaigns between 1847 and 1861: the Maynooth Grant, the 
Roman ecclesiastical hierarchy. Popish developments within the Established Church, 
and the Sabbatarian question all arose alongside the more perennial issues of Church 
rates and disestablishment17. But for reasons explained in Chapter Two the nature 
of religious data provides little opportunity to produce a statistical analysis based 
upon large numbers of individuals in order to determine the influence of religious 
affiliation on electoral choicel 8.
16. SeBCh.4,pp96-97. 17. Ibid, pp73-103. 18. SeeCh.2,pp3U32.
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Even so it is appreciated that the non-appearance of any data on the religious 
dimension would be tantamount to an assumption that it was of no consequence in 
the decision of the individual to support a particular candidate or party during a period 
when most historical writers are convinced of its importance. For this reason the 
voting preferences of the census-linked clergy were noted and the outcome set out 
in Table 14.
An examination of Table 14 reveals that in the 1847 election protestant nonconformity 
and Established Church are perfectly aligned on opposite sides of the political divide. 
All dissenting ministers were radical: all the Anglican clergy voted Conservative. 
There is nothing unexpected about this outcome, because whatever influence the 
developments of the preceding decades (or for that matter the preceding centuries) 
may have brought to bear, Parker, the Conservative candidate, was a loyal Anglican 
who staunchly opposed the demands for disestablishment expressed by Walmesley 
and Gardner, although Walmesley himself was nominally Anglican.
The 1852 clergy voting mirrors that of 1847 save that the Anglicans were evidently 
prepared to support the moderate Liberals in the absence of a Conservative 
candidate. Again this was to be expected since Wilde and Palmer were, like Parker, 
loyal Anglicans. But regarding the continued support of nonconformity for Walmesley 
and Gardner it offers firm evidence of a contemporarily strong connexion between 
radicalism and dissent. On the basis of the 1847 election it would be possible to 
argue that the dissenting ministers were merely voting as Liberals: in 1852 they had 
the choice between moderation and radicalism within the Liberal framework, and they 
opted for radicalism.
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In 1857 the pattern is somewhat less clear-cut. Of the eight Anglican votes cast, 
seven were given to Harris and, given the views expressed by the three candidates 
on matters of religious concern, this outcome was predictable. Harris was an 
Anglican who opposed disestablishment: Biggs was a dissenter who, like
Walmesley, advocated disestablishment. Admittedly one Anglican cast his second 
vote for Biggs but this may perhaps have been an anti-Walmesley gesture. 
Significantly neither church nor chapel gave any support to Walmesley. In the 
Church case this only reflected the earlier pattern, but his total loss of nonconformist 
support was surely due to his unorthodox Sabbath outlook. Even before the election 
took place the dissenters had pledged their support to Harris -  a decision made 
easier for them by Harris's opposition to the principle of Church rates. It would not be 
easy on the evidence of the 1857 election, set against a background of the earlier 
elections, to perceive a sudden nonconformist shift away from political radicalism 
because they remained loyal to Biggs, given that except for the 'Sunday League' 
question there was in matters of political policy little to choose between Biggs and 
Walmesley. Nevertheless the giving of their second vote to Biggs may have been an 
outcome of his outstanding influence in the town, for, as pointed out in Chapter Four, 
Biggs was seldom subject to the forceful attacks levelled against his radical 
colleagues19.
The 1859 election saw the Anglicans supporting the Conservative, Heygate, 
although three continued to support Harris also. Their solitary vote for Dr. Noble is 
understandable as Noble was a loyal Anglican except that, like Harris, he opposed 
Church rates. The general tendency of the Anglican clergy to prefer, when given the 
opportunity. Conservatism tempered with lesser, yet significant, support for moderate 
Liberalism mirrors the general pattern among Conservative supporters in the 1859 
election. For example, of the 1,239 pollbook-computed regular Conservative
19. SeeCh.4,p87.
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supporters who chose Heygate, 34% were plumpers (none of them plumped for 
Harris), 54% paired with Harris and only 12% paired with one of the uitra-radicai 
candidates20. But the election does suggest that the alignment between 
nonconformity and radicalism was breaking down. Whereas nonconformity's 
rejection of Walmesley in 1857 may well have been due to the Sabbath issue, their 
relative lack of support for Noble cannot be explained along the same lines. The only 
possible argument for their preference for Harris, other than as an indication of a 
trend towards their rejection of radical politics, is that Harris was a wealthy man and 
was therefore, like Biggs, influential. Noble on the other hand was merely a 
benevolent, local G. P.. Moreover two nonconformist votes went to Heygate, thereby 
reinforcing the evidence of a breakdown in the erstwhile radical/dissent alignment.
But it is in 1861 that the implication becomes almost inescapable. Only one vote out 
of the twelve cast by nonconformist ministers went to the uitra-radicai candidate, 
Taylor. There are no grounds for arguing that specific religious issues influenced the 
outcome. Harris and Taylor held identical religious opinions; both opposed 
disestablishment and Church rates, in the 1852 election Wilde and Palmer suffered 
total rejection by the nonconformist ministers: in 1861 Harris almost swept the board. 
Yet the only significant difference in their policies was that Harris, unlike Wilde and 
Palmer, opposed the principle of Church rates, and there must be some doubt 
regarding the importance of that difference because the Church rates question had 
ceased to be a burning local issue since 1849 when the Liberals captured the one 
remaining Conservative-controlled vestry of St. Martin, and thereafter Church rates 
payments in Leicester were strictly on a voluntary basis21. Nevertheless it is 
reasonable to argue that although Taylor held no views likely to offend nonconformity 
he held no views likely to attract them either, in this respect he contrasts markedly
20. See also this Chapter, p145. 21. See Ch.3, p45.
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with his predecessors in 1852 who were able to offer disestablishment and Church 
rates abolition as carrots to nonconformist opinion.
There are several points which require comment concerning the information given in 
Table 14. Firstly the Roman Catholic priests' vote is consistently and solidly ultra­
radical. This is entirely understandable since only the radical candidates tended to 
play down the often shrill chorus against Romanism in general and the Maynooth 
Grant in particular which characterised at least the earlier election campaigns during 
the period under study. Secondly it must be stressed that the nonconformist 
ministers whose voting preferences are recorded comprised the 'old dissent': i.e. no 
Methodist ministers appeared in the census-linked records. Thirdly there is a tacit 
assumption that the voting preferences of the clergy would have been reflected 
among the religious sects at large. It seems reasonable to suppose that this was in 
fact the case. Whether the religiously committed followed their respective ministers' 
leads or whether the ministers were being led by their congregations is surely 
irrelevant. It seems unlikely that ministerial electoral choice would have differed from 
congregation to any marked extent. Indeed there is much to indicate that the 
withdrawal of nonconformist ministerial support was a crucial factor in the electoral 
defeat of radical candidates -  Walmesley was ousted in 1857 and Taylor came 
bottom of the poll in 1861. But the same cannot be said about 1859 when Harris was 
defeated whilst Noble achieved an, albeit narrow, victory. Thus it may be that the 
Roman Catholic priests were influenced by their largely Irish congregations: i.e. the 
priests' decisions owed much to the Irish ethnicity of their flocks (none of the priests 
bore Irish surnames) although electorally the impact would have been minimal. No 
doubt the 'Chronicle' and the 'Journal' had considered the latter point before mounting 
what was clearly an anti-Catholic platform designed to woo protestant voters in 1847 
and 1852. Lastly there is the question of the reliability of the data. Certainly there
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hangs a question mark over any attempt to draw quantitative analytical conclusions 
from a mere handful of votes. Therefore in terms of reliability the Table 14 data is not 
in the same league as Tables 1-13 and this accounts for its exclusion from Chapter 
Five.
But having made this point the Table 14 data does seem to point to an overall 
conclusion on the influence of religious affiliation during the period. Although the 
pattern, election by election, can be interpreted in terms of several interlinking factors: 
eg. money and influence, disestablishment. Church rates and Sabbatarian outlook: 
and it would be foolish to deny that specific issues centring around specific 
candidates were of considerable importance, the overall trend is a weakening in the 
association of nonconformity and ultra-radicalism. At a grave risk of incurring disdain 
from historians schooled in the techniques of quantitative analysis the correlation 
coefficients between the incidence of nonconformist ministerial status and radical 
voting, vis-a-vis the Anglican clergy, have been measured. In 1847 and 1852 it was 
+1.0, in 1857 it had fallen to +0.41, 1859 to +0.34, and +0.21 in 1861. This 
represents a massive nonconformist swing against radicalism from 1852 to 1861 and 
more or less coincides with the progressive upswing in the social class cleavage 
along electoral lines presented graphically in Illustration 3d. Nevertheless religious 
affiliation was technically still more salient than social class in 1861: i.e. 0 (religion) = 
+0.21,0 (social class) = +0.16. But in terms of the split in the Liberal party only, the 
reverse is the case: i.e. 0 (religion) = + 0.08,0 (social class) = +0.21.
However as Tables Five and 14 reveal, on a Liberal versus Conservative basis the 
weakening of the alignment along religious lines was highly marginal (i.e. from +1.00 
in 1847 to +0.92 in 1861) and whilst this is accompanied by a concurrent shift 
towards class-based voting (i.e. from -0.03 in 1847 to +0.03 in 1861) the overall
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conclusion must be that religious affiliation remained the dominant element in 
electoral choice on a party basis. These findings are thus in agreement with virtually 
ail historians, who stress the primacy of religion in the political life of the mid 
nineteenth century.
Regarding political generation a number of interesting features emerged from the 
analyses. Firstly it was found that given that the age spectrum did not comprise a 
homogeneous blend of occupational, social class and residential characteristics -  ail 
of which independently influenced electoral choice -  care had to be taken before 
concluding that the observed general tendency of the younger section of voters to 
support radicalism to a disproportionately high extent was either the outcome Of a 
natural tendency of youth and/or the outcome of political experiences shared by the 
young contrasting with other shared experiences among the older voters. 
Nevertheless when controls for occupation and social class were applied a margin 
still remained, although statistically the results were less clear cut compared with the 
social class findings. Seemingly therefore it would be unreasonable to argue that the 
positive correlation between iow social class and radical voting was much influenced 
by an age factor, except to a very small degree. Rather it was the other way round. 
Much, though not ail, of the association between the 21-50 age groups and 
radicalism was due to their disproportionateiy strong presence within those social 
class and occupational groupings which were disproportionateiy radical anyway.
Secondly considering the electorate as a whole, or at least that sizeable portion of it 
which was successfuiiy census-linked, the generational phenomenon appeared to a 
great extent linked to the Liberal party split: i.e. the age disparity on a Liberal versus 
Conservative basis was insignificant in both 1847 and 1861. Therefore there seems 
a strong case for explaining the disparity in terms of the politicizing of the young.
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Certainly at least as far back as the late 1830s the ultra-radical wing of the iocaiiy- 
dominant Liberal party had been its driving force -  the section that had made ail the 
headway. Although this did not immediately produce a decisive split in the party until 
after 1850, when it did so it was the radicals who usually won: i.e. Walmesley, 
Gardner, Biggs and Noble. The sole exception before 1861 being Harris's defeat of 
Walmesley in 1857. Thus there appears to be ample evidence for perceiving the 
radical Liberals to have been the party in ascendancy, whereas the moderate 
Liberals, during a time when the Conservatives were offering no real threat, were 
largely on the defensive, it is therefore possible to argue that the phenomenon of the 
attraction of the young towards the party in ascendancy, observed in the mid 
twentieth century voting pattern, was also a feature of electoral choice in mid 
nineteenth century Leicester.
There are two further points concerning the phenomenon of political generation. 
Firstly it is clear that in terms of age the Conservative vote lies midway between the 
two Liberal camps in 1861. This was probably to be expected. Parental influence on 
electoral choice is recognized as being very potent. As Butler and Stokes discovered 
voters tend strongly to follow their parents' allegiance, and this influence far 
outweighs any generational trends22. Therefore there is no reason to expect the 
Conservative voters to have been markedly either older or younger than the Liberal 
voters as a whole, once occupational and social class factors are taken into account, 
and the mean (p values recorded at the foot of Table 13 demonstrate that this was in 
fact the case. But regarding the Liberal split the otherwise strong impact of parental 
preference could not have operated in the same way because no crossing of the 
traditional party lines was involved. Admittedly ultra-radicalism had been closely 
associated with the Congregationaiists and Baptists, who had since the late 1830s 
outstripped the earlier Liberalism of the Unitarians, but there is nothing to indicate 
/
22. Butler and Stokes, pp49-56.
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that the division in the Liberal party of the 1850s and early 1860s was associated with 
a cleavage along those particular sectarian lines. For example John Biggs was a 
Unitarian m l a radical, whilst several other candidates on either side of the divide 
were Angiicans. Therefore it seems unlikely that a man brought up in, say, a Baptist 
family would have been influenced into voting radical, rather than Liberal moderate, 
to anything like the extent that one brought up in a Libérai family would have been 
influenced into voting Libérai as opposed to Conservative.
The second point concerns the votes registered by the high class clerical/professional 
group in 1861, as recorded in the bottom right hand corner of Table 13. The 272 
younger electors which comprised this group gave substantially more support to the 
Conservative candidate than did the older electors within the same occupational 
grouping. Moreover the positive correlation (+0.30) between them and Conservative 
voting, vis-a-vis their elder counterparts, by far exceeds the other ups and downs 
which characterize the Table 13 data in general. This outcome raises two further 
points. Firstiy it cannot be expiained in the same way as the Libérai radical/moderate 
age disparity because, although there were signs that the iocal Conservatives were 
recovering from their eclipse, it had oniy began to become apparent within two years 
of the 1861 election upon which the Table 13 data is based. Therefore there is iittle 
to suggest that the younger half of the high class clerical/professional grouping had 
been exposed to a milieu of iocal Conservative ascendancy during their formative 
years. But then again for any political party or section of a party to even begin to gain 
ascendancy over its rivals it must surely win votes: i.e. although there is evidence that 
younger voters are inclined to mount upon a rolling bandwaggon it needs a fair 
number of voters to set it in motion in the first place. In this particular instance the 
extent of Heygate's victory in 1861 owed something to a distinct shift of opinion 
among the younger members of the high class clerical and professional grouping: i.e.
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the younger electors were not simply giving disproportionately strong support to what 
had already become the dominant political group -  rather they were providing the 
initial support which made its future dominance more likeiy. Secondly this stronger 
affinity for Conservatism on the part of the younger section of the high class 
clerical/professional grouping, relative to their older counterparts, may in itself be yet 
another indication of the gradual process of increasing social-class influence on 
electoral choice, as this grouping was almost certainly representative of the upper 
middle-ciass of mid nineteenth century Leicester. Whiist the younger Libérai voters 
were somewhat inclining towards the radical wing of their party in 1861 (i.e. +0.07) 
the younger upper middle-class were conversely leaning towards the Conservative 
party (i.e. +0.30). Of course this high class trend may have been in train for some 
years. It is not being suggested that the upper middle-class under fifty-one years of 
age had spontaneously shifted its allegiance in 1861. Indeed change in party 
allegiance on an individual basis has not been a feature of this research.
But when all is taken into consideration it is not difficult to perceive the association 
between radicalism and low social class, and the association between Conservatism 
and the upper middle-ciass. In both cases and especially with regard to the latter, 
the younger electors had played a significant role.
Furthermore in the light of the sectarian mini-analysis referred to earlier in this 
chapter, the moderate Liberal wing had in 1861 become what it certainly had not 
been a decade or so earlier -  a refuge for nonconformity. Maybe this was 
symptomatic of a change in the nature of Liberal radicalism by 1861. Although P. A. 
Taylor did make his own standpoint on religious matters clear (and no doubt he had 
to) his concerns were more secular -  more about taxation -  more twentieth century in 
tone. He had no time for the Whigs and Tories, and by implication he had no use for
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the religious and quasi-religious cleavages associated with them either. He thought 
the nation would be best served by the fusion of the two major political parties in
order to aiiow the reformers to get on with their task23.
23. SeeCh.4,p101.
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Tab le  1 : V o tin g  P references  ^ o f _ î ^ l c e s ^ t e r J T o ^ -'
(18LT-6 1 )
E le c tio n Town votes Outvotes
T o ta l  votes cas t ^OTI,tra.-.
ra d ic a l
Town vo tes  cas t 
(H)
,5to .t r a - -
r a d ic a l
18%T %,28l 72.66 fO .122 k51 45.56
1852 5,007 62.21 4-0.15L 597 37.69
185T L,569 62.71 to.151 292 41.10
1859 5, 49k 53.6k +0.132 k59 28.98
1861 5,2k6 28.22 +0.076 360 16.94
N .B . A U  d a ta  a p p e rta in in g  t o  Chapter 5 analyses a re  based upon 
a c tu a l numbers o f  vo tes cas t and no t on th e  numbers o f  
v o te rs : i e .  i t  is  a v o te -c o u n t, no t a h ead -cou nt.
VOTING PREFERENCE BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPING: LEICESTER I8L7-6I
O ccupational
Grouping. I8 L 7 1852 1 8 5 7 (a ) 1 8 5 7 M 1859 1861
D rin k  Trade : N. I7 L 389 155 225 353 217
ÿ u l t r a - r a d ic a l 5 6 .9 5 1 .7 8 5 .2 8 7 .6 68.8 3 5 .9
-0 .0 8 -0 .0 5 +0.14 +0 .15 +0.11 + 0 .0 3 i
Boot & Shoe:. N 81 165 86 80 142 121 f
^ u l t r a - r a d ic a l 6 9 .1 6 1 .2 6 6 .3 6 5 .0 5 7 .8 40.5
- 0.00 +0.01 +0.02 +0.00 + 0 .0 3 +0.04
B u ild in g  Trades :N 151 313 l 46 170 292 212
ÿ  u l t r a - r a d ic a l 66.2 L 5 .7 5 8 .9 5 5 .9 44.2 20.3
4 - 0.02 -0 .0 7 - 0.02 -0 .0 5 - 0.04 -0 .0 6
Food Trades : N 308 467 227 336 556 403
ÿ u l t r a - r a d ic a l 68.2 57.6 57.7 5 8 .6 5 1 .6 22. 8 .
i - 0.01 - 0.01 -0 .0 3 -o.o4 - 0.00 -0 .0 7
H o s ie ry  Trade:, ■ N 637 1,110 499 552 770 718
ÿ u l t r a - r a d ic a l 8L .8 8 0 .9 7 4 .0 73.4 64.0 3 6 .9
4 +0.21 + 0 .26 +0.12 +0.10 +0.12 + 0 .0 7
O ther T e x t i le s  :. N 233 516 253 286 462 327
ÿ u l t r a - r a d ic a l 7 8 .1 7 0 .9 5 8 .9 6 3 .6 5 2 .8 3 1 .2
' 4 + 0 .0 6 + 0 .0 8 -0 .0 3 -0 .0 0 +0.00 +0.00
C le r ic a l  &' 
P ro fe s s io n a l 
ÿ u l t r a - r a d ic a l
232
5L.3
512
3 9 .5
227
4 3 .6
288
5 0 .0
494
3 2 .0 S e
4 - 0.11 - 0 . l 4 - 0.14 -0 .1 0 -0 .1 5 -0 .1 5
Mean é  va lu e +0.01 +0.01 +0.01 + 0 .0 1 +0.01 - 0.02/
T o ta l  N 1 ,8 1 6 3 ,5 4 4 1,593 1,937 3 ,0 6 9 2 ,371
^ o f  t o t a l  
l in k e d  v o te * 7 8 .3 7 4 .2 7 8 .9 7 4 .8 7 4 .3 7 9 .9
^ A c tu a lly  these percentages a re  somewhat exaggerated because where 
th e  Census recorded 2 occupations th e  in d iv id u a l ’ s vo tes  may appear 
in  more th an  one o f  th e  7 groupings l i s t e d :  eg . ’ Framework k n i t t e r  
& Beerhousekeeper’ would be numbered among th e  H o s iery  tra d e  and 
th e  D rin k  tra d e  groupings. But ’ C le rk  in  H o s iery  t r a d e ’ would 
number among th e  H o s iery  tra d e  o n ly  and not in  th e  C le r ic a l  & 
P ro fe s s io n a l grouping.
VOTING PREFERENCE BY SOCIAL CLASS WrTHIN OCCU^'^CRAL GROUPING: LEICESTER l8^T-6l,
Occupational
Grouping I8U7 1852 l85T(a) 1857(b) 1859 1861
Drink Trade
Low ultra-radical
High $ "
<f) (Low class)
59.0(n= 95) 
5U.U(H= 79) 
+0.05
59.i (n=i86)
W;.U(N=205)
+0.1U
90.3(N= 72) 87.3(N=ll8) 
80.7(N= 83) 87.9(^ =107) 
+0.06
T5.T (ir= i79)
63.8(K-17L)
+0.10
ÏA.1;(n=108)
27.5(^=109)
+0.18
Boot & Shoe
Low ^  ultra-radical
High ^ "
 ^(Low class)
57.2(n= U9) 
8U.5(N= 32) 
-0.29
56.5(n=115) 
72.0(N= 50) 
-0.15
65.6(n= 61) 68.0(h*= 55) 
68.o(N= 25) 59.2(N= 27) 
+0.03
52.3(N= 90) 
67.3 (N= 52) 
-0.15
38.6 (N= 83) 
l4Î4.7(N= 38)
-O.06
Building Trades 
Low 9^ ultra-radical 
High ÿ "
j> (Low class)
6o«U(n= 86) 
73.8(N= 65) 
-O.lli
U2.6(N=202)
5 i.3 (K = n i)
-0.09
56.8(N= 81) 57.2(N=105) 
6i.6(N= 65) 55.8(N= 65) 
-0.01
52.l4(N=l87)
30.5(^=105)
+O.2I4
26.6(N=l43) 
7.2(N= 69) 
+O.2I4
Food Trades
Low % ultra-radical
High $ "
<l> (Low class)
67.i (n=i6i)
69.U(n=iU7)
-0.02
6o.3(N=322)
5l.7(N=llk5)
+0.07
65.9(^=126) 69.5(^=187)
h7.5(H=10l) 45.0(N=l49) 
+0.22
58.9(^=297)
U3.2(N=259)
+0.16
27.5(n=238)
i6.U(N=i65)
+0.1U
Hosiery Trade 
Low ^  ultra-radical 
High ^ ”
j) (Low class)
83.8(N=l499)
88,U(h=158)
-0.05
8i .6(H=836)
79.5(^ =2714)
+0.03
76.2(11=385) 78.8(N=4ll4)
67.9(N=13 )^ 58.6(n=138) 
+0.16
75.2(h=555)
h3.5(N=237)
+0.30
l4l.7(N=58U)
19.1;(N=15U)
+0.19
Other Textiles 
Low ^  ultra-radical 
High 9; "
 ^ (Low class)
82,8(H=15U) 
71.7(h« 99) 
+0:03
79.6(n=28U)
60.3(h=232)
+cr.23'"
61.8(H=110) 70.2(N=151) 
57.0(N=ll43) 58.6(h=13U)
6l.9(N=23l) 
l43.7(N=23l) 
+ O V I 8 ' ■
37.l4(N»l90)
22.6(N=137)
+0.18
Clerical &
Professional 
Low ^  ultra-radical
High io ”
j> (low class)
69.U(n= 72) 
U7.5(n=i6o) 
+0.22
53.2(N=2l6)
29.1(11=296)
+0.2U
U8.6(n= 72) 62.0(h=129) 
Ui.o(h=156) Uo.3(n=159) 
+0.1U
39.8(n=191)
27.i(n=303)
+0.13
20.8(H=15l4)
5.5(11=219)
+0.25
Mean ^ value -0.02(5) +0.06(5) +0.10(0) +0.13(5) +0.16(0)
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TABLE 6
MEAN AGE (YEARS) OF VOTERS PER CANDmTE£._LEICESrER^l8^^
Candidate i 84t 1852 1 85 7 (a ) 1 8 5 7 (b ) 1859 1861
Walmesley
Gardner
Biggs
Noble
Taylor
46.19
(n=8o6)
U6.(A)
( h=786)
46.29
(11=1,453')(N
46.67
=582)
4 5 .5 8
(h=763)
46.33 
(H=1.422)
4 7 .1 4
(H=688)
46.80
(H=884)
46.67 
(N=1,o88)
46.21 
(n=1,038)
4 5 .01
(h=798)
Parker
Wilde
Palmer
Harris
Heygate
46.41
(N=713)
48.02 
(N=970)
48.03 
(11=968)
4 7 .4 9
(h=767)
4 7 .8 2
(h=931)
48.51
(N=957)
48.17
(11=1,031
4 7 .6 0
(K=850)
46.91
(11=1,310)
VOTE DISTRIBUTION FOR CANDIDATES BY 10 YEAR AGE COHORTS; 
......................................LÊfcÊâPÊR'î84t= 6î : ” .......................................
184T Walmesley Gardner Parker
21-30=10 .6 iî6 (N =84 ): l l . l 8 ÿ ( N =  8 7 ) 10. 67^(h=  76) 
31 JK)=2l|..49l((N=194) :24. 8l 5((N=193) 25 -28^ (K = l80 )  
41-50=30.1856(11=239) 29.5656(11=230) 28.37^(K =202) 
51-60=22.1056(11=175) 20.9556(n=i63 ) 2 0 .9 3 $ (K = l4 9 )  
61-70=  8.8456(11= 70 ) 9 .5 lÿ (N =  7 4 ) 10.25ÿ(N =  73) 
71- 8o+=3 . 7956(k= 30 ) 3.9856(11= 3 1 ) 4 . 49^(n= 32) 
T o ta l  =10056 (N=792) 100^(11=778) 100ÿ(N=712)
1852 ■ Walmesley Gardner W ilde Pabiier
21-30=11.7556(11=167) 11.7856(n=i67) io .36ÿ (N = iO O ) I0 . i8 $ (w =  98) 
3l _ 4o=24. 6356(H=350) 24. 4756(k=347)  22. 07^ (k =213) 22. 22^ (k = 2i 4) 
4 i-50 = 2 7 .5 9^ (n = 39 2 ) 27.3656(11=388) 25 .70$(H =248) 25 .75^ (k= 248 ) 
51-60=20.1356(N=286) 20.2456(N=287) 22.0756(11=213) 22 .12ÿ(H =213) 
61-70=11.2656(11=160) 11.5056(11=163) 13. 7856(h=133) 1 3 .7 1^ (k= 1 3 2 ) 
7l-8ot=4.6456(w = 6 6 ) 4.6556(0= 6 6 ) 6.0156(11= 58) 6 .02^ (H =  58)
T o ta l= 10D^(|I=l>-49l )  10056(0=1,418) 100^(0=965) 100^(0=963)
1857 ffn rrlf i Biggs Walmesley
21-30=  9 .8o ÿ (0=  91) 9.4556(0= 8 3 ) 10. 48^ (0= 80 ) 
31-40=21.8556(0=203) 24.1556(0=212) 25 .03^ (0= 191)
41-50=26.9156(0=250) 28 .36^ (0= 249) 27.5256(0=210)
51-60=24.0056(0=223) 23:5856(0=207) 2 3 .59^ (0= 180 ) 
61-70=11.8456(0=110) 10.9356(0= 98 ) 11. 14^ (0= 8 5 )  
71-804-5.6056(0= 52) 3.5356(0= 3 1 ) 2 .2 3 ^ (0 = 1 7 )
T o ta l  = 10056(0=929) 10056(0=878) 100^(0=763)
T^g_%_(Contlnue&)
1859 . . Biggs Noble H a rr is  Heygate
21-50=  6 .1 T ^ (n =  66) 6 ,5 5 ^ (n =  67 ) 5 .99^(H =  57 ) 5 .38^(N =  55 )
3 1-14-0=2 1.23^(N=227) 21.95^(N=225) 19*98^(^=190) 2 2.11^(N=226) 
4i-50=26.94^(N=288) 26.4i^(n=271) 25.55^(n=245) 25.64^(n=262)
51-60=2 5.5W(N=273) 27.00ÿ(N=277) 2 6.50ÿ(N=252) 25*24ÿ(N=258) 
61-70=1 3.94ÿ(N=l4 9) l2.57ÿ(H=l29) 13*55ÿ(N=129) l3*6oÿ(N=139) 
7 1-8 0+=6 .i8^(n= 6 6) 5*5^^(n= 57) 8.42^(n= 80) 8.02ÿ(N= 8 2)
Total=100ÿ(N=l,069) 100^(N=1,026) ' 1Ô0^CN=951) 100ÿ(N=l,022)
1861 H a rr is  Heygate T a y lo r
21-30=1 2.37^(N=105) l5*07ÿ(H=l7l) l6.83ÿ(N=l34)
31 -14.0=22.85^(N=194) 24.08ÿ(N=315 ) 23.99ÿ(N=19l)
4l-50=22.85^(n=194) 24.85^ (n=325) 24.25^ (n=195-)
51-60=22.38ÿ(N=l90) 20.26%(N=265) 21.36^(n=170) 
6l-70=l2.84ÿ(N=109) 11.779^ (H=154) 9*8oÿ(N= 78)
71-8a+=6.7lÿ(N= 57) 5*9^ (^H= 78) 3*77^ (N= 30)
T o ta l  = 100ÿ(N=849) 100ÿ(N=l,308) 100ÿ(N=79^)
Tj^ L E _ 8
CORRELATION OF AGE WITH ULTRA-RADICAL SUPPORT: 184%2§1
E le c tio n 1847 1852 1857 1859 1861
Age-range :21-50 1,485 2 ,9 3 2 1 ,5 6 9 2 ,1 7 7 1 ,8 2 2
U l t r a - r a d ic a l  vo te 1,027 1 ,8 1 1 1 ,0 2 5 l , l 44 518
T o ta l  moderate vote 458 1,121 544 1 ,033 i ,304
Age-range 51 "804- 797 1 ,8 3 5 1,001 1 ,8 9 1 1 ,1 3 1
U l t r a - r a d ic a l  vo te 543 1 ,0 2 8 616 951 278
T o ta l  moderate vo te 254 807 385 940 853
( (5 when Biggs & 
Heygate are  
discounted)
+0.01 + 0 .0 6 +0.04
(+ 0 .0 5 )
+0.02
(+ 0 .0 3 )
+0.04
(+ 0 .0 7 )
T^LE_2
CORRELATION BETWEEN 21-50 AGE VOTERS & U I^gA -R ^IG A L
..................... “SÛPP.ÔRf'*ÎN’"î852r ” “ ............. — —
L e ic e s te r  Residents O utvoters T o ta l
A ge -range : 21 -50 2 ,6 3 0  (8 9 .7 # ) 302 (10.356) 2 ,9 3 2  (1 0 0$ )
U l t r a - r a d ic a l  vo te 1 ,685 126 1 ,8 1 1
T o ta l  moderate vo te 945 176 1 ,1 2 1
Age-range :51 -80+ 1 ,5 8 9  {86.656) 246 (13.456) 1 ,8 3 5  (10056)
U l t r a - r a d ic a l  vo te 942 86 1 ,0 2 8
T o ta l  moderate vo te 647 160 807
/ + 0 .0 5 + 0 .0 7 + 0 .0 6
TABLE 10
VOTE DISTOIBUTigN^BYjft.GE|_J2ATÇHING_0F^2^0CCüPA^^
Age-range 21-50 51-80+ T o ta l
H o s iery  Trade 6 6 8 (7 0 .0 # ) [ 57. 5^ 4 9 4 (6 8 .6 # ) [42. 5#] 1 ,1 6 2  [1 0 0 .0 ^
C le r ic a l /
P ro fe s s io n a l 2 8 6 (5 0 .0 # ) [55. 9^ 2 2 6 (5 1 .4 # ) [ 4 4 .1 ^ 512 [1 0 0 .0 ^
T o ta l 9 5 4 (1 0 0 .0 # ) 7 2 0 (1 0 0 .0 # )
TABLE 11
Age-range
H o s iery  Trade Low Class  
" ” H igh Class
T o ta l
21 -50
488(73. 1# )
1 8 0 (2 6 .9 # )
V
6 6 8 (1 0 0 .0 # )
51-80+
4 0 2 (8 1 .4 # )
9 2 (1 8 .6 # )
4 9 4 (1 0 0 .0 # )
C le r ic a l /
P ro fe s s io n a l Low Class
” H i ^  Class  
T o ta l
1 2 8 (4 4 .8 # )
1 5 8 (5 5 .2 # )
2 8 6 (1 0 0 .0 # )
8 8 (5 8 .9 # )
1 3 8 (6 1 .1 # )
2 2 6 (1 0 0 .0 # )
•M LE ^lg
CORREIATION BETWEEN YOUNGERf21- 50) ELECTORS & ^ T % % ^ 5ÏCAL_SUPPgRT ( l 84^^^ l )
E le c t io n : - 1847 1852 1857 1859 1861
O ccupational
Grouping
<j> N f  0 j) N N ^ N
Food Trades:'. ' D .C , - 0 .0 0 : l 6 l + 0 .0 6 :3 2 2 -0 .0 6 :2 0 1 +0. 11:297 + 0 .0 6 :2 3 8
ft , H .G . -0 .0 9 :1 2 9 + 0 .0 5 :2 9 0 +0 . 07:149 +0 . 11:259 +0 . 14:165
H o siery  Trade: L .C . - 0 . 02:499 +0 . 01:445 +0 . 02:413 +0 . 01:535 +0. 02:436
It H .C , + 0 .1 3 :1 3 8 + 0 .0 5 :1 3 6 - 0 . 14:135 -0 .0 9 :2 3 7 -0 .0 1 :1 5 6
O ther T e x t i le s :L .C . +0. 01:134 + 0. 08:142 + 0 .1 5 :1 5 1 - 0 . 01:234 -0 .0 1 :1 9 0
It H .C . -0 .1 2 :  99 +0 . 04: l l 6 -0 .0 2 :1 3 4 +0 . 12:225 +0. 12:137
C le r ic a l /P r o f :L .C . -0 .0 7 :  72 -0 .0 6 :2 1 6 + 0 .0 8 :1 2 9 -0 .0 3 :1 9 1 -0 .0 1 :1 5 4
It H .C . +0. 14: l6 0 + 0 .0 6 :2 9 6 - 0 . 10:159 -0 .1 1 :3 0 3 -0 .1 1 :2 7 2
Mean é :L .C . -0 .0 2 + 0 .0 2 + 0 .0 5 + 0 .0 2 + 0 .0 2
'
H .C . -0 .0 2 + 0 .05 -0 .0 5 +0 .01 +0.04
O v e ra ll Mean 4 -0 .0 0 +0.04 + 0 .0 0 + 0 .0 1 + 0 .0 3
(O v e ra ll Mean jf 
when Biggs & Heygate 
are  d is co u n te d .)
[+ 0 .0 1 ) c+0.02) (+ 0 .0 7 )
T ^L E ^^
CQRREIATION BETWEEN YgUNGER(21- 50%_ELECTgRS_&_LgERAL_SUPP^
Food Trade H o s iery O ther C le r ic a l /
Trade T e x t ile s P ro fe s s io n a l
L .C . ^ +0 . 05(N=238) -0 .0 7 (0 = 4 3 6 ) +0 . 05(N=190) -0 .0 0 (0 = 1 5 4 )
H .C . (j) + o . i i ( n = i65) + 0 .0 7 (0 = 1 5 6 ) +0. 16(N=137) -0 .3 0 (0 = 2 7 2 )
Mean jzf = - 0 . 00( 5) 
(Mean ^  1847 = - 0 . 00(3 ) )
NOTE: L .C . = Low s o c ia l c la s s : B .C . = H igh s o c ia l c la s s .
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P arlia m en ta ry  E le c tio n  R e s u lts : L e ic e s te r  1814-7-6l ,
18^7 S ir  J .  Walraesley 1, 6^7 
R ichard  Gardner 1,602
J.W . P arker l , h Q 3
1852 S i r  J .  Wahnesley 1,673
R ichard  Gardner 1,675
James W ilde l , l l 6
G eo ffre y  Palmer 1, 11^
1857 J .D . H a rr is  l , 6l 8
John Biggs 1,605
S ir  J* Walmesley 1,%^0
1859 John Biggs 1, 58%
D r. J .  Nohle 1,%9&
W.M. Heygate 1,%79
J .D . H a rr is  1,597
1861 W.M. Heygate 1, 59&
J .D . H a rr is  1,055
P .A . T a y lo r  977
1861 PolTbook/l860-6l Electoral Reg. 1861 CensuG Enumerator*B Book RC RV
AddresB Rome Occupation Ïr/Hg/T Occtç)ation Household
size
Servants Other
employees
Age £p.8
,, - '
;
1
i
j
i
i
1
1
-
-
1
i
'
j
\
APPENDIX TWO
PoUbook - Census Linkage levels by votes cast: ie , an enumeration 
of votes, not voters. Data on abstainers was in it ia lly  recorded but 
not used in the analyses presented in Chapter 5.
-... .
Election Date: 184? 1852 1857 1857 1859 1861
Census : 1851 1851 1851 1861 1861 1861
PoUbook Borough votes 4,280 4,979 4,518 4,318' 5, 497: 5,225
Linked Borou^ votes 1,951 4,254 2,049 2,353 5,709 2,625
Percentage Linkage 45.1 85.0 47.5 54.0 67.5 81.4
p/book Non-resident 
votes 452 597 344 344 459 381
Linked Non-resident 
votes 574 549 258 258 424 555
Percentaged Linked 82.7 92.0 75.0 75.0 92.6 87.4
Total p/book vote k,752 5,576 4,661 4,661 5,956 3,606
Total Linked vote 2,305 4,783 2,307 2,591 4,155 2,958
Percentage Linked ' 48.7 85.8 49.5 55.6 69.4 82.0
Note: Linkage was clearly more successful among the outvoters
than among the Borough voters,despite losses among the 
former category for the reason indicated in the firs t  
section of Chapter 3*  This outcome strongly suggests that 
the outvoters were fa r less inclined to leave their 
respective villages than were the Borou^ dwellers to 
leave their respective streets.
APPENDIX THREE
The » C o rre la t io n  C o e f f ic ie n t * ,  o r more p re c is e ly  th e  *Mean 
Square Contingency C o e f f ic ie n t ,  0* in d ic a te s  th e  s tre n g th  o f  
a s s o c ia tio n  between two dichotomous v a r ia b le s . A l l  analyses  
q uoting  0 in  Chapters 5 8s 6 are  based on th e  2 x 2 contingency  
ta b le :
i e . -
Y
T o ta l  
0 =
X T o ta l
(a+b)
(c+d)
(a+c) Cb+d)
ad -  be
. / fa + c ) (b + d ) (a + b ) (c + d )
F o r example (see T ab le  2) in  l 8%7 657 votes were cas t by  
h o s ie ry  tra d e  v o te rs , 8%.8ÿ o f  which were r a d ic a l  v o te s . The 
rem ainder o f  th e  lin k e d  e le c to ra te  cas t a t o t a l  o f  1,685 v o te s , 
o f which 1 ,0 6 8  were r a d ic a l  and 615 were m oderate.
R a d ic a l votes Moderate votes
H o s ie ry  tra d e 5%o 97
N on-hosiery  
tra d e
1 ,0 6 8 615
T o ta l 1 ,6 0 8 712
0 = (5%0 X 615) -  (97 X 1 ,0 6 8 )
V ^ l , 6 0 8  X 712 X 1 ,685  X 657
+ 0 .2 1  ( to  2 decim al p la c e s ) .
657
1 ,6 8 5
APPENDIX FCXJR
CCMPOSITION OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPINGS
DRINK TRADE:
P ub lican  :
Victualler:
Retired Innkeeper:
Common brewer:
Retired vic;tualler:
Agent for liquors:
Clerk in wine vaults: 
Agent, Burton Brewary Co: 
Agent for Ale:
Merchant maltster: 
Beerseller:
Inn Keeper:
Wine & spirit dealer: 
Journeyman brewer: 
Traveller for Brewery: 
Wine & spirit merchant:
Hotel Keeper:
Brewer*8 Agent :
Ale merchant:
Shopman (Spirit trade): 
Agent-wines & spirits: 
Beerhouse Keeper: 
Licensed victualler: 
Wine merchant:
Spirit merchant :
Dealer in British wines: 
Ale & Porter merchant: 
Agent for wines:
Hop merchant :
Wine cellarman:
Maltster:
Brewer:
BOOT & SHOE:
Bootmaker:
Boot & shoe maker:
Shoe dealer:
Last & pattern maker: 
Clerk (shoe manufactury)
Cordwainer:
Boot manufacturer : 
Shoeman:
Shoemaker:
Shoe manufacturer:
BUILDING TRADES:
Builder:
Plumber:
Timber merchant: 
Joiner:
Retired Builder:
Tile maker:
Bricklayer:
Glazier:
Retired Carpenter: 
Bricklayer* s labourer: 
Mason:
Plasterer:
Slate cleaver:
House decorator: 
Painter:
Caipenter:
Master carpenter: 
Slater:
Formerly builder: 
Brickmaker:
House painter:
Mill sawyer: 
Paperhanger: 
Stonemason:
Journeyman carpenter:
FOOD TRADES;
B aker:
M ilkm an;
B utcher:
Cowkeeper:
G rocer:
G ra z ie r :
R e t a i l  G rocer:
Pork b u tc h e r:
M u ff in  & Crumpet b a k e r:  
Foreman in  g rocery  warehouse: 
Tea D e a le r :
M i l l e r :
Com d e a le r :
C o n fec tio n e r:
T r ip e  d re ss e r:
F lo u r d e a le r :
Dairyman:
Journeyman m i l le r  :
R e tire d  b a k e r: :
Gardener (55 a c re s ):
Cheese fa c to r :
HOSIERY TRADE: ‘ '
R e ta i l  h o s ie r :
H o s ie r:
Loom hand :
Warehouseman:
Framework k n i t t e r  :
Glove m anufacturer : 
M an ufacturer o f fan cy  goods: 
M an ufacturer o f  fan cy  h o s ie ry :  
Dyer o f  h o s ie ry :
R e tire d  h o s ie r :
Fancy h o s ie r :
S tocking  w eaver:
Glove c u t te r :
P o u lte re r :
B is c u it  maker:
P ro v is io n  d e a le r :
R e tire d  P ro v is io n  merchant : 
F lo u r warehouseman: 
G reengrocer:
Cook:
Eatinghouse keeper:
Corn f a c t o r :
W holesale g ro cer: 
Journeyman b a k e r:
M aster g ro cer:
R e tire d  Tea d e a le r :
M aster b aker :
B u tte r  d e a le r :
R e tire d  b u tc h e r :
Fishmonger :
F r u i te r e r  :
G rocer’ s a s s is ta n t :
M arket g a rd en er:
Seed merchant :
M aster h o s ie r :
O verlooker o f  h o s ie ry :  
S tocking seamer:
Framesmith:
S tocking  maker:
Needlem aker:
Warp hand:
H o s ie ry  m an u factu rer: 
M an u factu rer o f  L is le  B e r l in  : 
M an ufacturer o f  Warp gloves : 
Trimmer o f s to c k in g s :
Warp lootnhand:
Cotton warp hand:
HOSIERY TRADE (Continued):
Stockinger:
Clerk in hosiery warehouse: 
Bookkeeper to hosier:
Commercial traveller - hosiery: 
Commission agent in hosiery yams 
Fancy woollen hosier:
Trimmer of hosiery:
Wholesale hosier:
Hosiery warehouseman:
Berlin Glove manufacturer:
OTHER jrgCTŒS:
Operative in worsted mill:
Stoker in worsted factory: 
Worsted spinner:
Tailor:
Draper:
Spinner:
Wool dealer:
Woolcomber:
Lacanan:
Lamhswool manufacturer: 
lamhswool spinner:
Lacemaker:
Woolsorter:
Trimmer:
Lace dealer:
Fancy dyer:
Clothier:
Ropemaker ;
Tailor’s assistant:
Dyer:
Berlin wool dealer:
Hood curtain maker:
Silk Dyer:
Foreman at worsted manufactury:
Glove maker: 
ÎYameholder:
Glover:
Sock hand:
Commission agent(hose): 
Retired framesmith: 
Sock manufacturer: 
Hosiery hook-keeper : 
Stocking framemaker:
Commission agent (yams): 
Worsted overlooker:
Comber:
Woolstapler:
Wool warehouse clerk: 
Bleacher:
Dyer dresser:
Woollen yam manufacturer: 
Linen draper:
Woollen draper:
Worsted maker:
Cotton manufacturer:
Yam spinner:
Scourer:
Scourer of yam:
Silk mercer:
Joumeyman dyer:
Twiner’s labourer:
Retired spinner:
Lacehand:
Salesman of worsted: 
Lamhswool slubber: 
Smallwears’ weaver:
Clerk-wool:
OTHER TEXTILES (Continued):
Wool carder:
Clerk In elastic web works: 
Woollen dyer:
Master tailor:
Manufacturer of tapes; 
Overlooker in cotton factory: 
Flax dresser:
Retired dyer:
Overlooker of shirt manufactury: Woollen rag manufacturer: 
Manufacturer of elastic web: Commercial traveller in lace:
Weaver (unspecified ) : Cotton/worsted waste dealer :
Clerk to Court of taxes of wool merchants :
Bank cashier:
Attorney:
Surgeon:
Surgeon(FRCS):
Collector of accounts:
Clerk in coal trade: 
Borou^ accountant: 
Solicitor:
Solicitor’s general clerk: 
Veterinary surgeon:
Doctor of medicine: 
Solicitor’s managing clerk: 
Architect :
Banker:
Banker’s clerk:
Physician:
Sherriff’s officer:
Clerk of Court:
Medical Practitioner: 
Surveyor:
Gfeneral Practitioner(MRCS ) : 
Medical Practise:
Clergyman:
Dissenting Minister: 
Baptist Minister: 
Independent Minister:
Vicar of 
Rector of :
Master of private school: 
Wesleyan Minister:
Minister of Independent Chapel: 
Schoolmaster:
Professor of Music:
Teacher of music & singing: 
Retired Dancing master:
Gas Engineer:
Roman Catholic Priest: 
Apothecary & Practitioner: 
Surgeon & Dentist :
Artist & Teacher of drawing: 
Captain-Royal Marines :
CaptainWlrray (half-pay): 
Retired Captain:
Army Colonel/Magistrate : 
Railway Debentines & Mortgages: 
Properannuator Officer of ease ; 
Medical Botanist:
Portrait & animal painter: 
Dissenting Teacher of religion 
Painter-Artist :
Book-keeper:
Writer:
Proprietor of Gas, Bank & Guaranteed Railway shares:
(continued):
Accountant :
Musician :
Governor of Borough gaol: 
Registrar of Births & Deaths: 
Registration agent:
Civil Engineer:
Newspaper proprietor :
Incumhent at St, Georges :
Clerk of Market:
Retired Captain in HEJCS: 
President of Baptist College : 
Teacher of Divinity & Classical 
-Literature :
Surveyor of Taxes :
Sub-agent. Bank of England: 
Auctioneer’s clerk:
Excise Officer:
Sergeant in Rutland militia: * 
Engineer:
Town Missionary:
Office clerk:
Clerk (unspecified):
Student at Law:
Mechanical Engineer:
Railway clerk:
Relieving Officer:
Quarter Master:
Newspaper Editor:
Librarian:
Major in Army:
Superannuated Excise officer: 
High Constable:
Publisher:
Life & Fire agent:
Registrar of Ecclesiastical Court:Railway Goods manager:
Officer of Inland Revenue:
Hi^ Bailiff, County Court: 
Chaplain of Lunatic Asylum : 
Clerk of Iron & Brass foundry: 
Waterwork’s clerk:
Agent for Conservative Society: 
Pensioner from Royal Artillery: 
Shipping Merchant ’ s clerk : 
General agent :
Manager of Building Society: 
Superintendant of Railway works: 
Inspector of weights & measures: 
Domestic Missionary:
Newspaper reporter:
Sergeant in Leicester militia: 
Collector to Gas Company:
Clerk to Gas Company:
Clerk to Leicester Union:
House & Estate agent:
Chaplain of County gaol: 
Auctioneer:
Superintendant of Police : 
Parish clerk:
Canal agent :
Agent for paper boxes:
Rate collector:
Police constable :
Staff-sergeant-Amy: . 
Currier’s agent:
Commercial clerk:
Collecting clerk:
Station master:
Private tutor:
Insurance agent:
Vestry clerk:
Commission a g e n t(unspecified)
Chelsea Pensioner (if no other occupation):
Fundholder:
Land & House proprietor: 
Landed proprietor:
Income from houses:
County Magistrate: 
Proprietor of Houses:
GROUPINGS:
Farmer:
Nurseryman:
Tanner:
Marine horse dealer:
Ostler:
Cooper:
Town servant:
Railway guard:
Servant :
Machinist:
Cabinet maker:
Wood turner:
Engine driver:
Traveller in earthenware: 
Gardener (no given acreage): 
Lock maker:
Ironfounder:
Smith:
Fitter:
Engine turner:
Letter Press printer: 
Attendant :
Store-keeper:
Engine smith:
Engine fitter:
Ironmonger:
Ironmonger’s assistant:
Annuitant : 
Magistrate : 
Gentleman: 
Esquire : 
Landowner: 
Independent :
Whitesmith & Bellhanger: 
Bookseller:
Railway servant: 
Labourer:
Sinkermaker:
Tobacco pipe maker :
Rag & Bone dealer: 
Turner of bowls :
Tallow chandler:
Saw maker :
Tool dealer:
News agent :
Haberdasher:
Watchmaker:
General dealer:
Barber:
Hairdresser:
Medical plaster maker: 
Pawnbroker :
Broker:
Gardener’s labourer:
Coal merchant: 
Upholsterer:
Wheelwri^t :
Furniture broker; 
Brazier:
Master model maker:
NOT _INCnmED .00 ÇUEAT lOKAL
GROUPINGS (Continued):
Groom:
Pasteboard box manufacturer: 
Joumeyman coach wheeler: 
Stoker:
Shopman :
Rakemaker :
Law stationer:
Saddler:
Iron foundry porter:
Spring maker:
Gas fitter:
Cutler:
Drayman:
Commercial traveller (un­
specified):
Bmshmaker :
. Day labourer:
Silversmith :
Jeweller:
Fireman (Locomotive ) :
Ramess maker:
Music seller:
Boarding-house keeper: 
Tumer:
Currier:
Carter (general):
Dmggist :
Iron grate fitter:
Chemist :
Boat man:
Iron machinist: 
Dmbrellamaker:
Mechanic :
Steam sawyer:
Coachsraith :
Bone sawyer:
Millwright master:
Clockmaker:
Founder:
Hatter:
Bookmaker:
Railway porter:
Basket maker:
Bobbin tumer:
Scale maker:
Coal carrier:
Gas meter inspector:
Farrier;
labourer at wharf:
China &.Glass dealer:
Pipe manufacturer:
Stationer:
Leather dresser:
Staw bonnet manufacturer; 
Picture dealer:
Braidmaker:
Windsor chair maker: 
Agricultural labourer: 
Blacksmith:
Manufacturer of hat & cap: 
Coachmaker:
Printer:
Leather cutter:
Overlooker in brace factory: 
Bracemaker:
Printer’s compositor: 
Fire-grate fitter :
Box maker:
Chimney sweeper :
Porter:
GROUPINGS (Continued):
8
Carman:
Labourer at Gas works:
Iron moulder:
Milliner:
Carver & Gilder:
Lampli^ter:
Retired Tanner:
Retired Tradesman (unspecified): 
Boots at Grand Hotel:
Tin plate worker:
Bookbinder:
Fancy Bazaar keeper:
Letter carrier:
Hawker:
Pianoforte tuner:
Paper dealer:
Cab proprietor:
Photographic Artist :
Dentist:
Designer:
Billiard Table proprietor:
Flyman :
Musician:
Retired sheepdip salesman: 
Homeopathic chemist :
Boilermaker :
Gunsmith:
Traveller (unspecified): 
Matchmaker:
Pensioner from County Prison: 
Whip maker:
Barometer & Looking-glass dealer: 
Coppersmith:
Agricultural Implement maker: 
Brace hand:
Vocalist:
Retired Engraver:
